473 
772 
C53 
3py 1 



fm^fi 



C ^4^ S E 

OF 

GENERAL FITZ-.TOHN PORTER. 

mr. choate's 

Argument for Petitioner 



"VsTEST ZPOHnTT, 
1879. 



OF 

GENERAL FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 



mr. choate's 

Argument for Petitioner 



18 7 9. 



.C53 



ARGLfMENT OF MR. CHOATE, 

COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER. 



^* Mr. CiioATE said : If the Board i)]ease, I will, as biietiy as I can, oou- 
clude the argument on the part of the [)etitiouer, and reply, so far as it 
may seem necessary, to what has been presented on the part of the gov- 
ernment. I say as briefly as I may, for I have been reminded of the 
advice that was given by Dr. Breckenridge to a class to whom he was 
lecturing on the subject of the efticacy of i)rayer, as coinpared with its 
length, when he said, "Young gentlemen, 1 beg you to remember that 
the Lord knows something." 

I am going to argue this case u[)on the assumi)tion that this Board 
knows something of the evidence which has been taken, and which they 
have been engaged in re(ieiving and examining for a period of six months, 
and especially something of the laws of war and of the rules of miUtary 
conduct. We, who represent General Porter, pretend to know very little 
of the latter subject, and confide entirely in the ample knowledge of the 
whole subject which this Board ])ossesses. 

At the outset, I wish to express our obligations to the learned Eecorder 
for the ingenious and instructive argument wliich for the last two days 
he has been laying before the Board. It is exactly that which we could 
have wished should be done, namely, that the strongest argument that 
could possibly be made upon all the facts sliould be ])resented to the 
Board on behalf of the government before you proceed to decide upon 
the evidence. In my judgment, the best argument which could be made 
on behalf of the government, from the facts presented, has now been 
made. 

More than that, we owe a considerable obligation to the Eecorder for 
the diligence whicli he has manifested in searching for and procuring 
evidence supposed to be adverse to the cause of (Treneral Porter. A 
large part of it consists, in my A'iew, of matter very strongly favorable 
to the cause of the i)etitioner, and matter which we never could have 
found by any search or power on our part, lie has gone further than 
the mere gathering of facts. Every rumor, every suspicion ; yes, I may 
say, every piece of scandal detriuiental to the interest or conduct of 
(leneral Porter, in relation to the events of the UTth and L*9th of August, 
180-5, has now been presented before you. And if, as I hope, notwith- 
standing all this, 3'our judgment shall arrive at a conclusion favorable 
to his cause, it must always be said that the search has been fully ex- 
hausted, and that everything that could possibly be brought into the 
balance against him has been thrown in. 

As it seems to me, nuich of the closing argument of the Recorder has 
relieved us of a great deal of responsibility and anxiety and labor ; be- 
cause, upon the main (luestion of this case, as I have always regarded it, 
namely, the conduct of General Porter on the afternoon of the l*9th of 
August, he has now seen tit to i>resent, for the first time, an entirely 
new view, something altogether different from all that has heretofore 
been clainu^l, and not only difterent, but absolutely anta.g(mistic to it. 
If we may accept him as the authorized mouth-piece of the go\erument, 
or of the prosecution, or of the adverse side which we are to resist or 
that is to resist us, so that we may take the propositions that he now 

1 CH 



presents as final against us, we may dismiss from pur minds all tlie claims 
that liave heretofore been made in relation to the decisive events of that 
important <lay. For, wiien we come to discuss that part of the case, I 
tliink wc shall be able to demonstrate to the Board that the claim of fault 
on tin' part ofCreneral Porter, ;is now in-esented, is not what General 
McDowell claimed, either on tlic former trial or upon this examination. 
It is not what (ienend Pope claimed, eitlier then or in any of the numer- 
ous and varied i)resent:itions of the case that he has since made. It not 
only is not the same, but is absolutely hostile and lepu^nant to all those. 
And, if what he now insists upon does n(>t bear the test of examination, 
that branch of the case will be entirely ended. 

We are entirely satisfied with the view that the Kecorder has pre- 
sented ; but in what light it i)laces those two great generals, who have, 
up to this time, stood in the attitude of accuser and of champion of the 
accuser, it is not for me to say. It does seem to me, however, that it has 
been a litth' ungrateful on the ])art of the learned Recorder, for he had 
a full view of the results of what he was ju-esenting ami of its necessary 
ert'ects ; ungrateful, foi- instance, to (4eneral McDowell, who, according 
to his statements made ujton oath in this investigation, has aided the 
Kecorder in this case, and comiK)sed, for his consideration and use in the 
])reparation of it, somewhere from six to twenty written and printed 
pa])ers. The general intimated at (lovern(n''s Island that he thought he 
was on trial. I <lid not then understand the trne purport of the renuirk. 
But now it appears that he was on trial in the mind of the representative 
of the government, and that by him he has been tried and found want- 
ing. He hjis thrown him overboard in this case, and turned him out of 
court with the utmost ignominy, as I tliink I shall demonstrate to yon. 
And so of (ieneral Poi)e; one would have supposed that the represen- 
tative of the government, now presenting this case for final consideration, 
would have tbund in some of the nuiny, the almost countless i)ublica- 
tions of General Pope on this subject, hostile to General Porter, an ink- 
ling of the elainj that he has now made. But he, too, is treated with 
contempt and scorn by this i»rosecution, as I shall show. Now, it will 
be my unexpected duty, which 1 shall ]n'rform with alacrity, to defend 
these generals ; and I shall he glad that while defending General Porter 
I can <lefend General McDowell, also, from what seems to me to be the 
attempt at com))lete stultitication, which is nuide against him by the 
learned liecorder. Whatever grievances we may have against that gen- 
tleman, howeN'cr nnich we may have reason to coinplain of his attitude 
in the juwious stages of this case, 1 do not think any one on our part 
has ever dared to suggest, or would be willing to intimate that he was 
guilty of the stui)idity and ignorance which is inevitably fixed upon 
him, if you feel called upon to adoi)t the view of the learned Kecorder, 
presented the day before yesterday for the first time in the whole history 
of this case. By what moti\'e is he actuated '? Is it to ascertain the 
truth t Does he believe now, as his argument necessarily concludes, 
that all the charges that were made on that branch of the case before 
the conrt-martial, and upon which General P(nter was condemned, that 
all these serious charges of sixt-'cn years ago were invalid? Does he 
desire to l)ring (Icneral McDowell into disreiaite i? Does he wish to con- 
vert this controversy into a third Bull Bun for that distinguished gen- 
ei-al, as if two wonld not sullice .' I shall, in its juoper ])lace, ask the 
careful attention of this P>oard to the view which he has set forth, 
because, as it impresses my mind, it stamps this whole prosecution with 
contempt, and demands for it the scorn of every intelligent and honest 
man. 



Again, the learned Recorder said — an nnnecessary straAv thrown into 
tlie scale against General Porter — that he had i>ersonally changed his 
mind as to the petitioner's guilt or innocence ; that, having coine to this 
investigation with A'iews favorable to General Porter, he, upon an exami- 
nation of the case, had been compelled to change his mind. AVell, we shall 
have to bear that. I do not think that it was necessary, in his oUicial 
capacity, that he should seek to ])ut that additional burden u]K)n Gen- 
eral Porter's back. ^Tor did it seem to me that the reasons that lie gave 
for the change of his views were reasonable, or woi-thy of any consider- 
ation. You will recollect that he enumerated the causes for his change 
of mind. But as he has done this, it may not be improper for me to 
acknowdedge also, a change of mind in regard to the case. For I must 
confess, almost with shame, tliat for more than fifteen years I Avas one 
of those heedless and unthin]<ing millions who took it for granted that 
(reneral Porter was guilty. Xot guilty, if you please, of the atrocious 
" crimes of whicli he was convicted, because I never knew the exact nature 
of these charges ; but guilty of something heinous and derogatory to his 
character as a soldier. I had taken it for granted, as I believe the mil- 
lions of the iidial)itants of this country had, that a court-martial con- 
sisting of nine eminent generals sitting in judgment upon their peer, 
could not liave foun<l him guilty and put ui>on him the brand of infamy, 
which is conveyed by their sentence, unless he had really committed some 
fearful crime. AVlien he came to ask me to act for him in a professional 
capacity, I was obliged to tell him so; and he said, with a manliness 
which I shall never forget, that he wouhl not ask me to act for him unless 
upon an examination of the record, and upon the facts that he had to 
present, I was satisfied of his innocence ; and further even than that, for 
he ad<led, that if, after taking his case, I should find, as it proceeded 
and was de\'eloped, any reason to believe him guilty, I should be at 
liberty to abandon it. Well, I examined the record. I found that the 
case had not been half tried ; that the trial had taken j^lacein the midst 
of the frightful excitement of war, when party and sectional passions 
were at their utmost height, when the disasters in which the war had 
involved the country had saturated the minds of the people and of almost 
all the soldiers of the country witli alarm an<l indignation. I found that 
there were circumstances most unfavorable to Justice in the surround- 
ings and in the composition of the court which tried him. I found that 
one-half of the main witnesses cognizant of the facts had not been ac- 
cessible to him or to the court at the time of the trial. I found that the 
most able and learned Jurists of the country, in examining the case, had 
pron<mnced that even upon the record as it stood, there was no evidence 
fairly, upon the acknowledged principles of Justice, to sustain the con- 
viction. A personal study of the record satisfied me of his innocence, 
and when I (;ame to examine his new evidence, not only did it demon- 
strate that he was not guilty, but that fVu^ the very acts and omissions 
to act witli which he was charged, he was entitled to the very highest 
merit and commciidatio)!. So it seemed to me to be not only a high 
l»rofessional service, but an urgent public; duty to enter into his detense, 
and to stand by him as long as he needed sui)port. 1 say a public duty, 
as well as a professional service, because, in my view, this is not (reneral 
Porter's case alone; it is the cascof the whole Army; it is the case of 
every honest soldier who marches un(M' our flag ! Yes, it is the case of 
all the people of this country, for blighting as was the stigma Avhich was 
jilaced upon him, it rests upon the Army and tlie countiy, too. [ think 
I shall show you that there never has been a soldier exjiosed to such 
shame and humiliation, and there never has been an army sutt'ering from 
2 CH 



such a brand as tliis; and if it is undeserved by him and by the Army, 
why, as the President has said, it is time that it was reviewed and 
removed. 

The learned Recorder has further said that he did not regard the fact 
that General Porter had l)een for sixteen years besieging the executive 
department at AN'ashington for relief as a circumstance entitled to any 
consideration. But I do. I think that is the first great convincing ar- 
gument of innocence which ])resents itself upon the threshold of this 
case before yon look into the CAidence. AVhy, what could have borne him 
up during all these sixteen years ? Could guilt have done it ? Suppose 
him to have been guilty of the crimes with which he was charged, should 
we ever have lieard of the case any more ? Should we ever have heard 
of General Porter any more, except as bearing his shame to his grave as 
best he might ? Xo ; a guilty man would never ask for a re-examination 
of the charges, knowing only too well that if one-half of the proof de- 
monstrated his guilt, all the knowledge that could be brought trom all 
the world to bear upon the sulyect would oidy prove it blacker and deeper. 
Yet I suppose that General Porter, from the I'lst of January, ISOo, until 
thismoment, has never had a single Avaking hour that has not been inspired 
with the i)rayer that he might not die until he should be al)le to demon- 
strate to his countrymen his innocence — should be able to clear his name 
from this infamous brand that has been put up(m it, and hand it down 
to his children as i>ure and bright as he received it from ancestors of 
honor and renown. This conscience which has been im])lauted within 
us is a great and powerful engine for sui)port or foi' destruction. It may 
make — Shakesjteare says it does make — "cowards of us all." It may 
make the great and gallant general, who has sought and found a bubble 
reputation at the cannon's mouth, qnail at the idea of coming before 
three of his brother soldiers simply to tell the truth. But when it takes 
the shape of what Virgil calls the " mens sihi couHcia recti^''^ the heart 
cons(;ious of its own innocence, it can carry a man, as it has carried Gen- 
eral l*orter, through perils such as have never yet been found upon the 
battle-field, and through years of suffering and humiliation to which 
death itself, at any time, would have been a merciful release. So I submit 
mit to yon that tlie fact that General l*orter has been asserting his inno- 
cence, in the face of all the world, from the moment of his conviction until 
now, is at least entitled to be taken into consideration in passing upon 
the question of the guilty or innocent intent within the breast of the man, 
which, after all, constitutes the very gist t>f this in(|uiry. 

AVell, he has maintained this contest, and upon wh^it ground has he 
ass<>rted it ? 

The learned Recorder is pleased to say, u])on the ground of newly-dis- 
covered evidence. 

Why, not so entirely, if the Board please. It is on the ground that he was 
always innocent, that ui)on no facts that could ever be truly stated ought 
he to have been convicted. And then, upon the further fact that what 
he asserted upon his original trial, and what the court refused to believe, 
he could now demonstrate so clearly that any man who runs might read 
and understand, and must believe it. 

Well, the leained Ivecorder says, why didn't he ask President Lincoln 
to open his case, if he liad such conlideiu-e in it himself.' and several 
questions of that sort have been asked by the learned Recorder, which 
inq)ly a forgetfulness of facts, facts proved in the case on his own part. 
There has not been a President at the White House from the day of his 
sentence to this, beibre whom he has not laid his case; and as to Presi- 
dent Liiu'oln, we expressly ])ro\ed an application on the ])art of Governoi' 
2sewell, representing the i>etiti(mer ; and we have always believed that if 



President Lincoln had not been taken away l)y tlie bullet of the assassin, 
we should have had Justice at his hands. But — and I beg the attention 
of the court to this tact — urgently as he has presented his appeal, just 
as urgently has it been resisted from other quarters. It is not for us to 
inquire or to know who has had an interest to prevent the question of 
General Porter's guilt or innocence being inquired into, but somebody 
has done it. And I rather think that the opposition has come from more 
sources than one. One of them is apparent upon this record : General 
Pope, his original accuser, has always, except u])on one occasion, the 
sincerity of which I do most truly doubt, been resisting the effort and 
inquiry, and has, down to this moment, been standing in the way of 
justice. I conceive that nothing but a consciousuess of absolute inno- 
cence could have carried General Porter through to his present position 
in this case against such obstacles. 

POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE BOARD. 

Now, we have the first result of all these strenuous efforts upon his 
part, the order for the constitution of this Board. The learned Recorder, 
from motives that I cannot understand, and from a view of the case which 
he has not disclosed, has studiously undertaken to behttle the functions 
of this Board. Ah, he says, it is to be regretted that this Board has no 
judicial functions. Judicial functions! A dignified board of eminent 
soldiers, ordered by the President of the IJnited States, and commanded 
to ascertain the truth of this controversy — for it is a controversy with 
sides, as it appears — and he a member of the Board, what object could 
tempt him to impute to it insignificance and a lack of judicial functions ? 
I had always thought that the highest function of judicial bodies, the 
highest aad the grandest, was the ascertainment of truth ; and when it 
takes the shape of the ascertainment of the truth of a point of history, 
which involves the good name not only of a gallant soldier, but of a 
great army, and a great nation, human justice can attain to nothing 
higher. And so it did seem to me that this reflection upon the Board of 
which he is a constituent member was wholly uncalled for. 

Again, he regrets that this Board has no power to summon witnesses, 
or, as he terms it, compel the attendance of witness. Well, who has 
been hurt by that ? Who has not come that was wanted l)y us or by 
the Board ? One man and one only. There is one big fish who has 
escaped from the meshes of this judicial net, the great general who stands 
behind this prosecution, holding up its arms. But is it for the learned 
Eecorder, especially in view of the tender and confidential relations 
which seem to have existed between himself and General Pope, to regret 
that this Board has not had the power to drag him across the continent, 
and to place him a reluctant witness upon the stand, and have the truth 
drawn out of him as by the forceps of the dentist ! Yet these are his 
reflections ; these are his regrets, and I have no doubt that, as I think 
I shall show you, it is General Pope's regret, which the Eecorder has 
uttered, that the suggestion originated from him, that this Board has 
not the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. And considering 
the defiant attitude in which that gentleman stands to this case, and to 
this Board, I think that the suggestion is cool, even for AVest Point, in 
the month of January. 

I submit that this Board has the most ample powers for the discharge 
of the duty imposed ui)on it. For the one thing that we have missed, 
the personal presence of General Pope, I do think we shall be able to 
get along without. I do think we shall be able first to ascertain what 
General Pope's views are, and, second, to put them to a competent aualy- 



6 

sis by eoiiiparisou with the facts as they have been proved here, just as 
well without his presence as with it. 

AUTHORITY FOR THE BOARD. 

Now, if the Board please, I wish to read the application of General 
Porter, and the order organizing- this Board, to show what its functions 
are. 

To His Excflleiioy Ki'THKRI-ord B. Hayks, 

J'residoit of the United SIdtes : 

Sir : I most respectfully, but most urgently, renew my oft-repeated appeal to have 
you review my case. I ask it as a matter of long-delayed justice to myself. I renew 
it upon the ground heretofore stated, that public justice cannot be satisfied so long as 
my a]>peal remains unheard. My sentence is a continuing sentence, and made to fol- 
low my daily life. Yav this reason, if for no other, my case is ever within the reach 
of executive as well as legislative iuteifcrence. 

I beg to jtresent copies of papers heretofore presented bearing upon my case, and 
trust that you Avill deem it a projier one for your prompt and favorable consideration. 
If I do not make il i)lain that I have been Avrouge<l, I alone am the sutferer. If I do 
make it plain that great injustice has been done me, then I am sure that you, and all 
others who love truth and, justice, Avill be glad that the oppportnnity for my viudica- 
tion has not been denied. 

Verv respectfuUv. vours. 

FITZ-JOHX POKTKR. 

Then follows the order of the President organizing the Board : 

In order that the President may be fully informed of the facts of the case of Fitz- 
John Porter, late major-general of volunteers, and be enabled to act advisedly upon 
his application for relief in said case, a Board is hereby convened by order of the Presi- 
dent. 

This is what it is to do : 

To examine, in connection Avith the record of the trial by court-martial of Major- 
General Poi'tei-, such new evidence relating to the merits of said case as is now on file 
in the War Department, together with such other evidence as may be presented to 
said Board, and to report, w ith the reasons for their conclusion, what action, if any, 
in their opinion, justice requires should be taken on said application bj' the President. 

One would think that there was an order from an unquestionable 
source of authority, which did constitute a judicial tribunal for one of the 
highest judicial purposes ever known to history. 

Well, then, at the outset, questions arose how yon "W'ere to proceed, 
and I have noticed a disi)osition on the ])art of the learned Recorder to 
hamper you by technical I'ules and restrictions ; but we do not under- 
stand that there is any reason for putting fetters upon the action or 
power of this Board. What is it that you have to do — what is the object ? 
Truth, is it not ? Truth, and the wliole truth, is the only object; and 
jUvStice, pure justice, is the simple end of it. 

The record of the court-martial is submitted to you first, but in con- 
nection with everything else in the nature of evidence which nni>' be 
brought before you. " You are to fully inform the President of the facts 
of the case," so as to enable him to act advisedly on the ap])lication for 
relief, and to report your conclusion with your reasons. 1 think my 
learned friend, the Pecordcr, might have cudgeled his brains for a good 
many years before he could have framed an order, the sco]»e of which 
would be nu)re full and large, to enable the Board to attain the oidy ob- 
ject which this ]u'titioner in askiug, and, as I believe, the President in 
organizing the Board, lias ever had, namely, complete and final justice. 

Now, the nature of General Porter's claim, I wish it to be understood, 
is not for ])ardon hut for justice only, lie does not ask for pardon, as a 
condemned and guilty defendant, but he asserts now, as he has always 
asserted, his entire innocence of all guilt, and asks that that maybe de- 
clared. Complete innocence, perfect, unconditional loyalty is what he 



asserts for himself, and what we, upon the record now before you, assert 
for liini. 

THE president's POWER. 

And that raises a question, I supjwse, of the power of the President 
in this uuitter of the constitution of this Boar<l. In res[)ect to that I 
liave a suggestion to make. At one time, when General Porter was 
making one of these renewed appeals for executive interference in this 
case, influences, which,. I suppose, were the same as have so long thwarted 
his application for justice, prevailed in procuring an act of Congress, 
Avhicli I will now read to you. It is to be found in the loth Statutes, 
page 125, and is known as "An act declaratory of the law in regard to 
ofi&cers cashiered or dismissed from the Army by sentence of a general 
court-martial." 

Be it enacted hy the Senate and House of Bepresentatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled, Thitt uo officer of the Army of the Uuited States who has been, 
or shaU hereafter be, cashiered Or dismissed from the service by the sentence of a gen- 
eral conrt-niartial, formally approved l>y the proper reviewing anthority, shall ever be 
restored to the military service, except by a reappointment, confirmed by the Senate 
of the Uuited States. 

A law which appears to me to be altogether just and wise, and as you 
see, it bears directly on the question, if ever there was a question, of 
the al)ility of the President in such a case to restore General Porter, or 
any other officer in a like situation, however innocent, to the military 
service, unless the reappointment shall be confirmed by the Senate of 
the Uuited States. Well, now, under that branch of this order, which 
requires you to form an opinion and to report what the cause of justice 
requires of the President, there may be occasion for your action ; there 
will be, as it seems to me, in any event. If, as tlie result of all our 
labors, you find the court-martial correct on all the facts now known ; if 
you find on all the evidence that has been brought before you that 
General Porter was guilty of the charges, you will so report, and 
that justice re(|uires no action of the President. I think that more than 
that would come within your province and your duty ; if you find that 
after all his lamentations he was guilty of all these infamous charges, 
you should not only report your conclusion, but that the punishment 
that was inflicted on him was altogether inadequate to the crime that 
he had committe<l. It would be only a just rebuke to the petitioner for 
vexing the ears of the country, and of the Presi<lent, and of this Board, 
and of the students of history witli his unfounded appeals. I say grossly 
inad(M|uate to the crime conunitted, because, as it does seem to me, 
there never was so foul a crime imputed to a soldier in historical times 
as has been by this record placed upon the petitioner. I desire to call 
the attention of the Board to this : it is not a mere case of disobedience 
of orders ; there have l)een ample cases of disobedience of orders l)efore ; 
it is not a case of treason, for which you can invent a motive, a provoca- 
tion, or an apology ; not at all. There have l>een other traitors. The 
place where we now sit was a witness to a conspicuous one ; but Arnold's 
treason was merely an intent to hand over one of the military posts of 
the country to its enemies. The case of General Charles Lee has been 
cite<l by the Recorder, occurring at Monmouth, in the Eevolutionary 
war, but that was of trifling malignity as compared with this, which was 
imi)uted to General Porter. Let me read one of these charges of which 
he was found guilty ; the third specification of the second charge : 

In that the said Fitz-John Porter, V)eing with his army corps near the field of bat- 
tle of Manassas, on the '29th August, ISG'i, wliile a severe action was Vieing fought by 
the troops of Major-General Pope's command, and being in the Vielief that the troops 



8 

of the said General Pope were sustaiuiug defeat and retiring from tlie iield, did shame- 
fully fail to go to the aid of the said troops and general, and did shamefully retreat 
away and fall liaek with his army to tlie Manassas Junction, and leave to the disasters 
of a presumed deft-at the said army ; and tlid fail, hy any attempt to attack the enemy, 
to aid in averting the misfortunes of a disaster that would have endangered the safety 
of the caitital of the country. 

Now, I challenge the Eecorder, or anybody else, to find in all history 
a crime like that. I do not believe it is possible for any sncli crime to 
be found related. The annals of history may be searched in vain for the 
counterpart of this. That he willfully, consciously, and merely to spite 
his commander — for that is the view in which it was presented by the 
learned Judge- Advocate and by the Eecorder here — merely to spite his 
commander, did hold aloof, A^ith his brave army corps, from the battle 
in which the rest of the army were engaged, with intent to sacrifice the 
rest of the army and bring shame upon its commander and ruin upon 
the country, and perhax)S to hand over its capital and its very existence 
to its rebel adversaries. There is an instance, not in history, but in the 
legendary days of Eome — and in those legends we have ideal history 
embodied — which shows the judgment, I think, of maiddnd as to the 
proper punishment to be inflicted for such a crime. It is related that in 
the days of Tullus Hostilius a conquered king of the Albans, Mettius 
Fufetius by name, whom he had placed as corps commander in charge 
of one of the armies of Eome, went out with him to the contest with the 
Yeientians, and the legend states that he stood aloof while the armies 
were engaged, in order that the anny of Eome might be vanquished. 
jSTow you liaAC observed that that had not the elements of crime here 
imi)uted ; it was not the case of a man who had been a loyal subject and 
a general of his own army, but it was that of a conquered king who had 
been trusted Avith a command. What did Tullus do with him ? 

So when the Eomans had won the battle, Tullus called the Albans together as if 
he Avere goiiig to make a speech to tliem, and tliey came to liear him. as was the cus- 
tom, without tlieir arms; and t-he Eoman soldiers gathered around them, and they 
could neither tight nor escape. Then Tullus took Mettius and bound hiiu between 
two chariots, and drove the chariots different ways and t<ne him asunder. 

And in my Judgment no less than that would have been an adequate 
punishment of such atrocious crimes as were imputed to General Porter. 

DISPARITY BETWEEX OFFENSE AND PUNISHMENT. 

Now, we call the observation of the Board to the startling difference 
between the guilt that was imputed and the punishment that Avas im- 
posed in this case. As one of the secrets of history it will probably never 
be exi)laiued how it could be that the court-martial regarded him as 
guilty of such a crime and yet merely dismissed him from service, and 
declared him to be forever disqualified from holding any office of honor 
or profit under the Tnited iStates. The sentence itself confesses the in- 
justice of the conviction. If it was for the punishment of the offender, 
it was wholly, as everybody sees, inade(|uate; but if there was an indirect 
purpose in that prosecution, if he was a sacrifice to the dicipline pf other 
men, of other generals, and other soldieis, that might ex])lain a thing 
Avhich otherwise is .so mysterious. And perhaps tlie learned Eecorder 
Avill not ((uarrel with the autliority which I now cite on that subject, 
which is tlie reply of Judge-Advocate General-Holt to the ansAver of Mr. 
Eeverdy Johnson, from whicli he has cited and to which he has so 
stronglj- objected : 

The wonder of military men, who uuderstand rlic atrocity of Porter's otfense in all 
its bearings, is. not that he was condemned, but that his life was sjiared. The court- 
martial might well have sentenced him to death, and they forbore to do so, in all prob- 



9 

ability, only l»ecans(^ tlioy felt that, as a walking, blasted monument of treachery to his 
country's llag, he ■would be a warning to others, far more effective than any voice 
which could issue from the depths of his dishonored but perhaps forgotten grave. 

Does not the Judge-Advorate-General here reveal the true inwardness 
of the action of the conrt-niartial '? 

If Porter was tried and sentenced and punished for the snpposed 
crimes or a]>prehended crimes of otlier men, we can understand it. If 
lie was sacrificed to tlie discipline of the Army of which he had formed 
a glorious part, even that, lilce death and wounds, is something which a 
patriot soldier can bear. It may be that we shall have occasion to ex- 
amine that very question a little further, because, as it does seem to us, 
that must be the explanation of the otherwise extraordinary judgment 
of the court-martial. This case has often called up to public recollection 
and comment the case of Admiral Byng, wlio, in the middle of the last 
century, was court-nmrtialed for a supi^osed failure on his part to do his 
utmost "\Aiien proceeding with a British tleet for the relief of the island 
of Minorca, that was besieged by the French. He was not guilty. He, 
too, was a brave and gallant soldier, faithful to his country's flag, but 
he was chargeable with an error of judgment in not pressing the French 
fleet with all his power, as his brother soldiers assembled in court-mar- 
tial felt that he might and should have done. There is, however, this 
remarkable difference between J:>yng's case and Porter's case: The court 
that declared the former innocent, condemned him to be shot, and he 
was shot — shot, in obedience to a supposed governmental necessity, to 
appease the bowlings of the British mob, for the court expressly declared 
he had been guilty of no cowardice, of no treacthery, of no evil intent. 
Yet, being instructed that the imperative nature of the article of war 
bearing upon the subject, if they found that he did not do his utmost, 
permittted no sentence short of death, they sentenced him ; 'and, the 
king and the ministry not being brave enough to stand up against the 
brutal demands of the British public, he was led out and shot like a 
traitor. The government, in spite of the eloquent appeals of William 
Pitt, deliberately sacrificed him to the mob, who had burned his eiflgy 
in every town in England, and had placarded all the streets of London 
with the startling threat, "Hang Byng, or look out for your king!" 
Well, as it seems to me, to a brave soldier, Byng's late was a light pun- 
ishment compared to these sixteen years of imputed infamy and shame- 
ful humiliation which Porter has borne, and so Byng thought, for when 
he heard of the judgment of the court, he said, " What! have they put 
a slur upon me ?" apprehending that they had ])ronounced him a coward. 
But when told that it was not so, that they had acquitted him of cow- 
ardice, a smile wreathed his features, a^nd he marched to his fate as 
bravely as he had ever trodden u])on tlie deck of his frigate. But this 
court which tried General Porter found him guilty of all these damnable 
attrocities to wliich 1 have called your attention, and yet failed to impose 
any punisliment at all in proportion to the magnitude of the offense. 

And now, suppose, on the other hand, after giving all weight to the 
judgment of tlie court-martial and its proceedings, you find General 
Porter innocent. You must ]»roteHl further under the instructions of 
the order organizing the Board and requiring it to report; and as a nec- 
essary' part of your investigation, and especially as bearing upon the 
question of the weight whicli you are to give to the proceedings of the 
court-martial, the imi)oitant (|uestion must be answered, how, being 
innocent, so far as tlie record discloses, he came to be convicted. Jus- 
tice to Porter, justice to the country, justice to the action of the court 
will require at least a recognition of that <iuestion. If there were cir- 
cumstances surrounding the court, or in its coinjiosition, or in the iieces- 



10 

sary haste imposed on its action by the exigencies of the service, or in 
the imperfect facts before them, or in the rules of evidence ap})lied by 
tliem, unfavorable to justice, it is important to know it — for you, for the 
President, for the country to know it — for the jturpose of determining 
how mucli you ouglit to regard yourselves as con<strained, as guided by 
their conclusions. And so, as to the action of President Lincoln, entitled 
in the eye of every American, in the judgment of history, to the very 
first merit as an authority. 

CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH PORTER WAS TRIED BEFORE. 

I ask you, first, to consider briefly the cii'cumstanccs under which the 
court-martial convened, with a view to the (]uestion whether they were 
favorable to a just trial of the cause. If they were, it lends a support 
to the judgment of that tribunal which it will require all the more 
comi)lcte demonstration of tiiith on the part of General Porter now to 
overcome. A\'ell, a\ e knew that it did not need any evidence to bring 
before you the circumstances under which the court assenn)led; and I 
submit to you that they were most unfavorable to tlie consideration of 
sucli a case or to the administration of justice ujion the particular ques- 
tions raised. This brings into view the whole previous history of the 
war in Virginia, but which need not occuf)y the attention of this Board 
for more than a few minutes. 

The breaking out of tlie war of the rebellion, as everybody knows, 
found this government and country in a state of absolute destitution as 
to i)rei)aration for wai-. The first efforts and struggles on tlie i)art of the 
government to sustain itself were of the most painful character ; and 
])articularly is this true of the history of the war in Virginia, where 
these transactions occurred on the 29th of August, 1802. This has a 
bearingu])onthecircumstances that surrcmnded this court-martial. AVho 
has forgotten tht mortification and humiliation in which the first cam- 
paign in Virginia resulted ? The whole campaign, if it may be called a 
campaign, in 1801, exi)osed the government and the country to chagrin, 
remorse, and mortification. AVhile the ])ress and the ])eoi)le were howl- 
ing "On to llichmoiKr' with ten million voices, our arms in Virginia 
s(M'med almost ])araly/,e<l. The story of the first J)ull Pun and of the 
Fe«leral Army waiting before the cpiaker guns of ^lanassas, is a tyi^e 
and a picture of the whole history of that year. Then the government, 
and its gallant generals who had rallied to its sui)]>ort, devoted them- 
selves to the great work of prei)aration ; the Army of the Potomac was 
organized, and the campaign of that army f(n- 18(i2, for the next year, 
was set on foot. It was suitjjosed to be the best organized and the 
greatest anny that ever, on this continent, sallied forth, and all the hopes 
and all the boastful promises and expectations of the goveriunent and 
of the peo])le were staked upon it. Put it is not too nuu'h to say that 
its career was another history of disap])ointnu'nt and mortification. AVho 
can ever forget the doleful stories that came from the swanii)s of the 
Chickahouiiny, and the ]>alsy that seemed to rest upon the country when 
the final step of a retreat to the James Piver was taken ? There were 
redeeming features in the view of the government of the distressing his- 
tory of that ]>eriod. There were two bright days: there Avas the day at 
Gaines' ^lill. and that other day at ^Malvern Hill, when it is not too 
much to say that the services of the i)etitio:ier Avere the most brilliant 
of all the great and brave achievements of its record. 

J>nt that army got back to James Piver, and in the judgment of the 
government and of the country, nothing useful had yet been accom- 
j)lished. 



11 

Well, our hopes never failed us, at any rate, and our courage never 
failed us, and a new plan was resolved upon. 

An Army of Virginia was organized ; General Halleck was called from 
tlie ^^'est and ])laced in command as General-in-Chief, and (4eneral Pope, 
for whom the best wishes and best promises were held forth, was called 
to organize and command this Army of Virginia; and as the next step, 
the Army of the Potonuic was i-ecalled to unite with the Army of Vir- 
ginia in the protection of Washington, and in new projects for the con- 
quest of the rebel Confederacy. 1 need not re])eat to you the history of 
the sixty days' existence of the Army of Virginia. It was another story 
of disai)i)ointment and chagrin ; more mortifying, more depressing than 
all that had gone before ; there was fighting enough, there Avas slaughter 
enough, but in the public judgment there was no result. And noAv we 
come, as I suppose, to the most distressing period in the whole history 
of our contest with the Confederacy. Gold went up and the hearts of 
men went <loAvn, and shanx? and anger possessed the hearts alike of the 
people and the government. Always, in times of great distress and 
dfsaster, I think there is no exception in history, it is the natural impulse 
of the great masses of a nation, the irresistible impulse of the popular 
heart, to loolv out for somebody to blame ; to put it upon the shoulders 
of somebody, for somel)o<ly nuist be to blame. Well, what was the key- 
note of this last imputed failure ? I pass no judgment. I can form none 
in such a matter, but I am looking at the jjublic judgment that sur- 
rounded that court. 

What was the key-note of the failure? Why, it was that General 
Jackson and his famous rebel army, after its capture had been heralded 
as an absolute certainty, was allowed to escape. That was what hap- 
pened, that was the crisis, that was the culminating point of national 
distress and mortitication, and everybody in(]uired who was to blame. 

Do you not know, does not everybody know that there are times, and 
that such are the times when accusation and conviction are equivalent and 
interchangeal)le terms ? Well, there was another Avheel within the wheel 
of the national distress; there were suspicions, there were charges that 
hung on e\ery lip, that were l)elieved by every other man you ]net in 
those days, that were evidently believed by the government, that 
there was treachery, that there was disloyalty in the Army of the Po- 
tomac, and among the generals of the Army of the Potomac, and 
that some procee<lings were necessary. Some example was necessaiy 
that shouhl enforce discipline and (^it out the roots of any such supposed 
disloyalty or treachery. For myself, I believe that the whole charge 
was without foundation ; for myself, 1 believe that they were all loyal, 
and that under any commander, as their achievements l)efore and after- 
ward <lemonstrated, they were ever willing to fight their best. P)Ut, 
nevertheless, this charge was made, was taken up and became a pul)lic 
outcry, and the necessity for something to be done that should stop or 
should i)unisli the sui)posed offense, was in every newspaper and on 
every tongue. The thirst of a great jiation for vengeance, for a victim, 
will always be satiated. Just then, General Porter was accused ; the 
government believed him guilty; (Tcneral Pope, the commanding gen- 
eral of the army, asserted liis guilt, and General McDowell, who was 
next in command, su])ported the charge. And who, in such times, could 
resist such a charge? 

Who does not know that in times like those the mere accusation was, 
from the inherent infirmities of hunmn nature itself, alhiost the same 
thing as a conviction ? The llecorder says that we bring charges against 
the court-martial. I disavow it. I unite with him in all his encomiums 



12 

npoii the distiuguislied geutlemeii who composed that court. I question 
not their cons(.'ientious pertbrmnnce of duty in that critical time. But 
they were ouly men, and human Judgment is finite. The learned Eecorder 
puts it most admirably, and if I had a copy of his opening- address I 
should be under obligations to him for expressing the very idea which 
I Mish to present in regard to that court. 

It is too true that human judgment is but finite, and that there are 
many times and occasions when an innocent man is necessarily con- 
victed. History is full of instances which demonstrate exactly what I 
mean. I mean the impossibility of preserving an unbiased judicial 
mind in the face of an overwhelming pressure of popular impulse or 
popular opinion. The greatest judges that ever sat upon the bench^ 
the wisest and most trained minds who had made law and the investiga- 
tion of disputed cases their sole province and study tl trough a score or 
more of years, have been exposed to the same subtle, insidious, irre- 
sistible influence of public feeling upon them; and it is not in the least 
derogatory to their character as judges, but merely imputes to them that 
they are men. Take, for instance. Queen Caroline's case, a case which 
enlisted the public feeling of every man and every woman in England 
upon (me side or the other. It is a regretted but a recognized fact 
that upon the questions of law raised by the facts in that case, and pre- 
sented to the law lords, embracing the greatest and wisest of the judicial 
minds of England, they always voted upon them, not according to the 
law and the facts as afterwards considered, when reviewed by judicial 
minds, but invariably according to the dictates of that party division of 
the people of England with which, by traditiim and by the experience 
of their lives, they happened to sympathize. Xobody has ever ques- 
tioned the integrity of Lord Eldon or Lord Erskine. So it was in 
O'Connell's case, when England was agitated throughout every hamlet 
and household. There are times when the administratiim of justice in 
the face of this subtle, far-reaching, irresistible ])opular i)Ower becomes 
wholly impossible. And so I say that this court-martial sat in times 
and under circumstances which were not fa\orable to the administra- 
tion of justice; and if any unfavorable reflections have ever been cast 
upon those judges or their action, l,for one, on the part of the petitioner 
and of my associates, disavow them all. We imiuite to them notliing 
but honest performance of duty. 

THE COMrOSITION OF THE COURT-MAE TIAL. 

In the next place, was there anything in the composition of the court- 
martial that was not favorable to justice ? In that respect, my learned 
friend, the Eecorder, has seen fit to comment upon the manner in Avhich 
the court-martial was organized. I think, myself, that there was an error 
conuuittcd. but one with which you have not to deal, and one for which 
the court was ]U)t at all to blame. Let me read to you the law to which 
I refer, the act of Congress of ]May 2!>, 1S3(», which was supplementary 
to an act for the establishment of rules and regulations for the govern- 
nuMit of the armies of the United States, passed April 11), 1800. 

It enacted that — 

AVlionovcr a jrtMU'niloIificiT C(nniii;in(liiijj; iiii army sliall lip accuser or proKcciitor of any 
ofHcrr ill tilt' Aiiny ol' the United Sratis. iiiidfr his coiiiiiiaiul, the iifiicial coint-inartial 
tor tlu' trial of such otliccr shall Itc apjioiiitftl hy the Picsiih-nt of the I'liitiMl States. 

In our present view of the evidence, as it stands recorded before this 
Board, General Porter was bnmght to trial by reason of the accusation 
and jirosecution presented against hnu by the general commanding the 



13 

Army of ^vllicll he was a i)art. If the facts bad been presented to tlie 
President or to tlie conrt-niartial at the outset of its sessions, as they 
have been presented to you, that court, at any rate, would never have 
proceeded with the trial. But General Pope saw fit to go befoi'e that Board 
and say that he was not the author of the charges, that he had nothing- 
to do with them, and so to leave the court under the impression that the 
real accuser and prosecutor was General lioberts, his inspector-general, 
in whose name they were presented. 

Now, as to the object of this law, we dift'er from the learned Recorder 
in his construction of it. We suppose that when an act says that when 
a general is to be tried upon charges presented by his superior general, 
commanding the army of which he is a part, that the court-martial shall 
be constituted by the President, and not by the commanding gen- 
eral — General Halleck in this case — we suppose it is so enacted out 
of consideration for the dignity of the offense and of the offender — that 
if a general officer is to be brought to trial upon charges involving his 
fame and his life emanating from such a source, no less dignified a per- 
son than the President shall appoint the court ; no less imi)artial a trib- 
unal than one created by him — raised, as far as human foresight can raise 
it, above army quarrels and army rivalries — shall be the judges who are 
to try him. JSTow, if that is the proper view of the law, suppose that 
General Pope had gone before the Board, and instead of swearing as he 
then did, that he had nothing to do with the charges, had sworn as he 
afterwards stated in his report to the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War in 18G5, which I have in my hand, for there he liot only boasted of 
having been the accuser, but confessed that he had denumded his reward 
for carrying the prosecution successful!}- through. 

He said : 

I consiclcrcd if a duty I owed io the country to hrinq Fits-John Porter to justice, lent at 
another time, and jcith yrenter opportunities, he might do that trhich would he still more dis- 
astrous. With his conriction and punishment ended uU official connection I hare since had 
with anythiny that related to the operations I conducted in Virginia. — (Supplement to 
Eeport of Committee on the Conduct of the War, part 2, p. 19(i.) 

Now, let me read you a previous sentence from the same report, to 
show his boast : 

In the last days of January, 18(13, when the trial of Fitz-John Porter had closed, and 
when his guilt had been esldhlinhed, I intintattd to tlie I'resident th((t it seemed a proper time 
then for some 2)ublic aeliiowledgmenf of my serrice in f'irginia from him. — {Ibid, p. 190.) 

Suppose, now, that the President of the United States, or General 
Halleck, or the court-martial had known those facts as there stated by 
General Pope, can anything be more certain than that a court-martial, at 
any rate selected not by the President, but by General Halleck, would 
never have proceeded to the trial of the cause ? 

The next circumstance in regard to the composition of the court that 
I have to suggest, without imputing the least reflection or suggesting 
anything in the least derogatory to the members of that court, except 
that they are but nuMi, is tliis — and is in the direct line of the last objec- 
tion that I have made — because T do not believe that the Presi(ient 
of the United States would ever have committed that mistake. What 
was it? What Avas the cardinal thing that General Porter was accused 
of! What Avas it that tlie rage of the country was to be ai)peased 
about! Why, it Avas letting Jackson escape, was it not — Jackson witli 
his army, after the '-'bagging of the whole crowd" had been most 
felicitously and publicly proclaimed ? Noav, from the facts that have 
been spread and confessed before this Board, we know that Jackson's 
escape was accomjtlished the day before that u])on Avhich General 



14 

Porter is charged with dereliction. It was not on the 20th of August 
that General Jackson effected his escape. It was on the 2Sth, because 
then, as was supposed, they had him in a trap from which he could not 
escape, and General IMcketts, Avho constituted one division of General 
McDowell's corps, was stationed at Thoroughfare Gap, between Jackson 
and Longstreet, and General King Ava.s marcliing down tlie turnpike to 
Centreville, behind Jackson, so tliat if they had remained there, as they 
"were ordered at all liazards to do, tliere could have been no possible 
help or relief for Jackson. But they left those i)Ositions, where it is due 
to General Poi)e to say, especially as to General King, that he was 
ordered at all hazards to remain, and, as was stated by General 
McDoTvell, and as everybody knows, and as the IJecorder will not ques- 
tion, the door of the trap that held Jackson was thereby left open, and 
nobody remained to guard it. Xot a regiment, not a soldier of our 
forces, intervened any longer between Longstreet and Jackson. Well, 
one would have su]i)posed, who knows anything of wliat are tlie neces- 
sary attributes of a judicial mind, that the very last thing which it 
would occur to the power constituting the court-martial to <lo would 
liave been to ])lace General Eicketts and Creneral King upon the court 
to try the offender — absolutely upright men, perfect men, as I sui)pose, 
but how could they sit as judges ? How could they bring to bear the 
iudicial element and the unbiased mind ? They might themselves be 
tried for letting riackson escape, and they to sit in judgment upon 
another man to be tried for that offense! What we say is this: That 
judicial impartiality under tliose circumstances cannot be asked of men. 
This law that I read was a wise one. I do not believe that the Presi- 
dent of the United States, if he had had the organization of the court, 
Avould have organized it in the manner in which it was constituted. I 
tlo not believe that General Halleck, who did organize the court-martial, 
knew the fact at all. What a position in whicli to place those generals ! 
I have spoken of the historical and traditional liability of the great and 
trained judges of courts of law to bias, to the diftlculty of sustaining a 
judicial mind, in times of popular rage or excitement ; but how much 
greater is the exi)osure of generals summoned hastily from the tield for 
the discharge, ]»erhaps for the only time in their lives, of the great func- 
tions of judges ? Well, why was this done ? The order constituting the 
court-martial explains it, and it is certainly a source of the utmost regret 
that the exigencies of tlie public service did require any such selection, 
for the (U'der orgaiuzing the court-martial says positively that it was 
necessaiy, and that there was nobody who c<)uld ])ossibly be s])ared to 
sit upon that court except those nine generals who did compose the 
court. I want to read the exact words of the order : 

No other oHicer.s than those named can be assenibk-il, without manifest injury to the 
public service. 

Was not that a lamentable thing, that two of the judges were thus 
related to tlie subjects that were to be tried '! I doubt not that they did 
their best; I doubt not that they tried to be judges, but how could they 
be? Unman ]iature will not stand everything, and however great they 
may have been as generals, or wise as men, I (h) not believe they could 
stand that. Nay, more, (General King, to whose withdrawal from the 
rear of Jackson on the L'Stli, contrary to orders, is now im})uted by every- 
body the esca])e of .lackson, not only sat as a judge, but had to be a wit- 
ness. The exigencies of the ])ublic service not only compelled him to 
sit in the impossibh; attitude of a judge, but comjKdied him to take the 
stand and establish the truth as a witness adverse to one of the princi- 



15 

pal aides and Avitnesses on the part of General Porter. Is it not askinj^ 
a little too nmeh of our poor luunan natnre to put a man in that posi- 
tion? Who knows bnt that it was the votes of (lenerals King and 
Eicketts — who knows bnt that it was General King's vote alone, that 
turned the scales of justice against General Portt^r? Nobody will ever 
know, except the members of tliat court. But Avhy do I cite all this? 
I^ecanse the ^Recorder said that the judgment of that court-martial was 
right, and must be accepted by you. independent of its being right, 
I think we see now that it was impossible for those nine men, all of them, 
to act as judges. That could not be. They might sit there and record 
their votes, but it was imx)ossible for them all — it was imi)ossible for 
two out of the nine — in the nature of things, according to the laws of 
the human mind, to be judges. 

Another thing, among the many circumstances unfavorable to the ad- 
ministration of justice by that court-martial : Was there any unnecessary 
haste ? The Eecorder says that the record shows tliat it took a great 
many days to get in the evidence. But was there any unnecessary haste 
in their judicial i)roceedings, which were required to be deliberate and 
slow — considering all things — looking before and after? I will read to 
you the order that was served upon the court upon the morning of Jan- 
uary 6, 1803, five days before the sentence was pronounced. Before I do 
that, let me say that even now, after we have had the benefit of a second 
trial, it would be regarded as rather summary if you should receive orders 
from the War Department to hurry back to your resx)ective commands 
as quickly as possible, and to close this case without regard to hours, 
because the public service required it, and that you should instantly, 
ui)on the closing of the argument, take a vote. It might be necessary, 
owing to the exigencies of the public service, but it would not be judicial. 
1^0 w I read this order from Secretary Stanton to this court-martial : 

War Departjiext, 
JVasMngton Citij, D. C, January 5, 1863. 
General : The state of the service imperatively demands that the proceedings in 
the conrt over which yon are now presiding, having been pending more than four 
weeks, shonld be brought to a close withont any unnecessary delay. Yon are there- 
fore directed to sit, withont regard to hours, and close your proceedings as si^eedily as 
may be consistent with justice to the public service. 
Yoius, truly, 

EDWIN M. STANTON, 

Secyetary of fVar. 
Major-General Hunter, 

Fresident, tfc, tSc. 

It was not, you will observe, justice to the accused, but justice to the 
public service, that the Secretary appealed to as the final motive for a 
hasty decision of the case. 

That was served upon the court-martial on the Gth of January. Then 
the prosecution brouglit up their rear guard of witnesses, and the ease 
was almost instantly closed that day. There- were given to the peti- 
tioner three days to prepare his defense, and then what happened ? 
Wliy, these generals, although they were judges, were generals first, 
last, and always. Plow could they shut their eyes to such an imperative 
order as that from the great War Secretary, who was in that day the 
master of the fortunes of the whole Army ! The country was in danger, 
its capital was at stake : it was more important to the public service 
that they should get back to their commands than that they sliould stoi) 
to deliberate upon the evidence upon which they had to pass. Xow 
what took jAace ? You can form some notion of how this imi)erative 
letter operated, judging by your own proceedings here. The Board met 



16 

at half past ten the morning- of tlie 10th of January. Tliere was an argu- 
ment presented on the part of General Porter, called the defense of the 
accused, which, read with even the speed of the rapid tongue of our 
learned Recorder, could not have been finished much before the shades 
of afternoon were falling, for it occupies forty closely printed pages of 
this record. I do not state it as a fact, because it is not in the record, 
but I have been informed that it did actually occupy four hours and a 
half, or until half past two in the afternoon. At six o'clock that court- 
martial had adjourned, and General Porter was already condemned and 
sentenced, because the exigencies of tlie public service demanded it ; 
that each one of these generals should go post haste to his command. 
Was that a condition of things favorable to the administration of justice! 
I should think that even you, after you know, as you now must know, all 
about the case, would deem it necessary to deliberate after the argu- 
ments were concluded, and to compare the evidence with the arguments 
to see whether on either side they were specious and fallacious or sound 
and based upon the truth. You would not say, '^ ^Vhy, I must be off 
to Saint Paul by the morning train," and " I must be off to Fortress 
^Monroe to-night," and ''I must return to my neglected cadets." But 
you would say, " Let us look into this thing ; there is a man's life at 
stake ; the fame of an officer of the Army is involved." You would 
require to deliberate ; and if you did receive such an order, which would 
be impossible in times of peace, you would remonstrate — you would 
refuse to decide the case witliout a chance for deliberation. 

So it does seem to me that there are circumstances surrounding the 
history of that court-martial which make it only fair for us to sa^' — and' 
e\en the learned Recorder will not term it libelous — that it was asking 
more than human judgment, ami more than human nature was master 
of, for them to pass judicially upon the case. 

Next, as to the state of facts before them. Do you believe that the 
court-martial knew anything to si)eak of about the real facts of the case ? 
AVhat does a soldiei', when he is looking for the movements of troops, lirst 
ask for ? Is it not for a map of the country ? Did they have a map ? Yes, 
they had a map, and only one map. Well, was it a map ? For there 
are maps and mai)s, fis the Recorder knows. It was in the form of a 
map, but it was all wrong. You could not tell anything about the coun- 
try from it. I do not think that General Pope and (ieneral McDowell and 
the other generals are so much to be blamed, as they sometimes have been, 
for the movements of that campaign ; l)ecause this map, the same which 
was produced before the court-martial, Avas the only one they had to 
study, and they did not know anything about the country independent 
of the map. Xow, what is the fact about this ma]> ? General Reynolds 
has said that it Avas all wrong, (reneral Warren, Avho has made a 
special study of the snl)ject, l)ecause he has been sent down by the War 
Department, detaiU-d for the sjjccial pur[)ose of preparing it, has given 
a correct map of tlie same region to tliis Board. 1 read from General 
Warren's evidence, at page 20 of the new record : 

That map is so citouoous that a proper answer oaimot be <>iven to tlie question. - I 
cannot reeoj^nizc these roails or phices, or any of the streams, as corresjiondiug to the 
jilaces as they are on the map I have matte, now before us. 

So I think that their pole star was wrong ; it was several degrees out 
of the way; and many a mariner might easily make shipwreck if the 
north star were to get dish)cated and removed many degrees, or even a 
few degrees, from its place in the heavens. Well^ did they know the 
great main facts of the case? Did they know that Longstreet's army 
had arrived on the scene of action, not whether they were in front or 




01— V 



17 

behind the Gibbon's woods — but did the court-niartial Iciiow that they 
Avere anywhere there ? Not at all. It was told them, Init obviously 
they did not believe it. You have heard from ]\rr. liullitt a discussion 
of the Judge- Advocate's reasons, which are to be taken as the reasons 
of the court and the I'resident, and it is perfectly obvious that they ut- 
terly disbelieved and ignored the great and the leading fact in the case 
as it is now known. Again, did they know the real location of General 
Porter, with respect to Jackson's right wing, when he was expected to 
fall upon and consume it ? Not at all. They had not the least concep- 
tion of the relative positions. 

Now, maps are to form an important part of my argument. I w^ant to 
call the attention of the Board at this moment to one or two. There is 
a map which has been produced here as indicative of what was under- 
stood by the court-martial, because it was so understood by the priuci- 
l)al witnesses who testified against General Porter as to the position 
from which he was supposed to have fallen back at the close of the action 
of August 29, 1802. It is one of those maps prepared by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Snuth, and is a \ery important item in this case, because, when 
1 come to ask you to look at the map which was before the court-martial, 
you will observe that the same error of fact Avas before that court as 
there is in this map in regard to the position of General Porter's force. 
Here it is described as the position from which Fitz-John Porter had 
fallen back. (See Map No. 5, from General Pope's Report to the Coni- 
luittee on the Conduct of the War, Map A in appendix.) 

Now, I ask the Board to look, in the same connection, at the Army 
map, which has been every day, until now, before the Board, and which 
I present as part of my argument, and shall ask to have it incorporated — 
to look at the errors of position connnitted before the court-martial, and 
Avhich the court-martial itself has committed in respect to the location 
of the troops — I mean, of Porter's force and of the resi)ective forces of 
Jackson and of Pope on the 29th. For that purpose I have here taken 
one of General AVarren's nuips (Map No. 3), the topography of which 
and the locations of the roads and streams upon which are all correct, 
and have applied u}»on it, according to the evidence and according to 
the original record, the location of the troops, as they were believed, 
upon the court-martial, to be. I think it will be found not without iu- 
i^truction, even to the Board. Here is the junction of the Manassas and 
Sudley road, at which General Porter is placed. Here [^13] is where 
Morell placed himself, and l*orter's corps deployed for a forward move- 
ment. There [M 3 or 8] is where the witnesses for the government 
(so called). Pope and McDowell and Koberts and Smith, place General 
Porter. Here are the positions in which, upon the evidence before that 
court, the rebel army, extending- to the Centreville pike, until the latter 
part of the day, and then supposed to extend down here [31 2], across 
the pike, were i)laced. Now, as General Eeynolds says, it was only two 
mdes, in a direct line, from this position of Porter's here [M 3] over to 
his own position. [These two maps, viz, the Army ma}) and Warren's 
map, with the same positions i)rqiected, will be found in appendix, 
Maps B and C] As tlie Court wili"bb«^rve, there was nothing to pre- 
vent, in that view, as there presented on ttie map before the court-mar- 
tial, a flank and rear attack by Porter upon the unsuspecting right wing 
of the rebel army, and that was the supposition of facts upon which he 
was tried and con\icted. Falsely placed immediately ui)on the right 
wing, and a little in the rear of the right wing, of Jackson's army, with 
no rebel foroe between, and nothing in the ground between to prevent 
hiQi, he was found guilty of lying idle on his arms all day, and keeping 



out of tbe fight, in which, upon that showing, he might ha^-e home an 
ettective part. All that, on this trial, has been taken back. On this 
trial, the witness Smith, who placed him thereby a spy-glass; and the 
Avitness McDowell, who placed liim there by mistake, both admit that 
they had put him, at least, a mile in achance of where he actually was. 
It has been demonstrated, as I suppose, that the right wing of Jackson's 
army, which he was expected to attack, was here at the Warrenton 
turnpike, and that the Confederate forces, under Longstreet (25,000 
strong), whose presence was proved beyond dis[)ute, but ignored l)y the 
court-martial, extended down cAen beyond the railroad, and the Ma- 
nassas and Gainesville road, far in front of Porter — I mean, over on the 
other side of Dawkins' Branch — and occui)ying an impregnable i)osition 
between his little band and the right wing of Jackson, which he was 
expected to attack. 

Now, I desire that this other map (Xo. 4) of the true position, at noon 
of the 29th, as now proved, may be recorded as a part of my argument. 
I do not, of conrse, present it as evidence, but as argument. I believe 
the projection of the positions upon this ma]) have all l>een honestly, 
conscientiously, and faithfully made ; and I shall be glad if the liCcorder 
has any ol)Jection or criticism to make that hemay be])ermittedtomake 
it. We do not, in this investigation, desire in tbe least to mislead the 
Board, or to vary from the record of the trial, and I earnestly hope that 
if tlie l\ecorder,upon that mai>, or upon any of the other maps that I pre- 
sent as a ]»art of my argument, can find any fault, whether it is founded on 
fact or not, that he be i)ermitted to find it. For, if these maps do not 
lie, they demonstrate that while Porter was convicted by the court-mar- 
tial of not attacking the right wing of Jackson's army while that army 
was contending at ecjual odds with Pope, he was really ])unished for not 
throwing liis army corps of ten thousan men in a hopeless assault upon 
Longstreet's twenty-five thousand, whose presence, known to him, was 
unsuspected by General Pope and the court-martial, and which put him 
as far out of the reach of Jackson's right wing as if an ocean had rolled 
between them. (The map last referred to showing the positions as 
claimed by the petitioner, will be found in Appendix as map I>.) 

Well, what else was there about that court ? Why, one-half of the 
witnesses could not be had. Some few witnesses from — shall I be per- 
mitted to call it the "Federal" Army, in spite of the Recorder's protest 
against that word? — were there; but all the Confederate soldiers and 
generals and other ofticer.> were, from the "(exigencies of the ])ublic 
service," compelled to be absent, and the court was compelled to get 
along without them. It does not give a very impressive weight to the 
judgment of a court that the doors of the court were locked, so that 
one-lialf of tlie witnesses could not get in. That would not pass muster, 
even in a case of " i)etty larceny," to the like of which the Recorder is 
sometimes dis[>osed to degrade tliis examination. I think that any poor 
wretch who had been convicted and sent to the county jail for thirty 
<lays for thieving, would be entitled to a new trial at once if it turned 
out that one-half liis witnesses could not get in, because tlie doors of 
the court-room were barre<l against iM)])ular entrance. That is a very 
important matter indeed in considering the weight to be given to the 
action of the court. 

I observe that my learned friend, the Recorder, has been inclined to 
draw a line between rebel witnesses an<l Union Avitnesses, to the disad- 
vantage of the former. But he cannot raise any sucli issue with us, nor, 
as I believe, with this lioard. I know nothing in regard to the gentle-, 
men who have been called on our pait from the Confederate army. Gen- 



19 

erals Loiigstreet, Wilcox, Early, and Eobertson, Colonel Marshall, and 
many others, except wliat is known by everybody as historical abont 
them. They were mostly soldiers educated at this institution ; and, with 
rare exceptions, I believe the gradnates of West Poiut arc taught, and 
do learu, so thoroughly that they carry it with them through all their 
lives, to speak the truth; whatever else they learn or fail to learn, they 
do learn that. It is a pretty good certificate from this institution that 
anyl)ody who does not tell the truth is \erj apt to sli]* out by the ba(?k 
door or' the ^Military Academy before the day of graduation comes 
around. Well, 1 believe they were gentlemen, I believe that they were 
possessed of just as perfect personal integrity as though they had not 
been rebels. 

They were just as good witnesses as the Federal witnesses and no bet- 
ter, entitled to equal credit, and to be measnred by the same standard. 
Their evidence all around is to be weighed in the balance, and all the 
witnesses alike are not to be counted, but weighetl. If they were to be 
counted we should have got out of court a good while ago ; for after we 
had closed our case with the examination of forty or fifty witnesses, the 
Kecorder summoned in a hundred. So, pray, don't count the witnesses, 
but weigh them. 

Again, the court-martial was led to believe, and it disposed of the case 
upon the theory, that there was a retreat by General Porter. On this 
vital point it has now been <lemonstrated, to the satisfaction of the most 
skeptical, as already shown to you by the arguments of my associates, 
that the whole pretense of any retreat at all was without the least founda- 
tion in fact. But once more, to dwell a little longer on the errors of the 
court-martial, and that on a part of the case which was most essential, 
namely, the alleged disobedience of the 4,30 p. m. order of August 21»th, 
the \^'hole truth was not before them, and there Avas what has now been 
shown to have been the most palpable fiilsehood before them instead of 
the truth. I suppose that if there is one fact that now stands clear be- 
yond — I Avill not say c<nitradiction, because the Recorder can contradict 
anything — but beyond reasonable contradiction, it is, that that order 
]iever reached the hands of General Porter until the sun was setting at 
about half past six; yet the case was passed upon by the court-martial 
upon the evi<lence befine them, in the belief that it was received by him 
at five o'clock oi- half past five. Now, everything is perverted by false 
evidence. No court can stand up against ]ierjury — no court can stand 
up against mistake, or against any manner of false evidence, and if you 
find that they were misled l>y false evidence, whether intentionally false 
or not is wholly immaterial, it lessens the weight to be given to the 
judgment of the court-martial. This is also, I thiidc, fairly to be said 
upon the record of the court-martial, that Avhatever weight was given 
to facts, the facts Nvere outweighe<l by the o]>inions of witnesses— the 
oi>inions, I mean, of General Pope, General McDowell, (ieneral Koberts, 
and Colonel Smith. If I undertake anything in this argument, it will 
be to demonstrate to the satisfaction of this court, ami of every thinking- 
mind tlmt looks into the case, that the opinions of these witnesses can- 
not be treated as fair or impartial opinions ; tluvt, whether from bias or 
from mistake and ignorance of fact, it was utterly im])ossible for them to 
express a fair and im])artial opinion. But that their opinions did carry 
that court-martial, there is and can be no (hmbt. As to both General 
McDowell and General Pope, with the utmost disposition to do honor to 
the established authorities, it is our <luty in this case to demonstrate to 
you that if they had stated to the court martial what they have stated 
since, and what one of them has stated upini oath befoic you, General 
3 cii 



20 

Porter'.s (^omictioii could not possibly bn^e taken i)la('e, and he would 
have been disehaiged hy that court, not with condenmation, not with re- 
buke, but with honor. 

Now, as to the rules of evidence applied by the court-martial, I think 
that, if they were overborne by pojmlar impulse, if they were men and 
not gods, if their minds were biased by(;auses which they could not help 
or prevent, perha])s you wouhl find .some signs of it ir^ their proceedings. 
And so, an<l only for that ])urpose, 1 ask you to look into the record for 
tlie ]mrpose of seeing how they treated certain questions of evidence 
M'hich are subject to well-established rules. And first, when General 
Pope was on the stand, at page liOof the court-martial record, a question 
was put to him which was certaiidy very material — in a case tried upon 
opinions, to the last degree was it material : 

Question. If, as you liave stated, you were of the o]iiiiion tliat the army under your 
command had been detV^ated, and in danj>er of still greater defeat, and the capital of 
the country in diinger of capture by the enemy, and you thought that these calamities 
could have been oltviated if (icneral Porter had obeyed your orders, why was it that 
you doubted, on tin? '^d of (SL'ptember, whether you would or would not take any 
miction against him ? 

The witness declined to answer the question, as not being relevant to 
the investigation. The i-oom was cleared for delil)eration ; and although 
they allowed the question to be filed, they did not allow it to be answered 
until the following took place : 

Tlu^ .Indge-Advocate said: The witness requests the permission of the court to 
answer the (juestion referred to in the ]»rotest just read. The accused made no objec- 
tion. The room was thereupon cleared, and the court x)roceeded to deliberate with 
closed doors. Some time after the doors M-ere re-opened and the .Judge-Advocate an- 
nounced the decision of the court to l)e that the witness have permission to answer the 
([Uestiiui i-eferred U>. 

Now, is not that a novel method of judicial procedure — to make the 
admission of a <|uestion of evidence depend upcm the wish of the witness 
and not upon the rights of the accused '. First, to exclude the evidence 
as irrelevant, because the witness refused to answer it, and then to ad- 
mit it as bearing against the defendant, when the Avitness requested 
permission to answer it. A whole day for deliberation intervened. It 
Avas not admitted the second day because of any mistake in thejudg- 
juent of the court on the first day, or of any change of opinion as to its 
relcA'ancy, but because the Avitness changed his mind and his wish. 
Well, you cannot sit in review upon that ; but, does it or not tend to 
confiriii the suggestion that we make on the part of General Porter, that 
that court, from the necessities of the situation, could not be judges ? 
I Avill not state all the numerous instances of this kind, but I aaIII call 
attention to three orfour more. 

The .same Avitness, General Poi)e, AA'as still being examined by the ac- 
cused. He had given an opinion against (leneral Porter, Avhose counsel 
Avanted to test that opinion. 

Question. Hearing in mind the terms and tenor of the order of 4.30 p. m. of the 2'Mi 
of August, and its direction to the accused to attack the enemy's liank, and, if possi))ie, 
liis rear, and at the same time to keej) up connnunication with General Keynolds, on 
the right of the accused, jdease to inform the court whether, if it could have been 
foreseen at 4.;3n p. ni. that at the tiijie when the accused should receive that order he 
would find himself in front of the enemy in large force, in such a jxtsition that he could 
not ontHank the enemy without severing his connect ion with (ieneial IJeynolds, f»n his 
ri^ht, would you. if tiiat state of facts bad been foreseen at the date of the i-eception 
t>f the order, have expected or antici]>ated obedience from tlu^ accused to the older, 
according to its terms ! 

He had already testified against the a<5cnsed that he A\ould expect 
obedience to the order as the (piestion had been put. Here Avas a ques- 



21 

tioii put to liiiii ou cross-examination for the purpose of testing' the weight 
of liis oi)inion in every aspect of the facts of the case ; it was the clear 
right of the accused to put the question. The question was objected to, 
iind after a good deal of discussion, and after the clearing of tlie court 
and its deliberation — 

After some time tlie court was reopened; whereupon — 

The judge-advocate announced the decision of the court to be that the witnesis shall 
not ans\\er the question propounded by the accused. 

Then, when the cotirt- martial had General Eoberts (at page 40 of the 
record) under examination, the same sort of a question, as it appears to 
nie, was decided in a different way. He was now being examined by 
the Judge-Advocate: 

Question. In view of what the army had accomplished during the battle of the day 
in the nbsence of General Porter's command, what do you suppose would have been 
the result u}»ou the fortunes of the battle if General Porter had attacked, as ordered 
by the order of 4.30 p. m., either on the right flank or the rear of the enemy? 

(The accused objected to the (£ue8tiou.) 

The court was thereupon cleared. 

Sometime after the court was reopened, and the Judge-Advocate announced that the 
court determined that the question shall be answered. 

What I have to say is, that undue weight was given to the opinions 
of the generals wlio testified adversely, and that they Avere not freely 
l)ermitted to testify upon one side as upon the other. For, further, it 
appears that on the cross-examination the accused was not allowed to 
test his opinion which had been introduced on the direct. On page 51 
of the court-martial record, when the same witness was under examina- 
tion by the counsel for the accused, this occurred : 

Question. Did not the joint order speciallj- exclude from the discretion of Generals 
Porter and McDowell the necessity of their remaining in such position as to enable 
them to fall back behind Bull Kun f 

(The question was objected to bj- a member of the court.) 

The court was thereupon cleared. After some time the court was reopened, and the 
Judge-Advocate announced that the court determined that the question shall not be 
answered. 

I^ow, whether these and other similar rulings could have been reviewed 
or not in a court of law is not the question. There are many more of the 
same sort. They have been carefully digested in a previous paper, which 
will be placed before this Board.* I only call the attention of the Board 
to them for the puri)ose of demonstrating, as it seems to me they dem- 
onstrate themselves, that the times were not favorable to the adminis- 
tration of justice by that Board upon the case and the questions that 
were before them ; so I will not trouble the court with any more refer- 
ence to what may be called internal evidence from the record. I only 
claim from all these cu-ciunstances that I have now brought to the atten- 
tion of the Board that there is good ground for saying that the judg- 
ment of that court-martial, as a judgment, ought not to stand in the way 
of justice now on any of the questions involved in the record ; that it 
does appear that they were not placed in a position that rendered it 
likely, or, as we think possible, for them to bring to bear a clear, undis- 
turbed, unbiased, judicial mind upon the questions before tliem. 

So, too, in regard to the opinion of President Lincoln. There is no 
man in histoiy for whose oi)inion on a case like this, if he understood 
it, if the facts were l)efore him, I Avould claim greater weight than for 
that of President Lincoln, and I believe that will be the judgment of 
the country. You will ol)serve, in the first place, that these errors 
which were committed by the court were all involved in the record ui)On 

* The appendix to reply of Hon. Reverdy Johnson to Judge-Advocate Holt. 



22 

which it was his constitutional province to pass ; and if he had exam- 
ined that record and then approved the sentence, they woidd have been 
committed by him also. But ^\e have made it clear that President 
Lincoln did not examine the record, that he could not have examined 
the record, and that he made his decision not upon the evidence, not 
upon any opinion of his on the evidence and the facts in the case, but 
upon the paper that was of a nature to mislead him, i)repared by the 
Judge-Advocate General under the order re(iuiring a fair and judicial 
revision to be made of the whole evidence, but which unfortunately sets 
forth only parts of the evidence, as it appears to us, in a cruel and vin- 
dictive spirit, and in a way calculated only to lu'ejudice and poison the 
mind of the reader against General Porter and against the truth. The 
great i>ressure of his overwhelming official duties in that crisis of our 
country's fate left the President no time to examine the record, and 
compelled him to rely, as he had a right to rely, upon what he believed 
to be a fair judicial review of the evidence, but which was, in fact, the 
(me-sided and embittered statement of an advocate determined upon the 
ruin of the accused. We proved that by Governor Xewell, because 
President Lincoln told him so. When application was being made to 
President Lincoln for relief on the part of General Porter, he said to 
the governor, in substance, that he had not been able to read the record. 
Do not the dates demonstrate with equal clearness that he had not and 
could not have done so ? The judgment and sentence were pronounced 
on Saturday night, the 10th of January. On Monday morning the 
order was made by the President — this order requiring the revision for 
the advice and determination of the mind of the President to be made 
by Judge-Advocate-General Holt. Yes, on the 12th, one day prior to 
the proceedings having been forwarded to the Secretary of AVar for 
transmission, under the law, to the President. So that the proceedings 
were not in the President's hands before they went to Judge-Advocate 
Holt, or before the 10th, when his pretended review beais date. For 
on the 19th comes that extraordinary paper, which has been suffi- 
ciently reviewed and exposed by Mr. Bullitt; a paper calculated not to 
lead the President to the knowledge of the facts, but to lead him away 
from the knowledge of the real facts ; and on that he based his judgment 
approving the action of the court-martial. 

1 have said before that we were nuich obliged to the Eecorder for 
calling many a witness that we did not know of and couhl not have 
«>l)tained. He calls a son of l*resident Lincoln; and if there was any 
doubt before about how much and what sort of weight ought to be given 
to the opinion of the President, it is terminated by his evidence, is it 
not? What <loes he say? He was then a young man of nineteen or 
twenty, and his father was in the habit of talking with him confidenti- 
ally. One day he found his father reading or meditating on the Porter 
case; and the President produced to him, what? Why, that dispatch 
of General Porter to Generals King and McDowell in the latter part of 
the 29th of August, indicating an intenticm to withdraw to ALmassas, 
in accordance with the injunctions contained in the joint order of 
General Pope. Wliere did he find that? Why, it was set forth in 
full in the opinion, in the paper, prepared by Judge-.Vdvocate-Gen- 
eral Holt. The whole fact of the retreat was there; and that was all 
the retreat there was; and Ave shall find that, instead of being a cen- 
surable purpose, it was altogether in'aiseMorthy under the circum- 
stances as now known and the facts out of which it arose. But 
the President was led to believe, because it is so stated in that paper of 
Judge-Advucate-General Hi)lt, that there was no doubt that General 



23 

Porti^r carried out and acted upon the intention declared in tliat letter 
and did retreat, believing that the rest of the army was standing its 
ground against destructive odds. It Avas in this false belief that the 
President evidently spoke, is^ow we know, if we know anything, that 
the dispatch to Generals McDowell and King meant nothing of the 
sort, and that there was no retreat. Then what did President Lincoln 
say ? And this sliows exactly what I have said before, as to the dis- 
crepancy between the guilt imputed, and the punishment awarded. 
Why, President Lincoln said that if that was true — if all those malig- 
nant statements aiul those i^erversions of testimony so insidiously set 
forth, in the papers of Judge Holt were true — that it would not have 
been too much or too severe a sentence if General Porter had been con- 
demned to be shot. So, when you examine that opinion and find the 
basis of it, you will see that, as a])plied to the facts and circumstances 
now before the comt, it is no more pertinent than if it were in refer- 
ence to the case of some other ofticer in some other war. But the 
striking point in Kobert Lincoln's testimony as compared with Gov- 
ernor Xewell's is this: The two together show how completely the 
mind of the President in regard to the case had been changed before 
his death, and how from being satisfied, and more than satisfied, with 
the condemnation of Porter, he had come, by a knowledge of the actual 
facts, to the conviction that injustice he was entitled to a new trial. 

THE CHARGES AGAINST GENERAL PORTER. 

Let me now take up very briefly these several charges. I propose to 
consider them in their order, because there is some confusion likely to 
creep into the case if they are considered otherwise, as the learned Ee- 
corder lias seen fit to treat them. In respect to the transactions of the 
29th, he jumbled up the consideration of all the charges, irrespective of 
the Article of AVar under which they are drawn. It may be that an 
officer is guilty of disobedience and yet is not guilty of the heinous 
crime of misbehavior in the face of tlie enemy, running away for the 
purpose of abandoning the cajutal of his country to a rebel host; and 
on the other hand, the accused party might be not guilty of disobedi- 
ence, and yet guilty of misbehavior before the enemy. So it seems to 
me tliat accuracy of judgment can only be preserved by treating of the 
distinct charges in the order in wiiich they are arranged. 

In respect "to the first charge, the alleged disobedience by General 
Porter, of the order of the 27th. I Avill first read the charge, and then 
offer a very few observations about it. 

Charge Ist^ NpecJJimthm 1st — Disobedience of 6.30 p. m. order. 

C'uah(;e 1st. — Vittliition of the 9tli Article of "War. 

S2)(ciJicafioii 1-sf. — In this, that the said jMajor-General Fitz-Johu Porter, of the vol- 
imteers of the United States, haviiii;- received a hiwfnl order, ou or ahont the 27th 
Anji;iist, 1H6'2, wliih' at or near Warreiiton Jimctiou, in A'irgiuia, from Major-Geueral 
John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, in the following figures and letters, 
to wit : 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

Briiftoe Station, Au{)ust 27, 1862 — (j.:50 p. m. 

General: The majitr-general connnanding directs that you start at one o'clock to- 
night, and come forward with your whoU> corps, or sucli i>art of it as is with yon, so 
as to be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker lias had a very severe action 
with the enemy, witli a loss of aV)out thice liuudred killed and wounded. The enemy 
has been driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from 
Manassas and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell 
is. If Morell has not joined yon, send word to him to push forward immediately ; also 



24 

send word to Banks to hurry forward with all speed to take your place at Warreutou 
Junction. It is necessary, on all accounts, that you shoujd be here l)y daylight. 

I send an officer with this dispatch, who will conduct you to this i)lace. Be sure tO' 
s<'nd word to Banks. avIio is on the road from Fayetteville, piobahly in the direction 
of Bealton. Say to Banks, also, that lie had Ijest run hack the railroad trains To this 
side of Cedar Run. If he is not with yon, write him to that effect. 
By command of Maior-General Pope. 

GEORGE D. RUGGLE.S, 

Colonel and Chief of Stuff. 
Major-General F. J. Poijtkr, 

Warreiitou Junction. 

P. S. — If Banks is not at ^Varrenron Junction, leave a regiment of infantry and two 
pieces of artillery, as a guard, till he comes uj). with instructions to follow you iunue- 
diately. If Banks is not at the Junction, instruct Cokmel Cleary to run the trains 
T)ack to this siile of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and section of artillery with it. 
Bv conmiand of Major-General Pope. 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of iSt off. 

did then and there disobey the said or<ler, being at the time in the face of the enemy. 

This at or near "Warrenton, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 28th of August. 
18G2. 

The ground lias been very fully gone over on our side, and it would 
be only imposing upon the good nature of the Board if I should detain 
it very long. In the first jdace your attention has been called to the 
eomi)aratively trifling nature of the charge — I mean as compared with 
the gross magnitude of those in respect to the 29th. It all depends 
upon what Ave believe to be an immaterial variance, utterly immaterial, 
of two hours in the time of starting on the march on the night of the 
27th. Without any regard to discretion, to judgment, to reasons that 
existed to the contrary, without any regard to the circumstances of the 
case, the learned IJecorder asks in the most defiant manner, "Was he 
not ordered to march at one o'clock ? He was. Did he march until 
three? He did not. Is he guilty? Guilty." Well, if that is the Avay 
to dispose of the charge, there is no use of examining it; there is no use 
of a trial. He was ordered to start at one; he did not start until three. 
And the Board will observe that the same case might be made if, instead 
of being two hours, it was one hour, or Imlf an hour, or quarter of an 
hour. If a court-martial can convict an otticer and dismiss Iiimtrom the 
service for a variation of two hours from the time at which he Avas ordered 
to march without the least regard to the circumstances, they can just as 
well do so, by the same summary method, for a delay of fifteen minutes. 

The learned Recorder made one suggestion in this connection that 
rather galled me. Even on the court-martial there was a decent regard 
l»aid to the feelings of the accused. The forn)s of courtesy at least were 
adhered to. But tbe learne<l Becorder in his opening argument has 
suggested that this change of two hours on the night of the 27tli was 
made by Ciencral Porter in the hope that those two hours would bring- 
a change of commanders, from roi)e to McClellan. I do not tliink such 
a suggestion as that is worthy of this Board or of a component member 
of it. Xow that 1 am upon that sid)ject, let me say also this: that the 
observations tliat he made tliis morning imputing a lack of personal 
integrity to ( Jeneral Porter are as gratuitous as they are ottensive. I do 
not think he would have made that after deliberation. Nobody ever 
made any such suggestion before as that General Porter wilfully stated 
falsehoods in his dispatches — a charge distinctly made by the Recorder 
this morning. That was not the charge on which he was being tried by 
the court-martial or retried here. I sliall not make any more observa- 
tions about these insinuations in the further progress of the discussion, 
except to repeat once for all that they were \'ery uncalled for and \ery 
painful to the feelings of the ]>etitiouer and his counsel. 



-25 

As to this order of tlie 27tli. 1 say, although the eoinphiiiit was a 
trivial one, although nothing came of it, and there was no delay result- 
ing, although, as I su])i)ose, it Avas nun-ejy tin-own in as a nuilce-weight 
on the subsequent and greater charges, still General Porter is bound to 
explain it and Justify it. We ask nothing that shall loosen the bands of 
disci[>line or impair the cardinal rules of the military service as to im- 
plicit obedience to orders. We claim implicit obedience, and we claim 
intelligent obedience; we claim actual and not fictitious and pretended 
'obedience; we claim that a corps commander should act. and tliat (ien- 
eral Porter did act, not like a umchine set in motion by an order which 
he was not to read or interpret, but that he was an inteliigent instrument 
of the dignity of a corps commaiuler, invested with the functions which 
the military law imputes to that high grade of service. ^STow, what is 
the nature of the (juestion ? It is not, as it seems to me, whether he was 
ordered to start at one and did not start until three. ] cannot think 
that that is the question. If it is, all the lal)or, talk, and study that 
has been devoted to it has been thrown away. 

The (luestion, it seems to me, is one of intent. Was his failure to 
march until three, an act of intended disobedience and disregard of the 
order, or was it a decision justittably arrived at by him in good faith, in 
the exercise of his duties and his responsibilities as a corps commander, 
ten miles trom his chief who gave it, an<l receiving it under circum- 
stances which could not be known to General Poi>e, who gave it ? If 
you establish the aftirmative of the latter question, we claim that Gen- 
eral Porter is comi)letely exonerated from this charge. The I'ecorder 
has said that General Porter has no right to set u]> his will against that 
of the counnanding general. ^Vell, so we say. We say he did not set 
up his will; that he did not assume or pretend to set u]) his will. His 
will, his imi>ulse, was to obey the order strictly and to tiie minute; l)ut 
his judgment, wliich he Avas at liberty to exercise, which he was bound 
to exercise, recpiired him not to move until the near ai>in'oach of day. 
In the first place, in regard to this order, I make one observation, and 
that is, that whatever may be the duties of corps commanders in the in- 
terpretation and execution of orders, they have a right to expect that 
all orders that are sent to them by their chiefs at a distance shall be 
both intelligible and possible of excution — I mean possible within the 
view of tlie sender. Now, was this such an order ? xVlthough the Board 
are iierfectly familiar with the order and the objects expressed upon its 
face, I will read it once more. 

I want to ask whether you think that General Pope thought it was 
possible of exact execution when he gave the order. Because, if he did 
not, the rule of discretion conceded by the Judge-Advot-ate and con-' 
ceded by the learned Recorder comes in. Applyiiig the test of the 
Napoleonic rule in respect to obedience and discretion, as to orders given 
by a commander at a distance, it is contended by both of those learned 
legal authorities that there is no discretion as to the end, although there 
may be a discretion as to the means. The rule is as follows: 

A military ordor exacts ])assive f)li(Mlieiice oiilji when if is given % a superior who is 
present on Ihe spot at the moment }vli( n lie f/ires if. Haxiiig, tlien, kno\vled<i;e of tlie state 
of things, lie can listen to tlie ohjcctions and give the necessary exidanations to him 
Avho should execute the order. 

The prosecution in that view says that this order was to get to Bris- 
toe by dayliglit, and if he could get to Bristoe by daylight by starting 
at some other hour than one o'clock, all right, no offense given or taken 
in changing the hour of starting; but there is no discretion as to the 
end. Well, sui)pose you have a written order of \\hich the sender does 



26 

not believe the end was possible ; suppose General Pope orders General 
Porter to march from Warrenton Junction at one o'clock, so as to get 
there at daylight, when he knows it is not i)ossible for him to get there 
at daylight, or wheu he has fair reason to believe that it is not ])Ossible 
for him to get there at daylight, and that General Porter on receiving it 
knows that; how does that affect the ai)plication of the rule as to dis- 
cretion, if there is such a rule ? It removes the end altogether, does it 
not ? If the commanding general orders a cori)S commander to march at 
one to reach a certain i>lace by daylight, knowing that he cannot do it,* 
even by starting at one, what is the next conclusion ? How is it to be 
construed '? 'Why, it is to get there with all practicable speed, is it 
not ? 

NoAv, 1 want to ask the Board whether they believe that General 
Pope, when he said start at one a. m., and get to Bristoe at daylight, 
thought Porter could do so ? That is an im])ortant (luestioii. If Gen- 
eral Pope had honored us with his i.rescnce, Ave couhl have found out 
from the best authority. Bnt when he stood at his post in Kansas and 
said he wouhl not come upon a re<piest, Imt would come upon a sub- 
poena, and then when he was subpcenaed said he would not come at all, 
and defied the summons of this Board, we have a right still to explore 
the case for his motives and his knowledge. And, fortunately, we are 
not witliout the means of ascertaining tliem. It so ha]»peJis that General 
Pope had gone over this very road from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe 
that afternoouj^starting in the latter part of the afternoon and getting 
there early in the evening, and he knew sonu'thing about the coiulition 
of the road. He did not know how it was after the wagon trains had 
closed up behind him, but he knew something about the distance and 
the condition of the road as it was when he went over it. He Avas ac- 
com])anied by two very intelligent and distinguished ofHcers. He went 
alone Avith those fcAV personal attendants on horseback, and it took them 
a good while to go; I do not knoAV hoAV long, but more hours tlian he 
aHoAved to this army corjjs to go in the middle of the darkest night and 
get there at daylight. Having got there, he sentls an order for this 
army cor])s to start at one, saying tliat it was necessary iorthem to be 
there at daylight. Xoav, a\ liat I say is, in the A'oluntaiy absence of 
(reneral Poi)e, if you liaVe the judgment of tAvo e(pially comi)etent per- 
scms A\ iio Avere Avith him Avhen this order Avas issued, and Avho accom- 
panied him on that Journey, you haAC, I tbiuk, a pretty fair means of 
testing Avhether General Po])e thought it was a i)ractical)le or possible 
order. I refer to the evidence of General Buggies and General Mc- 
KeeA'er, to both of Avhich I shall ask permission to call the attention of 
the court. 

I Avill read ^Iclveevei's testimony first, at ])age 147: 

Question. I will ask you wliethcr, in your judiiincnt and cxijericuc-c, a iiiiiitary 
coniniandf'i-, who had himsflf acconiiianit'd an ainiy corjjs over lliar I'oad in ilayli^lit 
that (lay fVoni ^A'al•l■<■nt()n Junction to Bristoe. would ha\(' deemed it ad\isalile lor 
anotlier army corjis oi" 9,0(10 men. with artillery, to leave AA'arrenton .Tunction at one 
o'clock in the nn)rning to reach Uristoe .Statimi by daylight or near that hour.' 

From the ansAver it is CAident that the AA'ord " advisable" is a misprint 
for " practicable." 

Daylight, I believe, for the purpose of this discussion, is generally 
admitted on all sides as about four o'clock. 

Answer. That is a ditfwult question to answer. It did not seem to nu^ at the time 
to l)e practicable. 

There is a clear and emi)hatic opinion by one oflicer entitled to great 
Aveight, as it seems to me. 



27 

On pai>e 279 General llnggles, General Pope's cliief of staff, says: 

Question. Have yon lifavd the i)roof here, or do you know what has l)e('n proved 
the ohstrnetion of that road by 2,000 or 3,000 army wagons? 

Answer. I knew tliere were a hirue number of wagons and that the road was 
hloekeil ; I heard that after Genciral Porter had come u^). I knew that tlie road was 
reported to liave been heavily bh)cked with wagons. 

Question. Do you know anything of the darkness of that night? 

Answer. I knoAV it was veiy dark, so dark that I lost my way going a few hundred 
feet from the bivouac. 

Question. How do you recollect that ? 

Answer. I recfdlect that from the reason that I had nothing to eat since morning. 
Our mess-wagon came u]> ; our cook had been captured, and we could not tiud any 
servants, and I had to stumble round in the dark myself. I think we slnmted and 
hallooed to people, and tinally we got to the wagon ; then I got in and looked around, 
but could lind nothing more than a ham bone, the same as Colonel Johnson ; the ham 
bone had been pretty well picked. 

Question. Does your experience enable you to form a judgment as to the practica- 
bility of an army e<u-ps on such a night, with a road obstructed as you understand 
this to have been, starting from Warrentou Junction at 1 o'clock a. m., to reach Bristoe 
Station by daylight? 

Answer' I donU think it could hare hceit done. I recollect that road as I came through. 

And lie eanie tlirongh side by side with General Pope. 

It ran jiart of the way tlnough groves or woods; audi recollect that there were 
stumps of trees and of sajdings in the road ; that the road was filled with these little 
stumjis ; That the road itself was tortuous. I think the men would have beeu impeded 
in the road by the trains, by these stumps, and Ijy the crookedness of the road. Ac- 
cording to my recolh'ction, there were several runs that crossed the railway l>etween 
those two ])oints, and over these runs were open bridges. I think the men could not 
have marched upon the lailway, because in the darkness they would have fallen 
through these open l>ri<lges. 

Xow, does not tliat satisfactorily establisli tliat General Po])e, when 
he gave that order, eonld not luniself have deemed that it was practica- 
ble to obey it ? If so, what lieconies of this rnle, urged by the Judge- 
Advocate' and by the liecorder, that the corps connnander, in such a 
case, has no discretion as to the end ? There is no end if the end is im- 
possible, except the end indicated by the order as the object of calling- 
the army corps over the road. As it has been pressed against General 
Porter, we have considered whether it was possible. But, further, was 
it quite fair and honest ! It was pressed upon the attention of the Presi- 
dent, you will recollect — and the court seems to have been imposed upon 
to believe — that the immediate occasion of giving this order was, be- 
cause, after the tight with Ewell in the afternoon, it was found that 
Hooker had got out of amnmnition ; and Porter having ammunition, that 
was the reason for sending for his corps to come up; and, also, because 
of an anticipated attack in the morning by the returning enemy. Both 
those consi<lerations were urged upon the President, in the review by 
the Judge-Advocate, and he was led to bebeve, as I understand, that 
that l)eing the purpose for which the order was sent, was the reason for 
its urgency, as nmde known to the court-martial. Well, now, if those 
were the purposes, would not it have l)een fair to put them in the order? 
If General Porter was afterwards to be tried and convicted for not obey- 
ing an order, the urgency of which was that they were out of aininuni- 
tion and expected aii immediate attack, would it not have been fair to 
put one or both of those reasons in the order ? 

PRETENDED REASONS FOR THE ORDER. 

Let us see now how this matter about the aninuuution and the antici- 
pated attack stands. General Pope made a report of Sei)tember 3, which 
has been put in evidence, but not yet called to the attention of the court, 



28 

aiul it is to be found in this Board Record, on page 1115. In that was 
the first suirrgestion that this order was sent oh one of those accounts. 
There it is stated in this way, on page 1110 : 

The luifortunate oversight of not luiiiginsi more than fcn-ty rounds of ammunition, 
hecame at once ahirniing. At nightfall, Hooker had hut iibout live rounds to the 
main left. As soon as I learned this I sent back orders to Fitz-John Porter to march 
w itli his corps at one o'clock that night, so as to be with Hooker at daylight in the 
moriuug. 

He does not say anything about any anticipated attack in the morn- 
ing. But he afterwards, January 27, 18G3, made wliat is called his 
official rei)ort; and there both these circumstances for the first time ap- 
pear. There, at page 18, he puts it in this Avay : 

Thinking it altogether likely that Jackson would mass his Avhole force and atteniptto 
turn our right' at liristoe .Station, and knowing that Hooker, for want of ammunition, 
was in little condition to nuike long resistance, I sent liack orders to General Porter, 
altoutdark of the 27th, to move forward at (»ne o'clock in the nigiit, and report to me 
at Ihistoe by daylight iu the morning. 

You Avill observe that the order says nothing about either of these 
matters. The order describes a very difterent state of things, and of 
l)urposes. After giving directions to come, and referring to the tight 
that Hooker has had, the order says : 

The eiicinj/ hiH heen dricvn back, aiid is retiring (don;/ the railroad ; ice must drire him from 
Manassas and clear the country between that place and GaiHesrille, where McDowell is. 

And these are the only purposes exjiressed in the order. Nothing 
about ammunition, notliing about an anticipated atti\ck; and for two 
reasons: First, he <lid not know when he sent the order that they were 
out of amnumition; and, second, he had no reason for anticipating an 
attack, because he tliought the rebels were retreating, and wanted 
Porter there to pursue them. Now, the Recorder says that General 
L'ojie and (Jeneral Heintzelman, and all the witnesses, prove that Pope 
knew, Avhen he gave tlie order, that Hooker was short of ammunition. 
I take direct issue witli that statement, and say that they do not; that 
tlicy prove just the contrary: that they prove that General Pope did 
not know of the ammimition being short, and did not know of the anti- 
ci])ated attack when he wrote this order. The order is dated 0.30 p.m., 
wliich is sunset; an hour after that it is dark. (Jeneral Buggies, in his 
testimony before this Board, says he wrote the order and dispatched it 
before reaching Bristoe, where Pope arrived at dark; and then, and not 
till then, could he have received any report of lack of amiintnition on the 
part of Hooker. (Jeneral Pope, on page 12 of the court-martial record, 
says ''just at dark." Very precise. This is his sworn statement: 

Jnut at dark Hocd^er sent me word, and General Heint/.<dmaii also rcjuuted to me 
th.-it he. Hooker, was almost entirely out of anniiunititui, lia\ ing bur li\ c rounds to a 
mail leff. 

Gc-neral Heintzelman, at ])age SO of the same record, says this: 

Question. What information have you iu regard to the condition of General Hooker's 
supjdy of ammunition after the battle of Kettle Run, on the '27th of August ! 

Answer. A ])ortion of liis division was nearly out of ammunition. 

Question. Was or was not that fact made known to Major-Geiieral Pojjc in the after- 
noon of tile 27tii of August .' 

Answer. Late in the afternoon it was. 

Well, this says late in the afternoon. l>nt tliat ju'ecisc point of time 
is fixetl by (Jeneral Pope, for he says it came to him jnst at dark; and 
he ouglit to know. Then the witness Dwight does not help the Recorder 



29 

at all oil tliat matter. His evidence appears at pages 722 and 724 of the 
Board record. He says, after the fight: 

We wore sluirt of innnmiiitioii. I was sent hy Colonel Taylor to General Hooker to 
ascertain what we slionld do in case we were attacked dniiiij;- the night, as there 
seemed to he some donbt as to whether it was a rear-<>nard or whether there wonld 
be an attack made. General Hooker replied to me, nearly as I can recollect: "TeU 
Colonel Taylor that we have no anininnition, bnt that there has l)een conniinnication 
had with General Pope, and (ieneral I'ope has commnnicated to General l'ort(>r, and 
General Porter should be here now. He will be here in the morning certainly." 

And on page 724 : 

Question. What time did you go into camp? 

Answer. Some time in the afternoon When Ave commnnicated with General Hooker 
it was towards dark, if I recollect. 
Question. How near dark? 

Answer. It was dusk; I could not say the hour; late in the afternoon. 
Question. May it not have been liefore dark ? 
Answer. No, sir; it was quite dark. 

Thus you have all tl»e facts and circumstances;, and you have the 
time when Hooker communicated to Pope, and it was just at dark. 
There is not a 'particle of evidence in the case varying- it from that. 
Writing his order to General Porter at 0.30, he does not say a word about 
ainmunition, liecause he knew nothing about it; and yet, in his report, 
and on the trial, and before the President, it was imputed to General 
Porter that this order was based upon the urgency of a want of ammu- 
nition known to General Pope at the time he sent it. 

porter's interpPvEtation of the order and action under it. 

The first thhig, in considering- the action of General Porter under this 
order, as it seems to me, is to inquire how it must have been considered 
by him when he received it. It was brought by Capt. Drake DeKay, 
whose evidence was taken on the court-martial. ]S^o\v, what is the fact 
about Drake DeKay's arrival with the order and how did he come ? 
He came alone ; he came on horseback with this order, which is regarded 
all around as one of great urgency, and he came as fast as he eould, did 
he not? I suppose so. He claims so. Xow, what time did he get there? 
The learne<l Pecorder thiiilcs he got there about i) o'clock, lint General 
Pope, in his report of the 3d of September, states the exact hour. He 
says : 

The di.stance was only nine miles, and he (Porter) received the dispatch at 9.50 
o'clock. 

It is said that General Porter did not .know very much al)out the road. 
Didn't he ? He knew that there was an aide, bouml to make all possible 
speed, coming- alone on horseback over the road, starting at 0.30 — that is, 
with the advantage of the last hour of daylight— and it took him three 
hours and twenty minutes, which was twenty minutes more than Gen- 
eral Pope proposed by the order to allow an army corps to go the same 
distance over the same road, in the darkness of midnight, afoot. Did 
not General Porter know anything- about the condition of the road ? 
Was not the first thing- that necessarily came to his mind the impracti- 
cabilitv of exactly executing- the order ? It seems to me that is beyond 
all question. What else came with it ? Wliy, DeKay complained that 
the road was obstructed, and of tlie great difticulty he had had in get- 
ting- through. ^^)v\', if he had had great difficulty in getting through 
alone on horseback, because of the obstructions of the road. General 
Porter at once saw that to an army corps, going- without any light what- 



30 

ever, on foot, and with their artillery, as they were re<inire(l, it was an 
impossible order. What was his lirst inipnlse ? There is a great deal 
of talk about aniinu.s in this case. The first words that an oftieer utters 
when he receives an order have a very strong' l)earing' ui)on the question 
of animus. He says, this order must be obeyed ; General Pope, w^ho 
gives it, knows what he wants. Let ns start at once I To whom does he 
say that ? To his division commanders ; all men of character and un- 
questioned loyalty and integrity — Morell, Butterfield. and Sykes. Some 
criticism is made as to the manner of the ])etitioner, whether he read 
the order aloud, or whether he handed it to each one of them, or Avhether 
tliey knew its entire contents. lUit General Butterfield says he handed 
it to Sykes or Morell; and I think General Warren says the same thmg. 
And ]Mr. DcKay says that they discuss(-d the subject-matter; he told 
them what had liai»pened, and that he was sent to guide them back. 

Xow comes the cpiestion of discretion. These division commanders, 
all three of them, instantly united in a common ]notest against starting 
at one o'clock. And on what ground ? Because of the jaded comlition 
of their troops, taken in connection with the impenetrable darkness of 
the night, for it was impenetrable at that time, and tlu? blocked condi- 
tion of the road, it being absolutely blocked up with wagons. AVagons 
had been rolling through there all day on the retreat to Alexandria, as 
specified in the orders of General Poi)e, which I will presently read to 
you. Now, it seems to me that the question Avhich is jn-esented in a mil- 
itary sense (and on that I speak with infinite distrust) is this : When the 
division commanders. Avho are charged with the responsibility for the 
weltare and condition of the troops and the performance of a marcli, 
nnite in such a jnotest on such a ground, ought tlu'ir protest to l)e taken 
into consideration ? There is the test of the guilt or innocence — of the 
alleged disobedience. Ought such a i>rotest to be taken into eonsider- 
ation ? Well, General Porter thought it ought. And if it ought, who 
is to consider it? Who is to say whether, in view of the jaded condi- 
tion of the trooi)S, or some of them, and of the infinite darkness of the 
night, and of the absolute blockade of the road — who is to pass upon 
that question, or is it not to be ])asse(l upon at all ? Is it to be consid- 
ered, and if it is to be considered, who is to consider ,it ? General Pope, 
who gave the order, cannot consider it ; he is ten miles away, and does 
not know these circumstances. If you answer the question, yes, that it 
is to be considered, the AA'hole question of disobedience ])asses away, for 
General Porter is the only man left to consider it ; the rules of war plac^' 
him there as the substitute of (rcneral Poi)e. That is the way it aj)- 
l)ears to me. You will ol)serve that while it is an absolute and pereiu])- 
tory order, if ycm please, to staiit" at one and get there l>y daylight, yet 
it gave the reasons why his in'esence with his cori)s was wanted. On 
this question of whether he <mght to consider the protest of his division 
commanders in view of the terms of the order, what the order says as 
to what he was wanted for, as it seems to me, comes in : 

The <'iicmy lias liotii diivon baclc ; l.nt is ivtiriiio- along the railroad. We must 
drive him iVoiii Manassas, and elear the eountry between that place and (Tainesville, 
Avhere MeDowell i.s. 

He was Avanted, then, to be there, not at daylight — not at all ; Gen- 
eral Pope, as we have seen, never could have suspi^-ted it i>ossible for 
him to be thereat daylight: he was Avanted as early as he couhl get 
there in the morning to i>ursue the retreating rebels, and sweej) the 
country between Manassis and Gainesville. 

Now, Avas it the thing, in a military point of A'iew, for a cor])s com- 
mander so situated, receiving such a i)rotest on such a ground fiom his 



^ 31 

division commaiulers — was it rijiht for liiiii to take the protest and tlie 
circuinstances into consideration, in view of wliat be was wanted at 
Bristoe for? Well, we snbniit that it was. We snbniit thatjnst that 
protest, on jnst those grounds, raised the qnestion, whether he eouhl be 
there so as to fnllill the ])urposes for which the order said he was wanted — 
not his own ideas, not his own purposes — but General Pope's statement 
of what he was wanted for. If you find, first, that it was right for him 
to exercise that judgment; second, that he exercised it in good faith; 
and, third, that he exercised it on fair and reasonable grounds and knowl- 
edge, he must stand acquitted. It does not seem to me that there can 
be the least doubt, regarding it as a question of law, or military science, 
or common sense. 1 sni)pose that in yonr i^rofession, as in ours, great 
(juestions of law, and great questions of military duty, alike depend 
upon the dictates of common sense, and are governed by them. 

l^ow look at the ground of protest as bearing npon the objects of the 
order, as stated in the order. What kind of obedience did it (;all for ? 
Did it call for General Porter to plunge his corps into the absolute dark- 
ness of midnight, at one o'clock, and thro\v them into inextricable con- 
fusion, and set them floundering al)out in camp, or at the first run, so 
that they conld not be extricated until after daylight, and so that they 
conld not start on the road nntil long after they had broken camp[? I 
supi)ose that it called for an effectual, serviceable obedience. That is 
what common sense dictates. That is what we suppose military laws 
and regulations reqnire. General Porter heard the protest. What did 
he know that General Pope did not know ? Well, he knew the condi- 
tion of the road as Drake DeKay, the messenger, found it. He knew 
the condition of the road, as his officers knew it ; as his aides-de-camp, 
Captains Monteith and McQuade, who had been sent out for the purpose, 
had reported to him. And then, as to the condition of the troops, Gen- 
eral Pope had not made any inquiries about that; there is not the least 
scintilla of evidence in the case that he had any knowledge whatever 
about it. Well, these troops that had been making day and night 
marches all the way from A quia Creek — their condition is not to be 
tested by a question of how many hours and minutes they had been in 
camp that day, or that night, but upon the knowledge and honest judg- 
ment of their direct and immediate commanders, exercised in good faith, 
as to their condition. The Eecorder says that the direction of the order 
was, that Sykes should come alone. That was not so. Sykes was not 
to come alone. Nobody was to come alone ; if Morell was not there, 
Sykes was to come alone ; but if Morell and Sykes were together there, 
as the proofs show that they w-ere, then the order is imperative. 

The major-general commandiug directs that you start at oue o'clock to-night, and 
come forward with yonr a-ltole corps. 

THE CONDITION OF THE EOAD. 

Briefly, as to the condition of the road. The evidence on this subject 
is very full. So fully has it been developed that I will not refer to it. 
I understand the substance of the evidence to be that there were be- 
tween 2,000 and 3,000 army wagons upon the te\^ miles of road. In one 
respect it will be seen that this case differs from its attitude before the 
former court upon this question ; the government has abandoned the 
pretense that he could have gone along the railroad, because, I siqipose 
under the evidence of McKeever and Kuggles, the Pecorder thought it 
was idle to make any such claim as was claimed before. Well, then, it 
was a common dirt road, and not a turnpike; running partly through 



32 

the woods, and blocked up "uitli 2,000 or 3,000 army wagous, which, if 
stretched out one by one, would occupy 24 miles in length ; and if they 
were doubled up it is very diflicnlt to say how ieven a horseman could 
get through without the greatest difticulty, as Drake De Kay found 
when he undertook to come alone. 

DAKKNESS OF THE NIGHT. 

The character of the night also has been pretty amply developed. If 
ever there was a dark night, it appears to me, from the evidence, that 
this of the 27th of August, 1802, was it. They say that there were other 
marches that night. Yes ; there were. There was the march of King's 
division. I should think a dozen privates had been brought here from 
Gibbon's brigade, King's division, to say how they marched that night. 
Bo you recollect the evidence of General Patrick and General Gibbon 
about it ! They were terminating a march that night, floundering and 
straggling along, going into bivouac at ten or eleven o'clock. The evi- 
dence of General Patrick is that he had to stretch a line of men across the 
road, in order that the troops might be stopped as they came along and 
turned aside, for it was not possible for them otherwise to see that those 
in advance had stopped. Then it is said that Lieutenant Brooke made 
a ride from Pope's headqnarters to Greenwich, ^^ith a troop of sixteen 
men, to carry an order to General Kearney and another to Eeno. Yes ; 
he did. How did he do it I Riding on an unobstructed road it took him 
three hours and ten minutes to go four and a half miles. There is also 
another very signiflcant piece of evidence in the case, l)ecause it is the 
testimony of one of the main witnesses for the government ; Lieut. Col. 
T. C. H. Smith went out on a scout, as he calls it, and he ma<le five miles 
between one o'clock and six o'clock. He says he was scouting for rebels, 
but I don't think he was. I think he was scouting for General Porter; for 
he says that he came around soon after daylight or about six o'clock, at a 
distance of tAvo or three miles from Bristoe, whence he had started, and 
then and there saw the head of the column come up, Mith General Porter 
at the head. Colonel Smith was, as you know, one of the most malignant 
of witnesses against General Porter. But he confessed that there was that 
night, beginning at nine o'clock or thereabouts and extending until eleven 
or twehe o'clock, a storm of darkness that exceeded anything he had ever 
witnessed ; the darkness was absolute ; he could not see his hands 
before his ej-es ; what eyes he has the Board know, because it was those 
marvelous optics that saw treason lurking in the eye of General Porter 
on the next day, the 28tli of August. The darkness, according to him, 
was total. He says it is true, that at one o'clock, when he started out, 
it was not so dark ; that he could see the forms of the houses and fences 
in Bristoe ; but he forgot to add what we called out from him on further 
examination, that the light of the fire at Manassas, that was made by 
Jackson burning our ham and bacon and flour in such immense quanti- 
ties, was still perceptible, but even that light was extinguished by the 
Cimmerian darkness of the storm between nine and twelve o'clock. Xow, 
there is something singular about this. When General Porter was called 
u])on to act ujton this order, it was right in the middle of the Egyptian 
darkness of that night,as depicted by Lieut. Col. T. C. H. Smith. I do 
not think the llecorder had ever considered that Avhen he pretended 
there was not any new evidence in the case on the subject of the dark- 
ness of the night. 

Another suggestion was made by the learned Recorder. I must admit 
that it would be unfair to ask any lawyer or military man to charge his 



33 

miiul with all the proof in tliis case. It is not ])ossil)le. No man's slcnll 
is large eiiongh to carry it all, and therefore I do not l)lam(^ the llccorder 
for forgetting it. I>ut he wonhl not have asked the ([uostion that he 
did ask if he had reniendjcred the evidence, lie asks, why did not Gen- 
eral Porter send back Avord to General Pope that he was not going to 
start nntil daylight, and his reasons for not starting? Well, the answer 
is, he did. After a la])se of sixteen years, when we have snch an infinite 
variety of facts brought out with such i»erfect clearness, it is one of our 
grievances that we still lack four things, four links in the perfect chain 
of proof. I refer to the failure of General Pope to produce the three 
dispatches which he received on the 29th from General Porter, and the 
dispatch that he received on this night of the 27th, when General Por- 
ter, at the close of the deliberations of his council of war, sent a written 
message by special messenger to General Pope, declaring that he could 
not start, and why he could not start, at one o'clock, the hour mentioned 
in the order, and when he was going to start. That is so important 
that I want to call the attention of the Board to the evidence on the 
subject. General Pope, at page 13 of the court-martial record, testified 
as follows: 

Question. Did ho at tliat time, or at any time bt'fore his arrival, explain to yon the 
reason why he did not obey the order ? 

Answer. He wrote me a note, which I received, I tliink, in the morning- of tlie 23tli, 
rcrif ((trill in the montiiuj, pcvhapa a Utile before dai/Iif/ht. I am not iinitc sure about the 
time. The note I have mislaid. I can give the substance of it. I remember the rea- 
sons given by General Porter. If it is necessary to state them I can do so. 

And on page 27 : 

On the contrary, from a note that I had received from him, I did not ui>der>itaiid that 
he would marelt until daijlight in the morning. 

Question. Have you, sir, in your possession, or can you readily tind in this city that 
note? 

Answer. I cannot, as I stated in my evidence yesterday. As the same statements 
contained in the note were made to my aid-de-camp, if other testimony on the subject 
is necessary it can be got fiom him. 

Question. When yon received the note which, according to your recoUeotiou, stated 
that he would be unable to march, or would not march until daylight, will you state 
at what hour you received it ? 

AnsAver. I think that, in my testimony, I stated that it was quite late in the night. 
I do not remember exactly the h(nir ; I think towards morning — towards daylight ; 
perhajjs a little before that. 

Question. Did you take any steps, by message or order, in another form, to the 
accused to expedite his march ? 

Answer. I sent back several officers to try and see General Porter and request him 
to hurry up. 

Xow, he sent back several officers, because of the answer he received 
from General Porter. He also says that this note expressed the reasons 
of the change in the execution of the order. We do not accept General 
Pope's statement that he mislaid this order. He had no right to mislay 
it. If he mislaid it he should have found it. It is not for the general 
commanding an army to come into court and saj' that he has mislaid or 
destroyed his dispatdies when he is seeking the condemnation of an of- 
ticer in respect to matters which would be explained if those dispatches 
Avere produced. General Puggles has testitied that when he ceased to 
be chief of statf of General Pope, on leaving Washingtcm at the end of 
that comi)aign, General Pope reijuired him to hand over all his dispatches, 
which he did ; and he says all were preserved. General kSmith, who was 
aide-de-camp to General Pope, in the same capacity, testified as posi- 
tively that he handed over to General Pope all the disi)a.tch.es that he 
had had. The learned Pecorder has quoted a good deal of Latin. 1 will 
give him a sentence: ^'- Omnia pre-suttnintur contra spoUaforcm." A favor- 



34 

ite maxim of law, that all things are to be presumed against the destroyer 
of evidence. There never was a more outrageous pretense or claim made 
than this, to condemn General Porter for disobedience of an order, and 
for not explaining the nature of his reasons for that disobedience, wlien 
the commander has destroyed or mislaid the note M'hich he received, 
stating wh}' the order could not be obeyed. 

I say there was no delay, no time lost. But suppose that instead of 
this intelligent obedience and this rational exercise of the functions 
of a corps commander, having in view the carrying ont the expressed 
l)urposes of the order in the best way in which they could be accom- 
plished, he had floundered out at one o'clock, as the order required, know- 
ing that he could not, by so doing, get there at daylight in this darkness, 
as described by Colonel Smith, that they had been involved in the inex- 
tricable confusion incident to such starting, and, instead of gettingto Broad 
Bun with the head of the column at eight o'clock, as did hax>pen, the 
corps had been delayed so that the head of the column did not get there 
until ten or eleven o'clock; he would have appeared to obey the order 
and he would not have obeyed it. Would not he have been culpable? 
I am not .competent to answer the question. I put it to you as military 
men; would not he be blam able for making a pretended obedience to 
the order, and not a real and intelligent obedience, if it had resulted in 
a delay that had thwarted the objects of the order as indicated on its 
face '? 

The Recorder has referred to certain worthless evidence on this sub- 
ject, of one Buchanan. Buchanan says that he was in front of Porter's 
lieadquartei's at 3 o'cdock and there were no signs of life till after break 
of day, and that he waited there and saw nothing of Porter till iifter sun- 
rise; but it turns out from the evidence of Locke and ^lonteith, who 
were in personal contact with Porter, that General Portei- was already 
out upon the road endeavoring to clear it to expedite that march in the 
dark. Then Solomon Thomas, corporal Thomas, who is always brought 
in when the Recorder don't know whom else to appeal to — he is Ijrought 
in to say that they did not start as soon as they should; but it turns 
out, on his cross-examination, that he says tliey did start at one o'clock 
a. m., and did not get to Bristoe until two o'clock the next afternoon. 

1 call the attention of the Board to another matter, which seems to 
me to be worthy of consideration. 

Several very eminent legal gentlemen have expressed to General Por- 
ter their views upon this case ; and, if the Board Avill permit me, I would 
hke to read a short extract from the o])inion of Charles O'Conor, which 
seemed to me exceedingly sensible and entitled to the greatest consider- 
tion, and we will treat it as an offset to the opinion of the Recorder: 

After making all ])ropev iiiqniries and cousulting with his chief subordinates, tlie 
accused, in conformity witli their judgment, deferred the rime of starting on tlie di- 
rected mar<-h for two hours. This was regarded by the c<Hirt-martial as an unautlior- 
ized deviation from thi^ chief's instriu'tions. For tlie (h'feiise it was asserted that, 
owing to the (L'lrkness of tlie uiglit, tlie condition of the road and the obstnictioris 
upon it, nothing c<nild have been lost by the change, either in celerity of movement 
or iu the time of arrival, and that the exhaustion of (leiieral Porter's troops from their 
lirevious service was such'that their arrival at daybreak, if ]iracticable l>y means of a 
start at the hour indicated, A>ovdd have be«'ii unavailing for the jmriiose in view. On 
some, of these iioints the evidence was slightly contlictiiig, but that in the aHirmative 
Itrepouderated. In my Judgment no examination of it was or is necessary. The tind- 
iiig manifestly went u]ion the ground that in respect to the hour of starting the order 
was positive in its terms, and that iniiilicit obedience, if ]diysically jiossible, wasthere- 
fore an iiiiperative duty. I think this view was not sustained by the law or the fact. 
A careful inspection of the order should convince any one tliat the writer did not in- 
tend to fix positively the time of starting or that of completing the march ; taking its 
Avhole contents into view, it imported nothing of the kind. The prosecutor was con- 



35 

scions of tliis, for, iipou the trial, lie sought by means of the oral extrinsic evidence 
hereafter stated to iini)ort into the docnnient a meaning quite contrary to its ])urpose 
and to anything Avhicli General Pope intended to convey, or which General Porter 
could have siipjiosed ov even imagined at the time he received it. It advised him (^2) 
that a severe action had taken i)lacc (at Bristoc), in which the enemy had been effect- 
ually and decisively defeated and driven back, so that he was retreating. It also stated 
distinctly (§:{) that the tste]) then in view and determined upon was, '' to drive him 
from Manassas and deny the country between that place and Gainesville." This can- 
not be regarded as idle gossip; the facts must have been connnunicated with a pur- 
))ose, and that i>uri)ose could not have been anythingelse than to give the subordinate 
full knowledge of the object and intent of the directed march. The words of the di- 
r<'ction itself (^l) were imleed peremptory ; but this was merely the writer's fashion 
of speaking. If they weie inten<led to exact the same blind obedience that, standing 
alone, they might seem to enjoin, adding a statement of the cause or motive was su- 
perliuous. Nay, more; it was extremely olyectionable, for it implied tliat the subor- 
dinate was not expected to act blindly, but to exercise his judgment. Looking to 
this announcement (^^^^^2 and 3), we perceive that it conveyed to General Porter, in the 
plainest and most intelligible form, infornuition that his troops were not needed either 
to nuike an assault at daybreak or to aid in repelling one that was a])Y>rehended at 
that time. And, on the ccnitrary, it showed explicitly that they were to be employed 
in a service essentially different. Their presence was sought as auxiliaries in the pur- 
suit of a defeated and retiring enemy. 

On behalf of the prosecution it was testified at the trial that General Pope's reason 
for directing this night march Avas an apprehension that the enemy, though defeated 
and driven back, might learn that his victorious oi)ponent, General Hooker, was short 
of annnunition, and, inasmuch as he had not been actually routed, he might, by that 
intelligence, have been encouT'aged to contemplate an attack on Hooker in the morn- 
ing. The date and tenor of the order, in connection with this very testimony (Rec, 
1>. 12), show that the latter Avas in all resi>ects a mistake. General Pope says it was 
"just at dark "that he learned the av ant of ammunition. The order Avas written, 
dated, and dis])jitched at sundoAvn, an hour before dark. It contained no reference to 
the Avant of anunnnition. Insteatl of advising General Porter that, as this testimony 
suggests, the enemy "still coufronte<l Hooker's diAision at Bristoe Station," it stated 
the A-ery rcA'crse, (. c, that the enemy had been driven back; and most emphatically, 
in w'onls of the i)resent tense, it announced that he Avas tlwit, I. e., at the date of the 
ordei", "reiirin(/ along the railroad." And this, too, Avas made the basis of a super- 
added exultant resolve to folloAV him into the territory toAvhich he had retreated, and 
thus clear the country of him. It could not be supposed that General Pope had in his 
mind Avhen he dictated this order the want of ammunition or aji ai>preheuded assault 
at day)>reak. 

The evidence of his somewhat communicative messenger, and the wlnde frame of the 
order, ]»reclude such a a'Icav of the case. These facts must haA*e come to General Pope's 
knoAvledge subseqiiently to the transmission of the order. Peremptorily enough, to be 
sur(^, in vS 1 he directed the start at one o'clock ; but, conscious that in vSvS 2 and 3 he 
had shown the absence of any necessity for a night march, he returned to the Object 
at ^ 5 and, in what unist be deemed an advisory or persuasive shape, expressed the de- 
sire for an arriAal at daybreak. Preliminarily to the expi-ession of this desire he caI- 
dently attempted to state some more forcible reason for it. But the attempt was 
ineffecttial; foi", in fact, none existed except that already indicated, /. e., the project 
of an eaily start from Bristoe in the intended pursuit. The phrase "on all accounts" 
defined no ground of urgency ; and the Avord "necessary" was eA'ideutly employed as 
synonymous with expedient. (Pec, pp. 19, 20.) Inexact Avriters, and even those who 
are generally accurate, often use the word in that sense. I have said that this attempt 
to engraft upon the Avritten order, by means of oral extrinsic cAidence, a su])plement 
or postscript (|uite inconsistent with its actual terms, must haAC been founded in mis- 
take. Using the expression in no incnljiatory sense, I must say it appears to be a mere 
afterthought; not, indeed, an afterthought conceivc'd in subtlety, but arising from an 
involuntary misconception. Whether such a niistakcexisted or not is, hoAvever, quite 
i)nmaterial, as there was no charge except for disoljediencc of the Avritten o der. 

Besides, General Porter could not have divined that in giA'ing the order General 
Pope Avas influenced by an object the very opitosite of that Avhich Avas clearly stated 
and expressed. If the oral testimony Avas correc't, the dispatch Avas most uuAvisely 
framed. It Avas actually misleading in its character and tendency. So great is the 
conflict betAveen the written and oral evidence of General Pope's intent and obj(>ct, That, 
if the dispatch had been lost or sui)pressed, there might Ikiac appeared to be ,s(mie 
color for this charge. Witli that Avritiug before the court, there being no pretense 
that the messeng<!r communicated anything about the want of annnunition or the 
anticijiation of an attack in the morning, the ccwiclusion of the court seems unaccount- 
able. 

General Popti was ten miles off; the conditi(ui of Porter's corps as to marching capa- 

4 CH 



36 

city was (luite nukuowu to him, and the order affirmatively iudica ted that nothing was 
designed bnt a general movement in the direction of Bristoe Station for the purpose 
of pursuing an enemy //(f'H on a retreat. Ihider these circumstances it seems quite 
clear that Gejieral Porter acted judiciously iu avoiding the exhaustion of his already 
fatigued eor])s by a night marcli. This, it could he jterceived, wonhl enable him to 
bring them to the jioint iiulicated Avithout undue loss of time, refreshed by ueedful re- 
l)ose and in lit condition to march on still further, if recjuired, in pursuit of the flying 
foe. His action was more conformable to the spirit, intent, and actual import of the 
whole order than if he had started at one o'clock, in literal comi)liance Avith its first 
sentence. Acccn-ding to very ample testimony, from sources entitled to the utmost 
contidence, he judiciously exercised, in conducting the retpiired march, a discretion 
vested in him by military law; and on this charge he was manifestly entitled to an 
acquittal. 

The Board then, at G o'clock, adjourned until to -nioirow moniiiiji- at 
10 o'clock. 



FOllTY-FOUETH DAY. 

West Point, January 11, 1879 — 10 a. m. 

The IJoai'd met pursuant to the forefioinj.;' order and adjournment. 

Present, Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, U. S. A. ; Brig-. Gen. A. H. Terry, 
U. S. A. ; Col. George W. Getty, U. S. A., and the Pecorder; also, Fitz- 
John Porter, the petitioner, and the several gentlemen of counsel. 

The reading of the minutes of the previous session was omitted, with 
the consent of the petitioner. 

Mr. Choate resumed his argument on behalf of the petitioner, as 
follows : 

Mr. Choate said : In reference to the subject of the state of public 
feeling at the time the prosecution of General Porter was initiated, and 
to the distress and excitement, especially of the authorities at Washing- 
ton, where the public feeling culminated, I omitted to read a passage 
or two from the rei)()rt of General l*ope to the Committee on the Con- 
duct of tlie War. I wish to read this morning" from page 106 of that 
report, where he descrilies the origin of the complaints — I will niot say 
the beginning of them, but where they take shape in ofticial form, pre- 
sented l)}^ the commanding-general of the Army of Virginia to the 
authorities at Washington. It is in a dispatch written by him on the 
1st of September, at Centreville, and addressed to Major-General Hal- 
leck, General-in-Chief. He says: 

I think it my duty to call your attention to the unsoldierly and dangerous condnct 
of many brigade and some division connnauders of the foi'ces sent here from the 
])eninsula. Every Avord and act and intention is discouraging, and calculated to 
break down the spirits of the men and prodnee disaster. One conunander of a corps, 
who was ordered to march from Manassas Junction to join mcuearGrovctou, although 
lie was only live miles distant, faih-d to get up at all — Avorse still, fell back to Ma- 
nassas Avithout a fight, and iu plain hearing, at less than three miles distance, of ii 
furious battle wliich raged all day. It Avas only in consequence of ])ereni[itory orders 
that he joined me nt^xt day; one of his lu'igailes, the brigadier-general of whi(di pro- 
fessed to be looking for his division, absolutely remained all day at Centreville, in 
plain Aiew of the l)attle, and made no attempt to join. What renders theAA'hole mat- 
ter worse, these are both otticers of the Regular Ariay, Avho do not hold back from igno- 
rance or fear. Their constant talk, indulged in ]iul)licly and in pronnscuous company, 
is that the Army of the Potomac Avill not fight; that they are demoralized by Avitli- 
drawal from the jx'uinsula, Ac. When such example is set by officers of high rank, 
the intlnence is Aery )»a(l among those in subordinate stations. Yon liaA'e hardly an 
idea of the demoralization anioug officers of high rank iu the Potomac army, arising 
in all instances friuii ]>ersonal feeling iu relation to changes of connnander-in-chief 
and others. These men are mere tools or parasites, bnt their example is producing 
and must necessarily produce Aery disastrous results. You should know these things, 
as you alone can stop it. Its source is beyond my reach, though its elfects are Aery 



37 

perceptible and very claiigeroiis. I am emleavoriug- to do all I cau, and will luo^t 
assuredly put tlieui where they shall light or run away. 

l^ow, to see what effect these words had (and by and by we shall be 
able to judge what measure of truth there was in them), the effect 
appears m the same report at page 189 : 

I made my personal camp at Ball's Cross-Roads, and on the morning of the 3d of 
September repaired to Washingtou, with a few officers of my staff, and reported in 
person to the General-in-Chief, the Secretary of War, and the President. Each one of 
these high functionaries received me with great cordiality, and expressed in the most 
decided manner his appreciation of my services, and of the conduct of my military 
operations throughout. 

Qreat hidif/uation was expressed at the treaeheroiis and iDifaithfitl conduct of officers of 
hif/h rank who were directly or indirectlji connected with these operations, and so decided was 
this fcrlinf/, and so determined the purpose to execute justice upon them, that I was urged to 
furnish for use to the f/ovcrnment, immediately, a brief official report of the campaign. So 
anxious were the authorities that this report should be in their possession at once, 
that General Halleck urged me to remain that day in Washington to make it out. I 
told him that my papers, dispatches, tSrc, were at my camp, near Ball's Cross Eoads, 
and that I couhl not well make a report without having them by me. He still urged 
me to remain with great persistence, but I tinally returned to my'camp, and proceeded 
to make out my report. The next day it was delivered to General Halleck, but by 
that time influences of questionable character, and transactions of most nuquestiou- 
able impropriety which were well known at the time, had entirely changed the pur- 
poses of the authorities. It is not necessary, and perhaps would scarcely be in place, 
for me to recount these things here, and I shall therefore only speak of results which 
followed. The first result was that my report, so urgently denianded the day before in 
order that the facts might at once be laid before the country and made the basis of 
such action as justice demanded, it was resolved to suppress. The reason for this 
change of purpose was sufficiently apparent. The influences and transactions to 
which I refer seemed to the authorities to make it essential to the temporary interests 
of the goverument that General McClellau should be reassigned to the command, and, 
as a result, that the bad faith and bad conduct which the government was so anxious 
the day before to expose should at least for the present, be overlooked. 

Here we have it clearly stated and confessed by General Pope himself 
that the alarm and distrust which his dispatch of September 1, from 
Oentreville, excited in the mind of the government at alleged treachery 
and infidelity among the generals of the Ai*my of the Potomac led 
directly to the avowed purpose of executing justice ui)0u them, or, at 
least, as the event showed, of finding a victim among them, and that it 
was to reports and information to be furnished in hot haste by General 
Pope, the author of the charges, that they looked for material upon 
which to base aud conduct a prosecution. If General Porter was really 
innocent, and if those were tlie motives in which his prosecution orig- 
inated, and which sustained and carried it through to the end, then we 
are not without jiroof upon the record of the truth of what has been so 
often observed, that General Porter stands iu the position of a scape- 
goat for the calamities that had overwhelmed the people, and the trans- 
gressions which had been committed, or which were supposed to have 
been committed, not by him, l^ut by others. And that that matter may 
be tested, I have looked into the original authority, to see what the real 
character of the scape-goat was; and for that purpose I beg leave to 
read three or four verses from the sixteenth chapter of Leviticus, where 
the matter is fully set forth: 

And Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats; one lot for the Lord, and the other 
lot for the scapegoat. 

And Aaron shall bring the goat upon which the Lord's lot fell, and offer him for a 
sin ottering. 

Hut the goat, on which the lot fell to he the scapegoat, shall he presented alive — 

Which may account for the failure of the court-martial to sentence him 

to be shot — 

before the Lord, to make an atonement with him, and to let him go for a scapegoat into 
the wilderness. 



38 

And Aarou Hliall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confvus over 
him (lU the iniquities of tJie children of Israel, and aU their transgressions in all their sins, 
putting them upon the head of the goat, and shall send him away hg the hand of a ft man 
into the wilderness. 

And the goat shall bear npon him all their iniquities unto a land not inhabited: 
and he shall let go the goat in the wilderness. 

And he that let go the goat for the scapegoat shall ^ash his clothes, and bathe his 
flesh in water, and afterward come into the camp. 

Now, wlio is the Aaron of tliis (Iramatie performance may easily be 
conjeotnred; and bow can tbere be timcb more donbt as to wbo fills tbe 
role of tlie man wbo let go tbe goat for tbe scapegoat ont into tbe 
wilderness^ for it was be who therchi/ secured the 7ca.^Jiiii(/ofhisoicn handSy 
(Old returned info the canq). Inj which I understand that he continued in the 
military service of the United States. 

OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 29. 

iSTow we reacb tbe matters of tbe 20tb of Angiist, wbicb 1 sball en- 
deavor to dispose of as briefly as possible. 

Tbe situation on tlie morning of tbe 29tb of Angnst is best displayed 
by tbe dispatcbes of General Pope, and whatever we can extract from 
tbose certainly tbe Eecorder will not object to. Tbe movement of tbat 
day originated witb a disi)atcb from General Pope, at a very early bour 
in tbe morning, an bonr wbicb be is fond of describing as tbe earliest 
blusb of dawn — 3 a. m. Tbe situation tben was tbat General Porter 
Avas at Bristoe witb bis corps, where be bad been directed tbe day before 
to wait and rest bis troops, their fatigued condition being recognized by 
the general in command. General Pope had gone on expecting to con- 
centrate his forces, as I understand, at Centreville, behind Bull Eun, 
excepting those which, as he then thought, lay between General Jackson 
and Thoroughfare Gap, consisting of McDowell's and Sigel's troops. 
He was of the belief that, if be had a fight, it should be, certainly, some- 
Avhere between Gainesville and Centreville ; and 1 think the dispatcbes 
will show you tbat be expected to have this fight behind Bull liun.. 
Now, cjuite a contest has been made here as to whether General ]VrcDow- 
ell disclosed to General Porter that that was tbe original pnrjiose tbat 
morning of tbe commander-in-chief, or whether that had been bis view 
on the previous day. But if the dispatcbes of General Pope show you 
that he expected the fight to be at Centreville, which is behind Bull 
Pun, all that controversy falls out of tbe case. He sends, at three o'clock 
in tbe morning, from bis headquarters near Bull Eun, this dispatch to 
General Porter : 

General McDowell has intercepted the retreat of Jackson ; Sigel is immediately on 
the right of McDowell. 

He was in entire unconsciousness of the retreat of McDowell's force 
from behind Jackson, although it had then actually taken place two 
hours before. 

Kearney and Hooker maich to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn ; Major-General 
Pope directs yon to move ujyon Centrerille at the first dawn of day with your whole 
command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you should be here 
at a very early hour iu the morning. A screre engagement is likelg to take place — 

[That is, of course, at Centreville — ] 

and your jn'esence is 7iecessary. 

The Eecorder has laid great stress upon this statement in the dispatch, 
tbat a severe engagement is likely to take place, and tbat General Por- 
ter's presence was necessary. So do I. But in a different direction, I 



39 

call it to the attention of the Board, as declaring- as eniijhatically as 
words could declare that he expected Porter to be then at Centerville, 
for the ])ur])ose' of taking' iiart in an engagement to be had there. That 
was, undoul)tedly, his expectation. Tlie heights of Ceutreville was the 
place where he might ho[)e, if he could hnd Ja<*kson there, for a success- 
ful engagement, as Jackson had MclJowell and Kicketts behind him. It 
so hai)pened, however, that at midnight of the previous day, the whole 
groundwork of the movement contemplated by this dispatch, without 
his knowing it, had fallen out ; instead of McDowell ha^■ing• intercepted 
the retreat of Jackson, that had faile<l, and his force, as I have said, and 
as it has been so often said, had moved away, leaving the way open behind 
Jackson, at a time, too, when everyl>ody knows that the main army of Lee 
was pressing forward to join him. and was coming through Thoroughfare 
Gap. Xow, the Board will observe that the suspicion had not yet reached 
General Pope, and no rumor had reached him, that McDowell was not, 
where this dispatch places him, behind Jacksou, cutting him off from any 
relief from the west. General Porter i)roceeded with the execution of 
that order. He advanced from Bristoe as soon as could be done after 
the receipt of this order, in the direction of Ceutreville, aiul his force 
arrived at Manassas Junction, or Manassas Station, or a little beyond ; 
and he, himself, reached Bull Eun, or very near Bull Eun, where it has 
been testitied he found a messenger from General Pope that morning. 

The Eecorder has somewhat gratuitously, I think, indicated that there 
was some delay in the execution of this order on the part of General 
Porter. It does not seem to me so, and it is not worth while to discuss 
it. It has been ably and fully discussed by Mr. Maltl\v. I challenge a 
careful inspection of the record, to bear me out in the proposition that 
this order was faithfully carried out by General Porter to the best of his 
ability, and that he was making rapid headway to the point to which he 
was directed, to Ceutreville, there to take part in a severe engagement, 
expected by General Pope to take phice, when the whole movement in 
that direction was counteracted by the receipt of the next dispatch, which 
turned him to the right about face to go tiack upon the road upon which 
he had come, and to proceed upon Gainesville — the explanation of this 
being, of course, that General Pope, in the mean time, between 3 a. m., 
when he wrote the dis]iatch which I have already read, and about eight 
or nine o'clock, when he wrote this next dispatch which I am about to 
read, had received news of the catastrophe which had taken place In^ the 
falling back of McDowell's force from behind Jacksou. You will see 
that General Pope, in those six hours, had got from near Bull Eun, 
where his headquarters were during the night and at 3 a. m., to Ceutre- 
ville, where this was written, probably at about eight o'clock — from eight 
to nine o'clock. 

C'ENTKEVILLK, AltflHSt 29th, 1662. 
Pnsli forward witli yonv corps aud Kiii<;'s division, ■wliicli you will take with you, 
upou Gainesville. I am following the euciuy <lowu the Warrenton turnpike. Be ex- 
peditious, or we shall lose much. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major-Ginerul Commuiiillng. 
Major-General FiTZ-JoHX Porter. 

It is observable that in this order there is no mention of General IMc- 
Dowell. The first dispatch had state<l that McDowell had intercepted 
the retreat of Jackson. This disi)atch, giving a new direction to the 
movements of Porter's (torps because of the departure of King's force 
from the turnpike, makes no reference to McDowell, or his great army 
corps, except what is implied in the order to Porter to take King's divi- 



40 

sion with liim. Xow, the first question is, what was the reason of that ? 
The reason is manifest, in the conspicuous fact uj)on this record, that 
McDowell at that moment was lost — lost to the commanding- general, 
lost to the Army, lost to all the world, and had been lost since four 
o'clock on the afternoon before ; and it was necessary that King's di^^- 
sion, which had fallen back in the immediate neighborhood of Manassas 
Junction where Porter was, should be put under competent command, 
and it was, therefore, placed under the command of General Porter. 
That being so is demonstrated by a map which I propose to offer as a 
l^art of my argument, showing the movements of McDowell i)ersonally 
from four o'clock on the afternoon of the 2Sth until midnight, or after 
midnight of the 28th, and where he was during that most imi>ortant 
period, while his troops, in defiance of positive orders, were abandoning 
the very key of the Federal position and throwing away the only chance 
of the capture of Jackson. His testimony is that, before the fight, on 
tlie turn])ike between King's division and Ewell's on the evening of the 
2Sth, being evidently in a state of great anxiety in consequence of the 
situation, he went in search of General Pope, and he went for the reason ' 
that he Avas better informed as to the situation than General Pope, and 
that General Poi)e would be benefited by a little conversation with him. 
That, I believe, is his exact language. He started out at four o'clock 
from a place on the turnpike a little west of where the fight of the 28th 
was, and he made this remarkable ride which will rank in history with 
Sheridan's ride, although under dift'erent circumstances. 

[The map was here explained to the Board, and will be found in the 
appendix as map F.] 

Thus the temporary disappearance of General McDowell is the obvi- 
ous reason for this order to put his troops under the command of Gen- 
eral Porter. 

Now, the immediate military object of this order is one ujion which I 
take issue with the Eecorder. The Eecorder says that the intent was to 
get this force of King's division, which had retreated from the turnpike, 
increased bj' Porter's corps, to which it was now added, back to the very 
l)lace of the battle of the night before between King and Ewell's force, 
which we will suppose to be Gibbon's woods, a very familiar ground to 
us now through the map, and on the pike just west of Groveton. Well, 
I do not know Avhat military object there could have been in getting 
them back there, if he wished to retrieve the position that had been lost 
the night before by their retreat, because the enemy were then under- 
stood by everybody to be in possession of that battle-ground, from which 
our forces had retreated. No ; the object of the order is evident to every- 
body. As has been asserted here, on our i)art, and as has always been 
asserted by General Porter — you will fiud it in his preliminary state- 
ment — it was to get this increased force back behind the lebel i)Osition, 
between them and Thoroughfare Gap, between them and, if possible, 
Gainesville, and at Gainesville, which was the comumnding position of 
the whole situation. There has been an attempt made to show, b}- Gen- 
eral Gibbon, that it was to put the increased force right back into Gib- 
bon's woods; and you know that the whole argument of the liccorder 
on this ]>oint was that, when he got to Dawkins' Branch, Porter was 
pointed a way proceeding straight n\y to (Jibbon's woods, and that he 
ought to have gone there, (ieneral Gibbon does not say any such thing. 
I desire to call the attention of the Board to exactly what he does say. 

General Gibbon, on page 243 of the new record, says: He having been 
concerned in the retreat, and being desirous that the mischievous con- 



41 

sequences of it should be remedied, went early in the iiiorniiiA' in search 
of General Pope: 

Qttostidu. Describe wliat occurred at that interview. 

Answer. I told liiui what had occurred the night hefore, and that the division liad 
]cit tlie line of tlie AVarrenton pike, and that I had ridden over and cave him the 
information, liecanse the aiiseiice of troops from tliat point left the Avay open for Lee's 
army to join Jacksoji, and that I thought it was a matter of importance that he should 
have this information, inasmuch as I xiresnmed if he had any troops to send out to that 
point, that lie ^^ ould dis))ateh them. After some little conversation, the particulars 
of which I do not recall, he turned to Colonel Ruggles, his adjutant-general, and 
directed him to write an order directing General Porter to move with his corps out 
on the Gainesville road, and take King's division with him, and gave it to me to let 
me carry it back to General Porter. The order was given. I was furnished with a 
fresh horse and started back. I rode rapidly as I couhl to Manassas Junction, and 
near the junction met General Porter, and delivered him the order. 

Question. Before leaving the conversation with General Pojte, do yon recollect Gen- 
eral Poi)e stating to you w hat he was doing in reference to this probable approach of 
the enemy through Thoroughfare Gap, with reference to the disposition of his troops? 
I wish you would try to recall what was said in that conversation. You informed him, 
as I understand, that your division, by leaving the Wai'renton pike, had left the road 
open for Lee's army to g(5t up and unite with Jackson. Now, wliat did General Pope 
say, if anything, in reference to the disposition he was making of his troops, or had 
made of them, with a view to jirevent tliat ? 

Answer. General Pope did not seem to appreciate, I thought, the fact which I in- 
formed him of, that the absence of those troops from the Warrenton turnpike left the 
door open to Lee's army to come up. He said, "Wh^-, we are pressing Jacksou now!" 
I cannot pretend to repeat the words. 

General Pope apparentlj" failing fully to realize the effect of the fall- 
ing back of King's division, and still hanging on to the idea that they 
were pressing Jackson in front. 

As I say, General Pojte did not seem to appreciate the importance of what I regarded 
as fatal; that is, the absence of troops from the Warrenton turnpike, between the 
detachment of Jackson and Lee's main army. To my mind, the fact that he was 
pressing Jackson from the east did not appear conclusive at all that he could ruin 
Jackson simply because he was pressing him back to Lee's main army. 

That is important in two aspects. It shows that General Pope under- 
stood perfectly well that it was not any small detachment of the rebel 
force that was i)ressing through Thoroughfare Gap to relieve Jackson, 
but that it was the main army of Lee, from which Jackson's force was a 
detachment. General Porter received this order at Manassas Station, 
or thereabouts, and just then, singularly enough, General McDowell ap- 
pears. Well, what was the situation ? It has been claimed that they 
fell unde]' tbat article of war which provides that where forces under 
difl'erent commanders are united upon a march, accidentally or other- 
wise, the senior hi rank takes connnand. That was not the situation. 
General McDowell had no troops. Khig's division, which was the only 
one of his corps that was then there, had been given to Porter, and he, 
under his responsibility, as corps commander had been compelled to 
take command of it with his own. The conduct of both generals shows 
perfectly well that that was recognized, although I know that General 
McDowell has intimated an oi)inion that he did have command or might 
have commanded. Xot so. Because, if he claimed connnand, why did 
he not lead the column ? Why did he ask Porter, as a favor, that he 
would put King on his right in forming his line, so that he could have 
him when General I*ope said so ? Why did he linger l)ehind at ^lamis- 
sas Station when there was this important order, important upon its 
face, Ui move on Gainesville and be expeditious or they would lose much — 
why did he linger at .Manassas Junction? That is fully ex])lained 
from his own testimony, and from Pope's testimony, namely, that he was 
impressed with his si'tnation and fully reabzed it; that wbile he might 



42 

be seuior in rank to (Teneral Porter, yet King's division liad been taken 
from liiiii and turned over to Porter, juntas tliese important movements 
were taking- jdace. How distasteful this was to McDowell and how 
embarrassing- to Porter appears irom their interview near Manassas Sta- 
tion. You can conceive how awkward and trying- it was to both of tliem ; 
under what restraint it necessarily placed both of them ; how embarrass- 
ing to McDowell ; and how ten times more so to General Porter, Well, 
General ]\IcDowell, to cure that, writes his note to Geneial Pope, pro- 
testing against King's division being taken from him, and asking that 
it might be restored; and then from that follows the joint order, the 
violation of which is the subject now under consideration. 

THE JOINT OlIDER TO M'DOWELL AND POKTEli. 

Head(juakti;i!s Ahmv ok Yii;gixia, 

Ceuirevillr, Jiif/ii>si2[), ISm. 

Yon will ])l('!i.sc move lorward with your joint comniiuul.s towards Gainesvillr. I sent 
Geuciiil I'ortfi- written oiders to that eticct an lioi'.r and a Latt' aj;'o. Heintzeluiau, 
Sigel, and Keuo are movino- on "Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from 
Gainesville. I desire that as soon as eommunieation is established l)etween this force 
and your own, the Avhole connnand shall halt. It nniy be neeessary to fall back be- 
hind Bull Kuu, at Centreville, to-nif;ht. I presume it will be so on account of our 
sui)]>lies. I haA'e sent no orders, of any description, to Eicketts, and none to interfere 
in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aide- 
de-caiu]), last niftht, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton pike until the 
trooiis Irom here should fall on the enemy's tlank and rear. I do not even know 
Kicketts' i)Osition, as I have not been able to find out where General McDowell was, 
until a late hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate ste]»s to com- 
municate with General Kicketts, and instruct him to join the other divisions of his 
corps, as soon as jiracticable. If any considerable advantages are to be gained by de- 
parting from this order, it will not lie strictly carried out. One thing must be held in 
view, that the troo])s must occupy a jiosition from which they can reach Bull Kun to- 
night, or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the em-niy is mov- 
ing in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow nigiit, or the 
next day. ^[y own heaihjuarters will, forthe present, be with Heintzelman's corps, or 
at this place. 

JOHX POPE, 
Major-General VommatnlliKj. 

Generals McDowkli- and I'ouTioi:. 

This joint order was not received until General Porter had reached 
the front at Dawkins' Branch, and the messenger who brought it, Dr. 
Abbott, declared that, bringing duplicates of it, which he took fro]n 
General Pope about ten o'clock in the morning, he fcmnd General IMc- 
Dowell somewhere between Manassas Junction and Dawkins' Branch, 
and delivered him his copy and then rode ra])i(lly on to Porter, found 
him at the head of the column at Bawkins' Branch and gave him his 
copy. Tlie>' were about a mile a]>art. That would very nearly account 
for the situation, because (ieneral ^rcDowcll says tliat at tliat time, at 
least, a full brigade of King's division marching behind Porter's had 
])assed Bethlehem cluirch and had got out, as I understand it, very near 
the Five Forks load, which the Becorder has now nuide the wonderful 
discovery was a road which somebody ought to have taken. Now, when 
General ^IcDowell and Geiu^ral Porter were together near Manassas 
Station, and had this unideasant talk — of (-ourse, it must Imve l>een un- 
pleasant to botli of them ; nothing could have lieen more disagreeable — 
General ^McDowell tlu^n declared liis Avillingness to recognize the situa- 
tion, stating that King's division had been taken from him and given to 
General Pcu'ter, and ex]»resse<l the wish that l^orter, when he formed 
his line of battle, would phu^e King's division u])on the rigid of him, so 
that it would connect with his own force, which was un<lerstood to be 



43 

south of tlie Waneiiton i)ike, or iij) at the AVarreuton pike in the neigh- 
borhood of Grovetoii. Now, wiieii tleueial iMoDowell getts his copy of the 
joint order he rides iumiediately forward, as he says, and overtakes Gen- 
eral Porter. IIow soon he reached Porter, after the joint order reached 
Porter, you can iniaj>ine, because the messenger was only a mile away, 
and he followed the messenger, and must have reached General Porter 
ahnost immediately with the joint order. 

Before considering the (juestion of the joint order, and as there is no 
fault found with Porter's conduct up to the time, at any rate, of the 
receipt of that order, and as there has never been any complaint of his 
execution, so far as he could, of this i)revious order to push forward 
"SAith his own force and King's division upon Gainesville, I want to call 
the attention of the Poard to what he did umk'r that order, before the 
receipt of the joint order, because it seems to me that is very important; 
it discloses. to us the military situation at which he had arrived, and the 
animus which inspired him un<ler that order, under his instructions to 
move upon Gaines\ille. oSTow, if Porter had any intention of holding 
back that day, it seems to me that is the time when he would have mani- 
fested it, is it not ? ]>ut what happened ? In the tirst place, it is neces- 
sary" to understand the point at which he had arrived. General Warren 
has fully described to the court his knowledge of the situation, and the 
Board has knowledge of it, as depicted by the map, and this makes it 
unnecessary for me to describe the stronghold at Dawkins' Branch, 
which Porter had reached, or that other similar stronghold, on the other 
side of that branch, which Mas already in possession of the army of Long- 
street. Beyond the Aalley was this other commanding situation, not un- 
like that at Dawkins' Branch, which he had already reached, and the bed 
of which stream was the dividing valley. To the right stretched the 
ravine, through which the stream continued, and an open space beyond 
that spread onward toward Groveton, fully commanded in all its pai'ts 
by the batteries of Longstreet from the opposite stronghold which he 
occupied, i^ot all known to General Porter, of course, for he had never 
been there before, luit sutticiently known, as a glance at the map will 
show, to enable him to realize the imjtortance and strength of that posi- 
tion, Avhich he had reached, and of the similar ])Osition in front of him, 
which the enemy already held. Then, it appears, they halted. Has 
that halt ever been com])lained of? Not in the least. McDowell says 
that " up to twelve o'clock" — which must have been from half an hour to 
an hour after the halt — ''Porter's movements were unexceptionable." 
What kind of a halt was it ? Was it ordered by General Porter ? That 
does not appear. But the reason appears : it was that necessary, spon- 
taneous, involuntary halt that any column of troops, I suppose, makes 
when they come into the actual i)resence of the enemy, placed in a posi- 
tion corresponding and opposite to that which they had themselves 
reached, and which, in this instance, was quite as inaccessible to Porter 
as Porter's own ])osition on Dawkins* Branch was inaccessible, in a mili- 
tary pohit of view, to the enemy across the stream. Now, what does 
General Porter do ? You will observe that there is a good deal of time 
from the arrival of General Porter at the head of his column at Daw- 
kins' Branch — he was neai- the head of the column Avhen it halted — 
there is a good deal of time between that and (leneral JMcDowell's 
arrival, and the arrival of the joint order. lie is not yet under the 
direction of the joint order. His direction was to move upon Gaines- 
ville l)y the order under which he was then acting. The road was the 
road to Gainesville. What did he do ? He prepared, as I sup])ose any 
wise comnmnder would, to move upon Gainesville, according to the 



44 

order — to continue to move upon Gainesville. He (lei)loyed Lis leading- 
di"\dsion, ^lorell's, on the right and left of the road ; he had Sykes' divis- 
ion then drawn up in column heliind jNIorell ; he sent General Butter- 
field Avith his brigade across Dawkins' Branch, where this enemy was in 
sight upon the opposite hill ; he sent out his line of skirmishers under 
Colonel ^Marshall. That was the situation when the joint order and 
General McDowell arrived. 

ISTow, was that right ? Did that show zeal and earnestness and skill 
on his part 1 It is for you to judge. General McDowell testifies em- 
phatically that it was all right. Now, the issue between ourselves and 
the Recorder is right here; he says that without and independent of the 
joint order, Porter was under orders from 3IcDowell ; there, says the 
Recorder, was his mistake ; that duty required him to march up this 
road, as he calls it, from Deats to Groveton, a road which is no road, a 
road which I think is a fiction of the Recorder's imagination. General 
Warren, when he went to make a map, found none there ; I do not under- 
stand that the Recorder, when he went to make his personal inspection, 
found any road there ; but somebody told him there had been a road 
there, so he marked it doAvn upon his map. It is not at all material, as 
it seems to me, for the deciding of this issue, whether there was a road 
there or not. If there was no enemy opposite, the country was all one 
road, for all the way to Gibbon's wood was open, and this resort to an 
imaginary road is wholly unnecessary ; but on the other hand, if there 
was an enemy in force upon the opposite rise of ground, then it does not 
matter, I supiiose, whether there is or ever was a road there or not. If 
there was a road, we suppose they could not march by the flank exposed 
to this enemy in force upon the opposite rise. On that matter the tes- 
timony of General ^Varren as to Avhat was the proper mode, supposing 
that a-military commander arrived with a corps at Dawkins' Branch, in 
that situation, finding a force upon the opposite rise of ground, knowing 
from the cannonading at Groveton that something of a hostile character 
was going on there, as to what was the proper mode if he wished to make 
a movement to the right, a movement to get oxev to Groveton to take 
part in Avhat was then going on — how he was to do it — that testimony 
was so important that I beg now to call it to the attention of the Board. 
It is a long while since it was taken, but it explains the situation very 
exactly, and is found on page 43 of the record. He is being carefully 
examined by the president of the Board : 

Question, What is the distance, measured along the ridge occupied by Morell, from 
the Avagou-road to the railroad / 

Answer. A little over half a mile. 

Question. Along the same general line from the railroad to the -vvagon-road above; 
■what is the name of that road '! 

Answer. The Warrenton and Alexandria road. That would lie a little more than 
three-(|narters of a mile. 

Question. Bearing a little more to the north, kee)>ing the military position from 
Morell's right, following along the edge of the woods to the north '! 

Answer. About thn'PMiuarters of a nnle. This ridge (on Dawkins' Branch) oontiu- 
nes along till about this j'lace (.James Xickerson's) facing this valley. Then these 
little ridges run on in this direction (Five Forks). 

Question. If you turn to the north, would there be any jiositiou along therefrom 
Morell's right ! 

Answer. There would be no good itosition anywhere in that direction, until this 
road was obtained (the (dd Warrenton, Alexandria, and Washington i-oad). 

Question. The natural ]iosition tlien woniil be around here if you had to lay a de- 
fensive line / (Around and behind Five Forks. ) 

Answer. If I had to hold Poiter's position ])ermauent]y. with time to pre])are to do 
so, I should have let the left rest where his was, extend along the ridge to the right 
to about the railroad, then take the highest line to the east and rest the right on Mount 
Pone ; tlien I would slash all the timber in front of mv line for at least half a mile. 



45 

That Avn.s soinetliing', I suppose, not to be tliouglit of by one who was 
ordered to move towards Gaiuesville. 

Question. What is tlie character of this cotiutry between the forest aud the Sudley 
Spring road ? 

Answer. Fainning country ; descendiuo- very considerably towards the southeast. 

Question. Could a coluuiu of tniops with artillery move through there .' 

Answer. Yes; but they would have to make crossings for streams and little ditches 
and things of that kind. 

Question. Indicate on the map, for present information, Avhere Reynolds was on the 
29th, if yon have such information. 

Answer. I have not it very definite, but it was somewhere in these woods (between 
Chinn's and Groveton). 

Qnesti(m. Can yon give the general direction of his line on that day ? 

Answer. If he had met the skirmish line, the advance line of Jackson, early in the 
day, his line wotdd face north ; if late in the day he had seen the approach of Long- 
street, he probably would ha\"e faced westward. 

Question. Al)OUt how far from Groveton was his left ? 

Answer. That I cannot say ; I cannot say where his left or right was, or where he 
faced. 

Question, Give us now the distance from Groveton, the shortest line, where Comi)ton 
lane strikes the old Warrenton road ? 

Answer. About a mile and a half. This map will enable you to see very easily what 
roads the Army used independent of these routes. There were no fences then, or if 
there were, armies disregarded them. 

Question. Give the distance from the junction of the Gaiuesville road with the 
Siidley road to New Market, and thence to Compton's house '1 

Answer. Three miles to New Market, or a little over ; to Compton's lane, a little over 
four miles. ^ 

Xow, here is the important part : 

Question. What is the nature of this position with respect to an advance of an enemy 
from the west (pointing to the Comptou house) ; I do not mean that exact point, but 
this general position between the headwaters of Dawkins' Branch and of Young's 
Branch f 

Answer. Yon have got to suppose the position of the enemy. Suppose the advance 
is from the west, on the old Warrenton and Alexandria road — there really is no good 
line. This would be the line on the rif Ige between Chinn's Branch and Holknm Branch, 
but it would place both tianks iuto the woods, and I'ender them liable to be got around 
by the enemy without his being seen. In the woods the flanks would have no effective 
tire. The natural position to resist an advance from the west is here (parallel to the 
Sudley Springs road, between Wheeler's and Dogau's) ; not a very good position either. 

Question. Not a good position anywhere there ? 
. Answer. No, sir; but that is the' one that we held finally, and that we held on the 
night of the 30th. 

Question. Is tliis ground here, generally speaking, commanded by this ? 

Answer. The most prominent ridge runs this way (from east to west, from Britt's to 
Compton's). If you form a line here, the enemy coming from the west could flank 
readily at Britt's. It is pretty nearly the same level. It is a high ridge and this ridge 
east of Carraco's is high. 

* s ^ # # » * 

Question. I understood this railroad (Manassas Gap Railroad) is such that iufantry 
coukl move along in column ? 

Answer. Yes, sir ; rather by the flank than column. 

Question. Could they deploy along Dawkins' Branch here liy the road from the 
woods ? 

Answer. Yes ; I think they might. 

Question. Could they see the valley in front of them some hundreds of yards ? 

Answer. 0, yes; they couhl see part of it, and all of the cleared places here (ou the 
southwest side of the high ridge which lies southeast of Carraco's). 

Questiou. The only difHculty across here would be the occupation of these heights 
by the enemy, as I understand '? 

' Answer. Yes ; that would be the greatest difficulty. 

Question. If you were forced to connect this point where General Porter advanced 
witii some military position in the vicinity of Groveton, what point would you first 
occupy ? What would you regard as the key of that position to be first occu)>ied, 1)e- 
ing compelled by the situation of the army to hold this point or some ])oint near 
Groveton ? Could you get to that place more quickly by coming this way (around by 
the Sudley road), taking into account the nucertaintyas to what might be in your front ? 

Answer. That, of course, would be a problem I cannot answer. I know very well — 



46 

take the case as it stood — that a movemeut made direct from Porter's position toward 
Groveton on that day would probably have brought on a general battle there. Of 
course, this occupation of this ridge, either at Britt's or Coihpton's, woukl only have 
been possible on the su])position that we wliipped the enemy. 

Question. Knowing that i)art of your army was near Grovettm and you arrived here, 
at Porter's position, witli the head of your cohimu, Avhat was the first move to make 
to secure tlie position of the whole army .' 

Answer. I should have withdrawn tlie whole army to the east of Bull Run. 

Question. 8u])pose you had not the ])ower to do that. Suppose your force here, 
wliere General Porter \\-as, ^^'as ordered to connect with the other troops, what would 
you have to do to accomplish that ? 

Answer. 1 should think I had a very desperate thing to do. 

Question. Suppose you had :50,000 men, and formed yourself with the head of your 
column on this road to Gainesville, and information that 30,000 other men of your own 
army were here (east of Groveton) and you were ordered to connect with them so as 
to form a continuous line of battle ? 

Answer. If I had an enemy in here, on the northwest side of Dawkins' Branch, I 
.should liaA-e moved against him to secAvhat he had (toward Vessel's). I don't suppose 
that I would be compelled to risk my 30,000 men to save the other 3(1.000; the risk 
would have to be e(iually divided and not to risk the destruction of this to save that 
Avhich could, without danger, be drawn to a safe place, but I should have certainly 
wanted to see what was the force of the enemy in my immediate vicinity before ex- 
jiosing my Hank to his line of battle. 

(Question. Considering the general extent of this position, as you now know it, how 
many troox>s would you want to make that attack ? 

Answer. I should feel that reasonably I ought to have a force here superior to the 
enemy. 

Question. Aljout what force of the enemy would occupy this position, as you now 
know it ? 

(Vessel's toward Carraco and Lewis.) 

Answer. As I now know it, I now know that all the forces from Groveton could have 
been brought up, Avhich i)robalily would have been 30,000 men; that an encounter 
here in the woods would not have been .successful unless we could have been able to 
whip 30,000 men. 

Question. You would not have felt at liberty to hate made that attack with less 
than 30,000 ? 

Answer. No ; not to engage seriously. At any time that you like you can feel the 
t?uemy with a force that you cannot afford to spare. 

Question. In the case supposed, would not you have taken this course and keep con- 
trol of this ground rather than by attempting to force the enemy's position ; you have 
here a ridge of high ground sejtarating the waters of Dawkins' Branch from the 
Avaters of Young's Branch. To tight a battle in as unfaviu'able a position as that you 
must have control of that ground ? 

Answer. Yes, sir. 

Question. Then this ])osition Avas a bad one to occupy ? 

AnsAver. It was a bad one to uioA^e from, but not a bad one to defend. 

Question. If you had to fight a battle against an enemy occupying this general po- 
sition, and difficult to attack Avith less than 30,000 men, Avould not you have moved 
to occnjjy this i)osition, so as to hold command of the ground between the tAVo posi- 
tions you now occu]ty? 

Answer. I (k)n't think I AAonld, because I think the enemy, seeing my object, Avould 
get there first. He Avould get command of that position before I could, in the position 
in Avhich Ave were ])laced lu-re. 

Question. Suppose you Avere ordered to connect with the troops at Groveton, i)rac- 
tically ; you see no alternative but to move front and fight ? 

Answer. Yes; move to the front and attack. 

Question. You think it would not be juacticable to move a portion of your troops 
here and occui)y this place (near Compton's) ? 

Answer. I woublu't <lo it. I have seen such attempts made. A great deal depends 
upon Avhodoit; what kind of troops you have. I hold it to be a general rule to ncA-er 
try to cstabUsh a line of I)attlc that the enemy have any chance to get hold of before 
you do. 

Question. Success, then, depends upon a question of time ; Avhctlier you Avere there 
beiore the enemy ? 

Answer. Yes. AVell, it comes under the general head of military i)rinciples ueA'er 
to establish your point of concentration inside of the enemy's line. 

So be goes on further at greater length and to the same efteet, that if 
he desired to move OYer to the right and occnpv tlie ground Avhich it is 



47 

claimed Porter sliould have occupied, the way to do it, in the eye of a 
military man, vras to move over and feel and attack the enemy in front 
of yon, clear them out from this rise of ground on the opposite side of 
Dawkin.s' Branch, advance over Stuart's Hill, about wliich so much has 
been said, and then you would be in a position to move u])on Groveton. 
Now, we are obliged to rely upon the testimony of a skillful and accom- 
plished officer, as to whose capacity there can be no question in a matter 
of engineering and military movements ; and we are content to rely 
upon the testimony of General Warren in the ob\ious situation upon 
the stronghold that General Porter had arrived at, as demonstrating 
the entire propriety of his movements before the receii)t of the joint 
order, and before the arrival of McDowell; and so clear is it, as we sup- 
pose, to military men that Porter's actual movements were dictated by 
the highest military intelligence and skill, that it is the reason why Mc- 
Dowell has always said that Porter committed no fault until after his 
own departure from the scene, and CA'erybody connected with the case 
heretofore has admitted that that is so. But now, for the first time, the 
learned Eecorder advances the theory that all this is wrong ; that, inde- 
pendent of the joint order, independent of anything, independent of hav- 
ing that interview Avith IMcDowell, and especiallj' after that interview, that 
it w^as Porter's duty to have marched to the riglit immediately on arrival 
at Dawkins' Braflch, and to occupy the battle-ground of the night before, 
because the purpose of the order was to move to Gibbon's wood, tlie 
scene of the last night's fight. IsTow, the Eecorder can fight a very good 
battle, if you get the enemy out of the way, I will agree. If there had 
been no enemy, any boy could have seen that when he got to Dawkins' 
Branch, if he was in sight of Groveton, and there was no enemy com- 
manding the heights opposite, why, he could go to Groveton. The Ee- 
corder has gone to great effort to discover this road. ^ Singularly enough, 
some k^'nd individual, apparently not connected with this case, but a 
student of it, has made and circulated a map which, by a happy coinci- 
dence, exactly conforms to the Eecorder's idea of the situation, and of 
wlmt then should have been done. 

The Eecorder. I should like to ask if that is in evidence ? 

Mr. Choate. No ; I propose to ask to have it incorporated as a part 
of my argument. 

The Eecorder. As an historical illustration ? 

Mr. Choate. As a geographical illustration. It is a singular piece 
of prophetic foresight in Avhoever prepared this map that he should so 
exactly have hit the views afterwards expressed by the learned Eecorder. 
I suppose I can have it incorporated as a part of my argument, because 
it shows exactly the condition in which the learned Eecorder's proposed 
movement would be a right one, and why it would not be exactly the 
wrong one, as demonstrated by General Warren. It w^as wholly un- 
necessary for the delineator of this map to lay out a broad army road from 
Deats' to Lewis Lane, through the valley of Dawkins' Branch, because 
on either condition it does not make any difference whether there was a 
road there or not. This road, known only to Lieutenant Brooke and 
the Eecorder, occupies a very conspicuous position upon this map. Then, 
a very important condition, a necessary condition, is to get the troops 
out of the way from the field in front, from the high ground correspond- 
ing to Dawkins' Branch, across on the northwest side. That is most 
happily and successfully done by the projector of this map, by withdraw- 
ing the Avhole of Longstreet's force, after he had got in position, and we 
liave proved that when Porter arrived at Dawkins' Brand i he had sul)- 
stantially got in position — withdrawing all those forces in the rear of 



48 

Pageland Laue, and placing- them exactly half way between Gaines^ille 
and Grovetou, a most extraoidinaiy thing to do with a rebel army under 
such an accomplished general as Lee, with such an aid as Longstreet, 
after they had been driving thiongh CTaiuesville three or four hours 
before, at the top of their speed, for the purpose of re-enforcing Jackson 
at Groveton. Then another necessary part of the condition is to com- 
press the rebel force into such a narrow place into the awkward posi- 
tion into which he has drawn them, or a very large i)art of them, up 
behind the rebel batteries that were posted between Jackson and Long- 
street. What good any of them could do there it is impossible to see, 
because it is demonstrated by the evidence that that was verj low ground, 
and they would have had to tire through several ridges in order to reach 
anybody anywhere. That is so happily in accordance with the views of 
the Eecorder, that I shall ask to have it incorporated as illustrative of 
my argument. 

[This map will be found in Appendix as Map G.] 

THE RECEIPT OF JOINT OEDER AND M'DOWELL'S ARRIVAL. 

Xow, w^hat happened when General McDowell came up ? for that is 
one of the important questions. General McDowell, we have proved — 
and this he has not contradicted, although he says he doesn't recollect 
it — General McDowell rushes i\]) with the joint order (which, of course, 
having been just received, is fresh in the minds of both and does not 
need much discussion) ; he comes quickly up, having now, however, ac- 
complished a purpose which he had in view in writing to General Pope 
in the morning. He has the joint order which now, under the Articles 
of War, places him for the first time in command of all the forces. 
Porter now, and until they separate, is his mere lieutenant. What does 
he do ? He rushes up and sees what is going on, does he not ? He says 
so. He says that the sJcinnishers were already engarjed. ^Miat does that 
mean ? Engaged with whom ? Why, engaged with the skirmishers of 
the rebel army on the opposite height. That he saAv himself. He is 
informed that shots have been exchanged. What does he say ? He 
says, "Porter, you are too far out; this is no i)lace to fight a battle." 
What did he mean I Here we come first to the consideration of the joint 
order, as those generals considered it. iSTow, what was deemed too far 
out by that joint order? Why, there was this: 

One thing must be held in view, that tlie ti'oops ninst occnpy a i)o.sition from which 
they can reach Bull Run by night or by morning. The indications are that the whole 
force of the cneiiiy is moving in this direction, at a pace that will bring them here by 
to-morrow night or the next day. 

Another passage which you will recollect is : 

It may be necessary to fall back l>ehind Bull Run, at Ceutreville, to-night. I pre- 
sume it will be so on account of our supplies. 

Such was tlie situation. Here was Porter, a mere lieutenant to IMc- 
Dowell from the nioment of the hitters arrival, after the receipt of the 
joint order. 

We proved by five witnesses that McDowell gave him this order, 
" Porter, you are too far out; this is no place to fight a battle'" — two of 
them new witnesses intro<luced upon this trial, in addition to those who 
testified before. Was it binding on Porter? Nobody questions. Was 
it given '? Nobody can doubt it. Now, what was he to do ? It thwarted 
his jdau, which had been to feel and press the enemy, as he was already 
doing by 3>utter}ield, and the express testimony is that he obej'S the 
order and withdraws Butterfield, leaving his skirmish line out. Now, 



49 

wliat next liappened ? What was there in tlie Joint order that tliey had 
to look to? 

You will please move forward with your joint counnnnds towiirds Gainesville. I 
sent Geueral Porter written orders to that etiect an hour and a halt' a<;(). Heiutzel- 
luan, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warrentou turnpike, and must now be not 
far from Gainesville. 

Let me pause there to ask the Board one question which I do not 
quite understand. This joint order was Avritten by General Pope, at 
Centrevilk', at ten o'chx-k in tlie morning-. Si}j;el, at least, under his 
directions, had commenced a severe skirmish with the enemy, on the 
turnpike, at six o'clock. Tell me, if you can, why no reference is made 
to that in this dispatch. This dispatch, as expressed, is an order of 
pursuit, ami not an order of l)attle. Was it possil)le that General Pope, 
the responsible commander of all those forces, was ignorant, four hours 
after it had taken ]»lace, of an important skirmish between Sigel's 
force and Jackson's force at Groveton ? AVas it possible, that knowing- 
it, he left it intentionally out of this dispatch, in so important a commu- 
nication to McDowell and Porter? But he did leave it out. He does 
not indicate the least suspicion on his part that an immediate action is 
impending. He makes it an order of pursuit, as I think you will see. 

I desire that as soon as communication is established between this force and your 
owu, the wh(de command shall halt. 

Halt with what view ? The next word is : 

It may lie necessary to fall back behind Bull Run, at Centreville, to-night. I pre- 
sume it will be so on account of our supplies. 

]^ow, in respect to this order, if this was in the minds of both generals 
when General McDowell rode up, what did General McDowell mean by 
saying: " You are too far out; this is no place to tight a battle" ? Did 
not he mean that the time had come, hearing this liring on the right, at 
(xroveton, and knowing that there the Federal forces had probably 
stopped, did not he mean to indicate — was it not plain u])on the face of 
the situation, without even this indication, that when he said '' You are 
too far out," he meant that this was the time and the jilace to halt, ac- 
cording to the directions of tlie joint order ? I suppose so. Then, what 
was the next thing ? The next thing was to ol)ey the joint order, un- 
less they should see tit to vary in the exercise of that discretion which 
was now McDowell's direction in carrying it out. 

As soon as communication is established between this force and your own, the whole 
command shall halt. 

Well, communication was not established ; but there was the place, 
according to General JMcDowell's indication, to make a comnumication — 
not connection. Tlie word is not " connection," which I understand has 
a very ditferent military significance from "communication"; but com- 
munication, at least, was ])ossible. l^ovr, what do they do ? They pro- 
ceeded through that unknown woods to a point down here [on the rail- 
road, nearly half a mile east of Dawkins' Branch], to see what there was, 
and how it was practifaljle to make communication, the remaning duty 
enjoined by the joint order. They go over across the railroad on horse- 
back, and come down and water their horses in this stream, which I do 
not consider must have been necessarily Dawkins' Branch, but some 
stream that rau into Dawkins' Branch. 

Xow, irresi^ective of the dispute which appears to l)e in the case, as to 
what orders General McDowell gave when he left, let us see what was 
determined at any rate, beyond all dispute. What were they there for 1 
What could be the only object of their ridino- there ? Of course to see 



50 

about this coinmuuication with Heintelzman, Sigel, and EeynokLs, on 
the left of the Federal troops. They came back, didn't they ? They 
found that that could not be done there, did they not, unless by this 
hajjpy device of the Recorder, according to that map, which neither of 
them was soldier enough to think off ? They found they could not do it. 
Now, it is suggested, and McDowell claims to have originated the idea, 
of his taking King's division around, which Porter testified in the 3Ic- 
Dowell court of inquiry, that he perhaps first suggested. "When they 
met at Dawkins' Branch, is it difiicult to see how it actuallytooki)lace? 
There is no doul)t that the request to put King on his right had been 
made in most urgent terms by Cleneral ^IcIJowell, aggrie^'ed as he felt 
himself in the taking away of King's division at their unhappy conver- 
sation at Manassas Junction. Now, then, they come uj) to study this 
qnestion of communication. McDowell has stoi)i)ed Porter's advance. 
Porter says that he suggested it. Well, what does that mean ? ]t was 
the suggestion of a lieutenant to his chief, was it not ; a suggestion in 
deference to A\'hat had been said at Manassas Junction, bet()re he had 
(;ome under McDowell's command, was it not ? And what did it amount 
to! AVhy— 

As yon cauuot get through here in the face of that eueiiiy in front of ns, it is po.ssi- 
ble to cany out your idea by taking King's division around l>y the Dudley road, and 
come up and make this communication. 

At any rate, that was the plan which ]\rcJ)o\vell, under his then re- 
sponsibility, conceived ; and it was ai)])arently concurred in by (xeneral 
Porter at the moment, for he says, in his answer to Secretary Chandler, 
which is harped ui)on here as a contradiction, that, when McDowell left 
him, he understocxl that that was his idea. 1 cannot see any contr;u,lic- 
tion betM'ecn his various statements on the subje(.*t. I wish I had time 
to read tliem all, and show you that they are exactly alike, and consist- 
ent with his statement as made here, and with the proved position as 
we claim it. I speak apart from anything that was said or any orders 
given. It was determined by McDowell, whose resptmsibility it was to 
determine, to take King around by the Sudley road. What was that 
for I What n)ust Porter have understood it to be for ? Was it for Gen- 
eral McDowell's troops to wander up the Sudley road to the turnpike ? 
No; it was to make the communication required by the joint order, by 
going around the Sudley road, and coming in on the ground between 
him and Eeynolds. Is there any question, then, that communication 
Avould have been established as required by the joint order ? Is there in 
the least a question that it never was established ? Whose fault was it ? 
Was it Porter's ? Is not McDowell and his force the missing link through- 
out this day ? There is a ma}) here, as I have stated, as to what they 
did; and (ieneral McDowell did not come in and make a connection or 
communication. Was Porter to do it ! Should they both do it? Gen- 
eral McDowell left him there and went around l>y the Sudley Springs 
road to make the connection which the joint order required. It would 
have been a very stupid violation of the understanding if, while McDow- 
ell was going arcmnd, Porter had gone over an^l occupied the ground 
to which McJ^owell had agreed to go, would it not' So I say that 
Porter's conduct is justified without any reference to any dispute that 
there may be about what was said. 

Let us see what became of ]McDowell's troops. 

Now, I introduce a map, which I ask to have incorporated as part of 
my argument, to show where General McDowell went, u]>on the evidence, 
as I understand it. Here [along Dawkins' Branch, and on Manassas — 
Gainesville road] is Porter's force ; here, substantially in the same posi- 



51 

tion, is where ]\[cDowell lott liiiii ; here [the prolongation north of Por- 
ter's line] is where the connection was to be made, somewhere in a 
direct line from here to the federal force at Groveton. Xow, did (Gen- 
eral McDowell ever come there ! Here [just east of the Chinn house, 
on and near the Sudley Si)rings road] is King's division at six o'clock. 
There is not the least symptom of any attempt by ^McDowell to occupy 
that ground; Porter was abandoned by him here, and if it was the nn- 
derstanding that McDowell should make the connection, or form on the 
left of lleynolds, that understanding Avas never carried out. [Tliis map 
will be found in Api»endix as Map E,] 

I desire now to call your attention to what was done under the joint 
order by General ^McDowell. One thing he certainly did do ; he ob- 
served the precaution ; he held it in view, that his part of the troops 
should occupy a position from which they could reach Bull Pun that 
night. General Patrick, at pages 189 and 190 of the new record, states 
what was done. Let ns see whether General McDowell carried out his 
purpose of making that connection. General Patrick was one of Gen- 
eral JMcDowelfs brigade commanders ; he describes the march ; he 
describes the orders. Xow, I do not care whether it was McDowell's 
I'esi^onsibility or Pope's responsibility ; Po])e was fighting that battle, 
and the responsibility lay between them for the movement of McDowell's 
forces after they got up on to the Sudley road ; certainlj* not on General 
l*orter. 

Wliil(? I Liiil been at Bt'tlileliem clmrcli, and ;n the iiitei-iiu between tlie time I had 
left Manassas, and this time I had strnek the Sndh'V .Sprinji's road, the other Imgades 
of the division, under General Hateli, liad moved on up the Sndley Springs i-oad on the 
pike, so I was now in tlie rear instead of leading. They eame np in this neighborhood, 
not very far from Conrad's, althongh I don't recollect the house. He left me after 
striking the Sndley S[)rings road, as near as I can recollect, near Conrad's, ami was 
gone a little while, and eame back, and then left again. 

Question. Did McDowell give yon any order there ? 

Answer. He left me here and told nie to take this ])Osition on the road and to the 
left of it, I think. I was subsecpiently moved by General Hatch somewhere Tip near 
this road that runs to Chinu's house from the Sndley Springs road ; it was under the 
cover of a wood. 

Question. How far from the Sudh-y Springs road ? 

Answer. Close by, a little off to the left, a luiiidred or two hundred yards; tliat was 
my second i)osition. Tlie tirst assignment was by General McDowell, and the second 
by General Hatch. I was then moved, but by whose order I don't now reccdlect, in 
past the shoulder of this wood to the east of the Chinn house. I think that must have 
been by McDowell, to be near to sup])oi't the Pennsylvania Beserve that were up liere 
in this wood northwest of the Chinn house. All tins time I was here, there was ar- 
tillery tiring going on, over along in this direction [north of the pike]. Apparently 
I could see from certain jioints what I afterwards learned to be the Dogan house. And 
in that neighborhood and along here there was firing. I saw the smoke ami heard the 
discharges. In here [woods south of Yf)nng's Branch] I should say that at that time 
there was rather nmre wood aiul undergrowth and lirush near this creek [Young's 
Jiranch] than is rt^preseuted on the map, but I could not say. I was then ordered by 
a staff-otticer of General Pope, I don't recollect who — a mounted staff-officer came up 
to me and said, "(ieneral Pope directs yon to take your connnand down directly across 
to Ihe pike in the neighborhood of that crest where Sigel is at work."' 

Question. Down by the Sudley Springs road f 

Answer. No. Go right down across ; and, ])articularly in the exhausted condition 
of the men, it was a very hard march to get down through there. We had reached this 
sti'eam, Young's Branch, and part over it. I suppose that we were about rwo-thirds 
of the way to three-fourths, when a staff-officer of General McDowell 

Question. This is the fifth order that you got ? 

An.swer. Well, I don't know — directed me to return instantly to my former position, 
with some other instructions as t<) supporting Reynolds, aud pushing in nearer to him 
farther into the west. I came back towards the Chinn house, but farther than I had 
been when I went in ; I cannot tell exactly where I was. I saw Reynolds before I 
left and had some C(mversation Avith him. 

Question. Can you locate where ycm had that conversation with Reynolds and what 
he was doing ? 

') CII 



52 

Answer. It was in this ueigliborliood [south of Young's Brancli and northwest of 
the Chinn house], just beyond the point wliere the wood-road erosses the arrow line. 
There was skirmishing going on in tlun-e. 

Question. You got your brigade there, did you ? 

Answer. Yes. 

Eitlier the making of comnmiiicatioii by the phiu tliat McDowell 
agreed upon "svas iiupos.sible, or if possible, he did not at'coniplish it. 
Either alternative is equally satisfactory to us on behalf of General 
Porter. 

DISOBEDIENCE OF THE JOINT ORDEK. 

Kow, we come to this question of the disobedience of the joint order. 
As I understand this joint order, it does not direct an attack, it directs 
a pursuit. But, of course, the Eecorder says that you cannot say it 
does not contemi)late an attack. Any movement in pursuit of a tiying 
enemy contemplates the possibility of an attack. But the not making 
an attack is not a disobedience to tlie joint order ; that is a disobedience 
to the military rules that control the situation. How^ was it in this case ? 
It has never been claimed by anybody, l)y General McDowell, or Gen- 
eral Pope, or by Judge- Advocate Holt, or by the Eecorder, that the 
joint order, taken by itself, was disobeyed. Not a bit of it. What is 
the claim ? ^Vhy, that the joint order as moditied l)y General McDowell 
was disobeyed, asserting the right of INIcDowell on leaving Porter to 
modify it. ' So the Judge-Advocate, and General Pope, and General 
McDowell say that a Aiolation of the joint order was committed; a 
violation of the jc^int order, as moditied by JMcDowell, because (xeneral 
McDowell directed him to make an attack. ISTow, what does the learned 
Eecorder say ? He says that Porter violated the joint order as moditied 
by McDowell, not liecause he did not make an attack; he should not 
have made an attack, says the Eecorder. That was an unmilitary move- 
ment; it was contrary to the recognized i)rinciples of warfare — but he 
violated the joint order, as moditied by McDowell, l)ecause, when he got 
to Dawkins' Branch, he did not wheel around and march up to the right, 
straight to the front of the enemy at Groveton. General McDowell, at 
Governor's Island, protested against being defended by the Eecorder. 
I see now, i)erhaps, what he meant, although I do not believe the 
Eecorder then disclosed this view. It is a com]»lete going back upon 
all of my learned friend's antecedents. Nobody heretofore has suggested 
this view ; and as I said at the beginning of my argument, if we are to 
take him as the authoritative mouth-i)iece of this ]»rosecution on this 
important part of the case, we need not consider it any further. For, 
he now asserts that McDowell was all wrong; that General Pope did 
not know anything about it; that the Judge-Advocate-General Avas en- 
tirely in the chmds, and that Porter's error, joint order or no joint order, 
and particularly under the order of General ^LcDowell, ordering him to 
go to the right, Avas in sending Butterlield across, in pressing the enem\ 
upon the other side of Dawkins' Branch, that he should have marched 
up to the right — they said that he should have attacked, and attacked 
more vigorously. AVell, I must leave them to settle their hash between 
themselves; I certainly cannot solve that i)rol>lem. 

Now, I fall back briefly upon the consideration of the case as it stands. 
We nuist either leave McDowell out or the Eecorder out; and it does 
seem to me that his presentation of the case dis])oses of itself. Now, I 
propose to leave him out, and consider a little further the case as made 
without him. Njw, how is it ? Here is a case presenting this remarka- 
ble situation. I did intend to read what Generals Pope and McDowell 



53 

said on that subject. I tliiuk I will briefly call your attention to that, 
because it bears on the question of the construction of the joint order. 
Was it, as the Eecorder now claims, to go right up to the liattle-field of 
the night before, or get in behind that l>attle-tield and reach Gainesville ? 
Oeneral Pope, at page 14 of the General Court-Martial IJecord, says (I 
think it is refreshing after the views that have been i^reseuted, to go 
back to what he and McDowell said on the former trial) : 

I then sent a joint order to Generals Porter and McDowell, directed to them at Ma- 
nassas Junction, specifying, in detail, the movement that I wished to he made hy the 
troops under their command — the withdrawal of King's division, of ^IcDowell's corps, 
which, during the greater part of the night, I had understood to be on the WaiTen- 
ton turnpike, and west of the troops under Jackson. Their withdrawal to Manassas 
Junctifin, I feared, had left open .Jackson's retreat in the direction of Thoroughfiire 
Gap, to which point the main portion of the army of Lee Avas then tending, to rein- 
force him. I did not desire to pursue Jackson beyond the town of Gainesville, as we 
could not have done so on account of the want of supplies — rations for the men and 
forage for the horses. My order to Generals Porter and McDowell is, therefore, worded 
that they shall pursue the route to Gainesville, until they effect a junction with the 
forces that are marching upon Gainesville from Centreville — the forces under Heiut- 
zelman, Sigel, and Reno; and that when that junction was formed (as I expected it 
would have l)een very near to Gainesville), the whole command should halt, it being, 
tis I stated before, not feasible with my command in the condition it was in, ou ac- 
-count of supplies, to pursue Jackson's forces further. 

Then at page 30 General Pope further says — now, here is a pretty 
^ood answer to the Recorder : 

Question. Will yon state ou what road you intended General Porter should march 
to Gainesville, in the execution of vour written order, referred to in the joint order of 
the --^'Jth of August ? 

Answer. I intended him to march on the direct road from Manassas Junction to 
Gainesville. 

Question. Would that road have brought the accused and his command to the bat- 
tle-lield at Groveton ^ 

Now, my learned friend insisted that you should construe the joint 
order so that it would have brought them ou to the battle-field at Grove- 
ton. Then at page 33 : 

I knew the position of the enemy, who occupied a line perpendicular to the War- 
rentou turnpike, and at or near the town of Groveton; I was sure, from the orders I 
had given him, that General Porter must be somewhere between Manassas Junction 
and Gainesville on the road to Gainesville. 

So that you see a departure from the road to Gainesville would have 
been a departure from General Pope's idea. 

.So £{tr I knew, within certain limits, though not exactly, the relative positions of 
General Porter and of the enemy. My belief was that the road from Manassas Junc- 
tion to Gaines-viUe either passed by the right flank or was occupied by that flank of 
the enemy, and that Porter's march, if i)ursued, conducted him either to the right 
flank of the enemy or past the right flank of the enemy toward his rear. 

But it is not necessary to occupy any further time in reading from the 
record about tliat, it is so clear what the understanding of Pope and 
McDowell was about it, that they were to move toward Gainesville and 
not in any other direction. This new figment of the imagination about 
turning oft' at Dawkins' Branch is to my mind a wild and delusive one. 
Now, how was it ? If you cannot impute any violation of that joint order 
except as modified by McDowell, was there any modification of it? 
General Porter says there was, by General McDowell telling him to 
remain where he w^ks. General McDowell says there was by his giving- 
Porter an immediate order to make a vigorous attack upon the right 
flank of the enemy in front of him. Now, which is right ? Did General 
McDowell give any such order as he claims to have done ? He says he 
told him, "Put your troops in here"; but you will still recollect his 



54 

description of it, wliich has been brought to your attention by Mr. 
Bullitt — his interpretation of those words given on the former trial — 
when he is brought to the point of what he meant, saying: "I meant 
just what is stated in the 4.30 p. m. order/' Well, there is no doubt 
about what that was, and what that order directed, because that is just 
what McDoAvell testified on the former trial that he meant to say, and 
did say by, " Put your troops in liere.'' The 4.30 p. m. order says : 

Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's riglit flank. I desire you to push 
forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and if ]iossible on liis rear, keeping 
your right in eommunication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the 
woods in front of us. 

Now, did General McDowell give any such order as that? AVe say he 
did not. He swore upon the former trial that he did. The case went 
again.st General Porter on the violation of this joint order upon the 
belief of the court-martial that General McDowell did give such an 
order. Xow, did he do it ? In the tirst place, let us see Avhat the two 
generals knew ou the subject of the force in front of them at that time. 
We have seen, up to the time of General McDowell's arriving, that Gen- 
eral Porter Avas not very fully informed ; he saw there was a force there, 
and he was proceeding to feel it and i)ress it; he had taken a couple of 
scouts who said it was Lcmgstreet's force, and that opened his eyes. 
AVhat came with McDowell ? McDowell brought a dispatch from 
Buford. AMiat did that tell him ? Why, if they were not fools, it told 
them everything; it told them that all of Longstreet's force Avas there. 
Because you will observe in what I have read from General Poise's testi- 
mony that he understood perfectly Avell that it was the main army of 
Lee that was inx'ssing through Thoroughfare Gap to reinforce Jack- 
son; no small detachment, no room for any quibbling about divisions 
or brigades, but it was the main army of Lee that was pressing through, 
and nobody knew it better than McDowell. Had he not been stationed 
in front of Lee on the Ilappahaunock when Jackson broke oft' from him? 
Do not his dispatches subsetpieutly .show that he knew well that what 
Lee was fearing was that he could not get through Thoroughfare Gap 
in time to relieve Jackson ? That was obvious Avithout any special in- 
formation; it seems to me that the youngest lieutenant in the Army 
might have guessed it and ought necessarily to have inferred it. Now, 
the Pecorder says that the captured scouts may have been two of Rob- 
ertson's troopers, and that llobertson's troopers were not with Long- 
street ; they were Avith Jackson. Was that quite ingenuous ? Did he 
suppose that he could mislead the minds of this P>oard by such a sug- 
gestion as that ? What does this dispatch of Buford's say ? 

Headquarters Caa'alry Brigade, 9.30 a. m. 
Seventeen regiments, one battery, five hundred caA^alry, iiassed through Gainesville 
three-cjuarters of an hour ago, on the Ceutreville road. I think this division should 
join our forces now engaged at once. 
Please forward tliis. 

JOHN BUFORD, 

Brig. General. 

That was Buford Avho had been sent to keep watch of them. The Ke- 
corder has saved me the trouble of counting those troops. They were 
14,100 men, he says — more than one-half of the main army of Lee that 
Avas ju-essing forward aa ith all speed tt) relieve Jackson, as tliey all under- 
stood it. What had happened ? Why, a quarter before nine, just about 
the time that (ieneral I'orter receiA'ed his order to reverse march at Ma- 
nassas Junction, they had, Avhat ? Come through Thoroughfare Gap ? Xo.- 
Reached GainesA'ille ? No; but ^><^(.s.se</ ihrouijli GainesA'ille — the main 



55 

army of Lee tliat was coiuiiio" tlirouj>li Tlioiougiifare Gaj), that was what 
had come. I do not mean the entire army that had come np from Kich- 
moud. I mean the main army ; the portion that Jackson had left or 
broken himself off from, when he came thronj^h Tlioronghfare Gap. 
Now, then, if they came to re-enforce Jackson post-haste and had passed 
through Gainesville, which is nearer to D iwkins' Bianch by far — a little 
more than half as far as the distance from Manassas Junction to Daw- 
kins' Branch — if those two generals were not fools, didn't they know who 
and what was in front of them ? There were, at least, 14,100 men. 1 do 
not care whether they were at Stuart's Hill, or between there and the 
turnpike, or between there and this road ; they were there ; they com- 
manded this position on the other side of ]>awkins' Branch, which Gen- 
eral Warren has described as a stronghold, corresponding to this strong- 
hold on which Porter was. General McDowell disavowed knowiug 
anything about Longstreet, ami led the court-martial to believe that he 
did not believe they were there. But you must put yourselves in the 
places of Generals JNIcDowell and Porter, when they read that dispatch 
of Buford on that ground, and found that those two scouts had reported 
Long-street's men in front of them. What ought they to have under- 
stood I But we are not left to that. We are not left to any mere cal- 
<;nlation, because INIcDowell himself says what he thought aljout it. At 
page 803 of the new record, it does seem to me this question is settled 
beyond all dispute. Here is the passage to which I call the attention of 
the Board : 

Question. AVhen you testified on the foiiucr trial of General Porter, were you of the 
belief that thti force mentioned by General Bnford's dispatch was the whole rebel force 
in front of General Porter that afternoon ? 

Answer. Did not I answer the question a little while ago ? 

Question. I now call your attention to later in the afternoon ? 

AusAver. I left General Porter about noon. After that time I knew nothing of what 
occurred in his front. 

Question. You knew of no increase of rebel force in his front ? 

Answer. I knew nothing of what occurred in his front. 

Question. When you testified on the court-martial, it was with the belief that the 
rebel force in front of Porter all that afternoon was limited to the troops mentioned in 
Bufoi'd's dis])atch ? 

Answer. I didn't say that. 

Of course, we knew that he would not stultity himself b}' saying that, 
so we pressed the question. 

Question. I ask you ? 

Answer. No ; I don't. I say that was not a question that came up. I acted upon 
that thing up to twelve o'clock. 

That is, on Buford's dispatch. 

After I went away from there I had no further concern personally with that question- 
/ took it for grunted that there ivould he other forces come «j>. 

Of course, they took it for granted. They were educated at W^est 
Point, were they not f They knew that here was an army of 25,000 men, 
more than half of which had passed through Gainesville at a quarter 
before nine, and the question was at twelve, where were they ? Were 
those troops interfering with their progress ? Longstreet was another 
name for the main army of Lee. How much was it 1 Fourteen thousand 
one hundred men certaiidy already there, and they took it for granted 
that the rest were coming. General McDowell says, " That under those 
circumstances he told General Porter to attack at once witli his whole 
force." That he swore to on the former trial. Was he mistaken about 
it ? May he have been mistaken about it ? I will not reargue that 
question ; it has been so fully argued by Mr. Bullitt. Of course, he was 



56 

mistaken. Of course, this lameutable result of tlie first trial upon Gen- 
eral Porter came from that testimouy. 

On pages 802, 803 of the Board Record, General McDowell testifies as^ 
follows : 

Questiou. Didn't yon tliiuk that ■when yon left liim, lie A\-as left to the nurestrained 
oi)eiation8 of General Pope's joint order ? 

Answer. Ivo, sir; as moditied by me. It is for tlie Board to decide that qnestiou. 

Question. Suppose that General Porter ascertained, alter yon left hiin, that the rebel 
force in front of him was twice what yon had supposed it to be, and spoken of to liim, 
and twice Porter's own force, do you think then that he should have maile an attack? 

Answer. I think he should have found out the force. 

Question. Ytui say he should have teste<l and found out the force ? 

Answer. I think so. That is a question for this Board. 

Question. Now, having tested and found out a force quite as large as his own, do 
yon think he should liave attacked them ? 

Answer. He should have made some tentative operations. There are a number of 
ways of attacking; you attack headlong, or you skirmish, or you shell; but to do 
nothing whatever, certainly would not be complying with the order — to make no eti'ort 
with the troops. 

Question. Now, I ask yon, if, after making efforts necessary for the purpose, he had 
ascertained there was a force there double his own after you left him and took King 
away, do you say that he sliould have attacked ? 

Answer. He sliould have made an attack ; yes. 

Questiou. He should have made an attack just as you ordered it ? 

AnsAver. My order was, I confess to you, a very vague one. It was made to a per- 
son whose zeal and activity and energy I had every knowledge of. I did not pretend 
to give him any particular iustructious or directions that he should skirmish, or shell, 
or charge, or anything of that sort. I merely indicated the direction in which his 
troops should be applied. Further than that I did not think, and would not think 
now, if I had the thing to go over again, to direct. 

Question. You did not construe it as an order given by yon to an inferior geueral? 

Answer. Certainly I did. 

Question. What clid you mean, then, by giving orders that were vague and amounted 
to nothing ? 

Answer. I did not say that. 

Question. Well, gave orders of the kind yon have described ? 

Answer. What orders .' 

Question. What did yon mean by giving orders "vague" and merely au indication? 

Answer. I meant just \vhat I said, that General Porter commanded a corps. I did 
not tell him that he sliould deploy so many troops, or that he should put in so many 
skirmishers, or so many batteries, and do this, that, or the other. Those are <|u<'stions 
of detail which, as an army corps commander, he was to carry out. All I did was to 
give line to his operations. 

Question. You meant that with the indication you gave him, he should act on his 
own discretion f 

Answer. Yes; but he should act. 

Question. Now I come back to the f[uestiou I put to you before. If, after acting, he 
ascertained the presence of a rebel force in front of him twice as great as his own,, 
twice as great as yon on leaving him had supposed it to be, he should have brought 
on a general tight with them ? 

Answer. He should not have brought on so general a fight as to have thrown the 
whole of his force headlong upon this supposed double force of the enemy. 

And on pages 814, 815, he testifies : 

Question. When you left him did you expect that within an hour he would be en- 
gaged with the enemy .' 

Answer. Yes, sir. 

Question. Then you do not tliink it would have taken him an hour? 

AnsAvei'. You just asked me that question — if I thought that within an hour he 
would be engaged with the enemy ; I said yes, I thought he would. 

Question. Short of an hour .' 

Answer. I did not say short of an hour. 

Questiiui. Well, that is what I understood by icifhhi an hour. 

Answer. I say at the end of au hour, if yon want to get at the exact time. 

Question. Did not yon expect V»y the end of that time to get your force well around 
and coiniect with Reynolds? 

Answer. I hoped to do so. 



57 

Qnestiou. Tlieu, as you left General Porter, I understand your itlau was oncvof co- 
oiteratiou f 

Answer. With liim? 

Question. With hiui and with Reynolds. 

Answer. We were all co-ctix'ratinji,- to the same point. 

Question. But you did not expect that he should become engaged with the enemy 
until yon should get arouiul to the left of Reynolds? 

Answer. I did not nuike any such calculation ; I have said nothing of the kind. 

Question. You said souicthiug very near it ; aud I want to know whether that was 
your expectation — that he would he in a general engagement with the enemy before 
yon got round <ui the left of Reynolds? 

Answer. You want to make me say what he would be doing at a certain time, and 
where I should be ; I say no such calculation entered into my mind. 

Question. You said by the end of an hour you expected to be well <ir )und on the 
left of Reynolds with ycmr troops? 

Answer. No, sir ; I did nf)t say well around to tlu; left of Reynolds. 

Question. What did you say '1 

Answer. Well around. 

Question. Well, around where? 

Answer. In the direction where I was going. 

Question. Around to the Sudley road, and on the left of tlie >Sudley road, towai"d 
Reynolds ? 

Answer. I say yon are putting that in. 

Question. Well, the record will show what you did say. Did you intend that he 
should get into a general engageuient with the enemy while you were removed from 
the scene back on the Sudley road, so as to be oiit of all possibility of rendering him 
innnediate assistance ? 

Answer. I do not want that question put in that way. 

Question. That is the one I want you to answer. 

Answer. Because you are putting words in my mouth, aiul putting plans in ray head 
which were not suggested there. 

Question. Then you can merely say it was not the case. 

Answer. JVheii I left General Porter, I left him a corps commander, for him to operafe in 
the direction indicated. How (/uickli/ he n-as to r/et in an enfifu/emcnt, irhctlirr an hour or an 
lionrand a liatf, and how he wonld do it, wlicthcr in one W(i;i or another, I did not indicate, 
nor did I take it into mi/ mind ; it was simply that lie was to operate on the left, and necessa- 
rihi, whfn he got over there, the natnre of his operations would he determined bi/ the condition 
of things that he would find. What those conditions would he I could not at that time tell. 

And on page 817 lie testifies : 

Question. Did yon exjiect General Poi'ter to engage the enemy alone, when along 
tlie rest of the line there was nothing but artillery engaged ? 

Answer. He would not be engaging the enemy alone if the rest of the line were en- 
gaged Avith artillery. Yon seem to think artillery is of no consequence. 

Question. What kind of an engagement did you expect him to enter into while no 
other but artillery fighting was going on along the rest of the line ? 

Answer. As I have tried to make myself understood on several occasions, the nature 
of the particular kind of contest which he was to engage in was not a matter which 
I ventured to impose upon liim. As a distinguished and zealous officer, with his corps 
under his connnaml, I did not venture to do anything more than indicate the place 
where I thought he was to api)ly that force. Whether he wan to skirmish or have a 
very dee^) line, or extended one, was a question which I did not go into at all, nor 
think of going into. 

Question. Then a skirmish-line would have answered your expectation when you 
left General Porter if, in his discretion, that was more advisable ? 

Answer. It would depend upon the nature of the skirmish — how it was done ; how 
vigorously carried out ; whether the circumstances reqviired it, and it only. It de- 
pends upon a great many things that you must make a great many suppositions about 
before I can give an intelligent answer. If you Avant to know a general principle, I 
believe it is laid down by military writers that a body of men should be in a condition 
to otter battle or decline i( ; whether the main body shall be advanced or retire on the 
reserve, and many other ]>ositions; all of which are coiulitions upon which battles are 
determined. 

Question. And deleruiin.)d upon the discretion of the corps commander? 

Answer. Yes; provided he acted energetically. 

Question. Provided he acted according to the best of his discretion as a soldier ? 

Answer. Yes, sir. 

I have tlxus shown that General McDowell was utterly reckless in his 
testimony, on the court-martial, producing a wholly false impression on 
which Porter was convicted, and which he has now been compelled to 



58 

retract and coiTect. On tlie court-martial, he .swore that he left Porter 
with a positive order to attack at once. For not doing so, as ordered by 
him. General Porter was convicted and disgraced. 

How far, and from what motives the error arose, it is not for me to 
say. There may be various explanations of it. • I should think, perhaps, 
he might have been angry, so as to disturb his good judgment, but he 
denies that we have ever seen him angiy. Peihaps he had the uight- 
mare, as he says this caiupaign has been a nightmare to him from the 
time of its occurrence. T took occasion to see what eftect that would 
have, and I tind that it might disturb any man's judgment if it was 
operating upon him when he was testifyina'. A very recent scientific 
authority describes a nightmare as "a terrific dream, in which there ap- 
pears to be a disagreeable object, as a i)erson, an animal, or a goblin 
present, and often upon the breast or stomach of the sleeper, accom- 
l)anied by an inalnlity to cry out, or move or (;all for help." Well, some- 
thing hap])ened to destroy his judgment or his presence of mind, or his 
recollection upon the former trial, and he swore to that. Xow, at Gov- 
ernor's Island he came and said that he meant no such thing as he had 
been understood to mean, and had sworn at the court-martial that he 
did mean — not that he did not use the words, "Put your troops in here," 
but that he didn't mean any such thing as was imputed to Ins hmguage 
at the court-martial, but that all he meant was to do just what General 
Porter did do, act ui)on his discretion, feel the force of the enemy in 
front of him by a skirmish-line, if in his judgment that was thfe proper 
thing to do under the circumstances, and any other method that he, as 
a corps commander, left as sole master of the situation, might deem 
sufficient and proper. What we claim is that General Porter, acting 
under that discretion, did what he did, and that it was the best thing 
under the military circumstances to do. If it was left to his discretion 
the question is whether his discretion was exercised honestly aiid in 
good faith, and not whether it was the best thing that might have been 
(lone. McDowell comes to Governor's Island and says that he did not 
mean what was imputed to his language before, but that he did not think 
there could be much doubt about it, because when he said it he indi- 
cated by a gesture what he meant by "Put your troojts in here." Now, 
his testimony on that sul)ject is very remarkable. One would suppose 
that if he said "Put your troops in here," and indicated by a gesture, 
he would know where the gesture indicated. Xow, here is the cross- 
examination on that subject: 

Question. You are quite positive, I uiiilerstanil, as to your recolleetion of tlie exact 
words whicli you used to (ieneral Porter al>out putting- in liis troops, as you stated on 
page 85, "You put your force in here." Is it your recollection of those being the ex- 
act wordn/ 

Answer. Yes, sir. 

Question. Was then and is now ! 

Answer. Yes, sir. 

Question. Then you did not say ''Put your tro(>i)s in tliere"? 

Answer. Is not that wliat you said ? 

Question. A'o ; '• IMit your troops in h(;re." 

Answer. It was accoiu])anied by a motion of the hand, here or there. 

Question. I want to know whether it was lure or ilteirf 

Answer. Tliat I cannot tell yon. 

Question. Would it ni;ikr a difference Avhether ir was here or there.' 

Answer. No; one might be. a litrle more critically correct as an expression, but 
''here or there" would have been understood. 

Well, it would have been a very singular order for him to say to (ien- 
eral Porter, "Put your trooi)s in here or there." 

Question. I look for your recollection of the real words, whether yon said "Put your 
troops in here," or "Put your troops in there." 



59 

Answer. I coiild uot tell you as to that. 

Qiii'stion. Yon say tliat Iicic or tlirre would make no difference ? 
Answer. No; in connoctiou witli the movement of the liand, as indicating the place 
Question. Do you recollect the movement of your hand f 
Answer. I cannot tell you whether it was the right liand or the left. 
Question. Can you recollect which way you were facing? 
Answer. No, sir. 

Question. Can you recollect whetlier you moved your hand north, or south, or east, 
or west ? 
Answer. It Avas not in reference to the direction of the compass. 
Question. No ; can you recollect that fact ? 
Answer. I could not. 

I do not think the order is helped out much by the ge.stiue, and when" 
you come to see that there was no order, but only a gesture, achled t(i 
this wild and unintelligible " here " or " there," east, west, n(n'th, or south, 
it left General Porter in the position which I now will indicate. 

General Porter swore before the McDowell court of inquiry, ^vhich I 
am much obliged to the llecorder for putting in e\ideuce, that when 
McDowell left him he said no such thing as "Put your troops in here"; 
luit that when Porter said, in view of this idea of taking King away, 
"What shall I do?" he, McDowell, said nothing, but waved his hand 
and rode off as fast as he could. Is thei-e any corroborating testimony 
to that ? Yes, Captain ]Montieth, aide-de-camp to General Porter, was 
l)resent and heard the question and saw the wave of the hand, and saw 
the de])arture without an answer. Xow, what ? "Why, General Porter 
was left there alone, down near the place where the horses were drink- 
ing, and he came l)ack alone to his command. As he came back, he 
saw, as he swears before the McDowell court of inquiry, the enemy 
gathering in his front. He knew well enough what that meant, did he 
not ? That those troops reported by Buford were there, and, as he 
thought then, coming down upon him. What was the natural move- 
ment ? What was the natural suggestion? He had thought before Mc- 
Dowell arrived, and when he was in command of 17,000 men, 0,000 of 
his men and 8,000 of King's, which had been placed under his special 
command — he had thought the wise course was to press the enemy in 
front, and if possible, go over to attack him; but McDowell having now 
left him, without any answer even to his suggestion that now was a 
time when he might make a communication by taking King's division 
around on the Sudley Springs road : (these things slnfted with every 
changing view from the euem}', did they not?) And, as he rode back, 
he saw the enemy gathering in his front, and he says : " Now, if ever, is 
the time to attack. Don't we know that the force rei)orted by Buford is 
here — don't we take it for granted, as McDowell says, that all the rest 
are coming ! Now or never is the time to attack ! " What does he do ? 
Why, he renews and continues his movement to piess the enemy, and 
in that view jjushes Morell over to the right 1)eyond the railroad ; he is 
l)reparing a new or a forward movement beyond Dawkins' Branch, 
AVell, on what view was that possible ? On what theory had it always 
been possilde and practicable in his idea ? Why, it was not with 0,000 
men against from 14^,000 to 25,000 over there, wherever they were. I 
don't care whether they were within a. few rods of Dawkins' Branch, or 
anywhere that the Recorder pleases to put them; No ; it was not with 
any such idea. It was, that with 17,000 men he might try it ; and that 
was the only time, as it seems to me that military men will say, that an 
attack should liave been tried. So, on the imi)ulse of the soldier, know- 
ing that there is a su] (porting force within reach of him, namely. King's 
division, he sends to King to hold on. What was that for ? That he 
might press with Morell ; that he might bring Sykes out here (in sup- 



60 

port), and make tlie movement described by Warren as tbe necessary 
movement and tbe only practical)le one, witb King's force to be beld in 
reserve wbile Morell deployed, and to come np as be and Sykes advanced. 
Now, tbe learned Eecorder sees fit to dispute tbat tbat took place. I 
never bave seen bow it can be dispnte<l. I never could see bow, at 
least, General Porter could belp believing- tbat it was so ordered by 
General McDowell, and acting on tbat belief. He sends General Locke 
after King's force. Tbe answer comes back from ^McDowell in place of 
King — 

Give my compliments to General Porter, and tell liim to stay where he is ; I am 
going to the right, and I will take King's division around with me. 

Now, if tbat was tbe time to attack, wbo is responsible for its not Lav- 
ing been done ? Porter, wbo wanted to do it. Porter, wbo began to do 
it, or McDowell, wbo refused to join or support bim ? 

And now I wisb to call attention to tbe Recorder's imputations upon 
our evidence tbat wbat I ba^ e tbus stated did really bappen. McDowell 
said be didn't recollect it. Tbat is all be said. General King said be 
didn't recollect it. Well, if it turns out tbat General King was not tbere, 
and tbat it was some otber oflicer, tbere is pretty good reason for King- 
not recollecting it, apart from tbe terrible illness under wbicb be was 
suffering, wbicb migbt naturally affect bis memory, an illness wbicb it 
is proven ui)on tbe record did overcome bim, and from wbicb be bad 
])een suffering and in a disabled condition for tbe wbole of two weeks 
before. Well, but, says tbe Recorder, Porter knew tbat King bad gone 
away, and, Avben Porter says tbat be sent Locke to King, be tells a 
falsebood. Now it would be soinetbing if Porter knew tbat King bad 
gone. Tbe Recorder bas made tbe deliberate statement, witb tbe intent 
tbat you sbould believe it, tbat tins recortl sbows, by tbe evidence of 
Patrick and Judson, tbat Porter knew tbat King bad gone. I deny it. 
I say it does not sbow any sucb tbing. At page 104 is tbe testimony 
of Judson, upon wbicb be relies, wbicb is tbis : 

Question. What time did yon reaeh that position (Bethlehem Chnrch) ? 

Answer. I cannot state the hour; it was early in the morning of the 2yth. I think. 

Question. Then your division knew the way very well from Bethlehem Church to 
where the lighting was the night before ? 

Answer. Yes, sir. 

Question. In the morning, were you still posted on that road when General Porter';* 
division came along marching towards Gainesville? 

Answer. We were. 

Question. Did they come hy you; the head of the colunm on the road ? 

Answer. ]\Iy recolle<'tion is such. 

Question. Was General Porter with them ? 

Answ»^r. He was. 

Question. Did you see liim ? 

Answer. I saw him. 

Question. Did you have any conversation with him? 

Answer. I did. 

Question. State that. 

Answer. General Porter asked me where the commanding otficer of these troops 
was. 

Now tills was a man in Hatcb's brigade. 

Answer. I coiulucted him to General Hatch. 

Question. Had General McDowell at that tinu^ made his apjiearance? 
Answer. I have no reeollection of s 'eing General McD;>well since the day before 
until that time. 

Is tbat an indication cAen to Porter tbat i>robably King was not 
tbere ? Not in tbe least ; tbere is not a word of suggestion about King. 
Judson may bave taken bim to ILitcb as tbe immediate commander of 



61 

the brigade, wliicli lie was, or King may have been tem]»<)i'ari]y away. 
There being no reference to King, how unfair it is to impute to Judson's 
testimony knowledge on Porter's part that King had gone. It does not 
help the matter any more to refer to General Patrick, at page 187, be- 
cause it shows tllat, when Patrick says that King came up to say good- 
bye, Porter's column had already gone past. 

I think General King was the tii'st whom I saw. It was somewhere ah(mt eight or 
nine o'chiek, while my commissariat and personal start' were hunting up siii)plies, &(•. 
General King rode over to my head([Uarters, anil told me that he was not tit to be in 
command, that he was going to Gentreville, and came over to hid me good-bye. I 
think Colonel Chandler, his adjutant-general, and I do not reooHect who else, were 
with him at the time ; he came to say good-bye, and I do not know that I saw him 
after that. 

Question. In the mean time had you found the promised supplies '? 

Answer. We got some somewhere. 

Question. You found after a while the rest of the brigades of your division? 

Answer. No; I have no personal recollection of seeing them there at all. I must, I 
think, have seen them or knew of their being thereabouts from some source. 

Question. What happened next after King's departure for Centreville ! 

Answer. I was ordered, I think, by McDowell in person, to move as soon as I could 
in the rear of General Porter; Porter having just passed through, or passing through 
near Manassas Junction, to go back to the scene of our fight the uiglit previous. 

Clearly, when General King came there to bid General Patrick good- 
bye. Porter had already gone to the front. How puerile is it then to 
say that Porter must have known that King had gone, and therefore he 
could not have sent this message by Locke to King, when it appears 
that he was all day (and the government produces the dispatches) send- 
ing dispatches, not to ]McDowell and Hatch, but to McDowell and King. 
O, says the Recorder, those disiiatches were properly described by a 
little 'word of three letters, seldom used among gentlemen and never 
among soldiers. Well, will that go down with the common sense which 
we claim for leading military minds ? Of course not. This message 
was sent by Locke to McDowell, and this was the answer ; and, mind 
you, it corresponds in substance with what McDowell said at Governor's 
island, that he meant by "put your troops in here," "I meant to indi- 
cate the point at which he should operate." For there is not nuich 
difference between that and " Give my compliments to General Porter, 
and tell him to stay where he is." 

Was there a disoijedience of the joint order ? Xobody claims that there, 
was, except as moditied by McDowell ; and it was not moditied by Mc- 
Dowell, except to thwart what General Porter thought ought to be done 
with the 17,000 men, and to leave him there with his force of 0,000 or 
10,000 men — a force utterly insigniflcant, as compared with what they 
both knew was over on the other side. I will not enter into a dispute 
with the Recorder as to Avhere each division of the enemy's troops Avas. 
They were there, as everybody knew. Longstreet, AVilcox, Marshall, 
and" Williams have told you where they Avere. Corporal Solomon 
Thomas and bis reverend associates, and the medical assistant surgeons 
of this, that, and the other regiment, may come and tell you to the con- 
trary, but there is the evidence. It hardly needed more thau Buford's 
dispatch to demonstrate it. 

Well, both the Recorder and the Judge-Advocate-General say that 
there was a retreat, and that that was a violation of the joint order. It 
is pretty late in the history of this discussion, as it appears to me, for 
us to be arguing the question upon the evidence as to whether there 
was a retreat that day. I think we will be stultifving ourselves to dis- 
cuss that matter anymore; unless we accept the learned Recorder's mili- 
tary view. If you clo, then there was a retreat. He says that when 



62 

General MorelFs force, m obedience to the order of IMcDowell, was with- 
drawn from beyond the raih'oad and bron<>ht back to the road and 
placed under cover to '' come the same ;iame " upon the enemy, as they 
were evidently coming' upon him, and so Sykes' brigade was withdrawn 
100 or 200 or 300 yards to make room for them, he says that was a retreat. 
^Vell, it seems to me that there was a pretty emphatic expression upon 
the countenances of the several meml^ers of the Board about that when 
the evidence Avas coming in. It seemed to be a pretty plain indication 
that some of us did not know what the word "retreat" meant. We do 
not pretend to dilate now upon that question. There it stands upon the 
record. All the witnesses, as it seems to me, sul)Stantially agree that 
there was not any retreat ; that there was nothing in the nature of a 
retreat; there were movements back and forth. If a brigade is moA'ed 
up 100 or UOO yards we do not call that an advance upon the enemy ; 
and if they withdraw to give place for the movements of other brigades, 
we do not call that a retreat. Well, that is all there was that day af- 
fecting in the least the situation. 

It is true that, under tlie circumstances which I shall present!}' de- 
iScribe, there is claimed to have been an order to General Sturgis — or so 
stated by him, and forgotten from the outset by General Porter — there 
was a direction to General Sturgis, who was in the rear of Sykes, to go 
back to Manassas Junction; and then there was apparently an almost 
immediate recall, and they came back before they had got anywhere 
near Manassas Junction ; and it is not far from the junction of the Dud- 
ley Springs and the JManassas and Gainesville road to Manassas Junc- 
tion. Ah, but, says the Eecorder, there was an intention to retreat; and 
in a case of petit larceny, he says, the taking of a watch or other chat- 
tel and having it in your hand, even for a moment, makes out the crime. 
Well, is this a petit larceny court ? AVe think that sometimes he has 
had that idea. We supposed it was a great military tribunal, examin- 
ing" into a (juestion according to the recognized maxims of warfare, 
not to judge that there was a retreat unless there was a retreat, and 
when there was no retreat, flnding that there was none; but if this 
Board is going to be degraded into a police justice's court, I for one beg 
leave to retire. I should retire beyond 3Ianassas Junction. It seems to 
me that we should be imposing upon the good nature of the Board if we 
took uj) the details and answered the criticisms of tlie learned Recorder 
about the movements in the nature of a retreat. He said a good nuiuy 
other ingenious tilings ; it seems to me that a good many niglits must 
have been emph)yed in digging them out — keen and crispy criticisms 
upon the evidence. But how any of them fairly weigh upon the mind 
of the Board as indicating a retreat it is impossible for me to guess. It 
would be a waste of time to discuss that (juestion. They all admit of 
the obvious answer that a great deal of the testimony upon which they 
were founded was from utterly incompetent men. Dr. Faxon ; who 
is he ? Dr. Faxon was assistant surgeon of a Massachusetts regiment. 
His office required him to atteiul to his pills and powders, his lancets and 
his cutting knives ; he did not notice anything in i»articular, but he 
thought there was a retreat. But ]\Eorell, aiul Butterfield, and Sykes, 
and Warren, ami Griftin. all skilled lead<n-s, didn't see it. Wt-ll, it is 
the medical view of the situation. 

We do not believe it will be a valuable use of the few remaining hours 
of this day to discuss that ([uestioii of a retreat, and so we leave the 
subject of the joint order. AH pretenses of disobedience of that order 
have long since been exploded. If it was violated, it was not violated 
by Porter. If it was varied from, he could not vary from it, because 



63 

the responsibility was on otlier shoulders. He wanted to do, with a force 
which possildy niioht have been adequate, what here and there in this 
case it has-been claimed he ou«iht to have done, but he was thwarted 
by the peremptory refusal of his superior officer. In that same connec- 
tion we call the attention of the Board to a most renmrkable document, 
and one that has excited no little curiosity, one that was sent here by 
the Secretary of War, or under his authoritative sanction. We have 
tried to get the Eecorder to admit its paternity, but lie does not see tit 
to do so, and we have liad to look at the internal evidences, which are 
sometimes quite conclusive. The external evidences are considerable, 
because on the back of it is this endorsement, which does not say Avho 
wrote it or where it came from, but which indicates, it seems to me, its 
source : 

"Washixgtox, Jmw I'yili, 1878. 

Respectfully referred to Maj. A. B. Gardner, Judge-Advocato, U. S. A., Recorder of 
Board, ai)poiuted l)y S. 0. 78, of April 1'2, 1878, from tlii.s ottice. 

It is understood that (General I'opc wishes Maj. T. C. H. Smith, ])ayraaster U. S. A., 
to attend the trial, and the Secretary of War thinks it would l)e welf to sultpiena him, 
as he is quite familiar with the facts. 

Bv order of the Secretary of War. 

(Signed) E. D. TOWXSEXD, 

Acljtttaiit-General. 

The Eecorder. Do I understand that that is in evidence ? 

Mr. Choate. Xo; I am using it as part of my argument. 

The Eecorder. Then I shall bring it to the notice of the Board that 
the gentleman is arguing upon what is not in evidence. 

Mr. Choate. Xone of my argument is in evidence. 

Mr. Maltey. That was admitted and shown to the Board <luring this 
session, though the name of the author was not recinired. 

The President of the Board. Not admitted as evidence, but as a 
suggestion of a line of argument. 

The Eecorder. Is it put upon the record to be printed as the rest '? 

The President of the Board. Xot at all ; it is received as a line 
of argument. 

Mr. Choate. I will ask leave to incorporate it in my argument. 
There is some little indication of its authorship. It is sometimes said 
that the style is indicative. I think the style is very indicative, and if 
you can attribute a part of it to anybody, perhaps you can impute the 
rest of it to the same author. Now, I find in a letter of General John 
Poi^e to the Compte de Paris, written from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
December 21, 1870, this sentence : 

The f/reaier tite force of the enemy hi our front, the greater need there was of the help of 
Porter's corps, and the greater his obligation to render it, and If ijoa conlel prore that flie 
whole SoHthern Confederacy was in front of him on that day, you would only succeed in hlack- 
eniny his crime — the crime of desertiny the field of battle and ubandoniny his comrades to the 
nnecinal odds he left behind him. 

Now, in the document thus indorsed by the Secretary of War I find 
this : 

The greater the force of the enemy in front of Porter, the greater the necessity of his aid, 
and if the whole ^Southern Confederacy had been before him, it only made his desertion of the 
rest of the Army the more shameful. 

I should not suppose that better exterjial and internal evidence could 
be furnished or reipiired than this of the authorship of this remarkable 
document, which has been sent here under the imi)rimatur of the Secre- 
tary of War for you to consider, and I trust you will consider it. I care 
not whether it originated with (leneral Pope, whose language it evi- 
dently bears, or with Colonel Smith, whose name is upon the back of it, 



64 

€r from some unknown source, which appears to be pressing this prose- 
cution from behind. It is the last authoritative statement, prior to the 
Ifecorder's, of the aroument, and in that point of view I want to read it. 
If it differs from what was chiimed on the former trial ; if it differs from 
what General Pope then claimed ; if it differs from what General Mc- 
Dowell then claimed ; if it differs from what he claimed at Governor's 
Island ; if it differs from what the learned Eecorder now claims, I give 
the government the benefit of the doul)t. They may choose between 
their various theories when they get through. 

Now, I will read this. The theory of it is this, that Porter was at fault 
for not attacking when General McDowell was going around on the Sud- 
ley road. Was ever anything so preposterous as that heard before, in 
view of the claims that have now been made, and all the evidence that 
has been laid before you ? After McDowell's refusal to let King stop a 
juoment that he might make an advance, they say Porter was at fault in 
not making an attack any time while McDowell, with King's division 
and Pickett's division, was going around Avhere they went. Now, there 
is a remarlcaljle circumstance connected with this theory, the cardinal 
idea of which is that King and Eicketts were \\ithin supporting distance, 
although they were l)eing led by their commander away from the scene 
of action, in which he refused to let them participate, and away from this 
theory; that is to say, around upon the Sudley road, where we always 
supposed King and Eicketts both went up. But some clergyman or 
sutler, or ])ossil)ly Oori)oral Solomon Thomas, having said that he saw 
Eicketts' division around on Avhat is called the new road, the gentleman 
wlio got up this fancy map, as we will call it, which harmonizes with the 
Eecorder's view, put Eicketts aAvay around — not on this road to Sudley, 
but away around here [on the "New road'' from Manassas Station to the 
Sudley Springs road], several miles further off". Now, in the light of 
that consideration, we will observe -uliat this paper says about theii* 
being in sup])orting distance as a reason why Porter shouhl have made 
an attack between 12 and 2 o'clock : 

At 12 o'clock m. on the 29tli of Auo;iist, 1862, a severe battle -was going on, and so 
(•ontinueil until dark, between the right wing of the Union Array and the Confederate 
forces under General T. J. Jackson, at Grovetou, on the turnpike leading frouiCeutre- 
ville to Warrenton, Ya. 

The line of battle was perpendicular to the turnpike, the left of our force and the 
right of the enemy's being just south of that road. 

If this came from General Pope, it is an emphatic denial of the Ee- 
corder's theories about a contrary position of his own troops. 

At twelve o'clock noon — 

That is the objective point of time — 

when the battle of the right wing was at the hottest — 

Just think of that, in view of the clear proof to the contrary — 

these twocorjjs. Porter's leading, had reached a point west of the Bethlehem Church. 
At that church the road to Sudley Springs branched to the right (north) and passed 
tlirectly throuj;h the lines of battle. 

The orders of these two corps, which directed their march from Manassas Junction 
upon Gainesville, are j>iven in the testimony before the Porter court-martial, and re- 
(piired their march to be lontiuued towards Gainesville until tliey connected 1)V their 
rif-ht with the rij-lit wing of the army. When they reached Bethlehem Church,' about 
half-way betAvcen Manassas Junction and (liainesville, they were in full hearing of the 
battle going on on the right, and found their advance in the pre.sence of a force of the 
en«'my. 

The writer of this paper thought the enemy was there. 

McDowell, finding the whole road in front of him toward Gainesville blocked up by 
Porter's corps, which was stretched out in column, and knowing how necessary it was 



65 

for liim as well as Porter to go iiniiicdiately into action, told Porter to attack at once 
where he was, and that he (McDowell) would take the Sudley Springs road, on which 
the rear of Porter's column rested, and join the battle on the right. 

Sec liOAvtliis clift'ers from McDowell at Governor's Island and from the 
Eccorder here: 

That McDowell would linve attacked, as he told Porter to do, liad lie been in front, 
there is not the faintest shadow of a doubt. 

McDowell declares that he thought that he then had so far advanced 
that they were close u]t to the pike, and that there was not room for any 
considerable force of the enemy between them and the i)ike. And it is 
clear from an examination of his whole testimonj- and his false position 
admitted in it, that he thought they were very near the pike at twelve 
o'clock. 

At that time and for two hours afterwards McDowell's corps was still with Porter. 

What an outrageous proposition that is. Porter sends back for King's 
division. McDowell says "You cannot have it," and takes it away with 
him, and this paper says that at that time, and for two hours afterwards, * 
all the while they were getting up to the Henry house,, McDowell was 
still with Porter. 

Or so near that its rear, as it marched to the right up the Sndley Springs road from 
Bethlehem Church, must have been still iu view, so that Porter's iittack could and 
would, if necessary, have been supported by McDowell. At the time Porter's attack, by 
every rule of warfare, aud of military oi)ligatiou, should have l)ceu made, and for 
hours afterwards there were present ou the ground, not uiucli (if any) less than twenty 
thousand Union troojis, viz. the corps of McDowell and Porter, less Kicketts' division, 
but plus Piatt's brigade of Sturgis' division which was with Porter's corps, in additit)n 
to his own two divisions. 

The sul:»stance of it all is that Porter was at fault for not attacking 
while McDowell was going off to make connection on the right, after 
having positively refused to let him have a man. That is about a fair 
specimen of the groun<l upon which this prosecution has been pressed. 

The Board then, at one o'clock, took a recess of one hour. 

Mr. CiiOATE resumed his argument as follows : 
pouter's testimo^vy before the m'dowell court of inquiry, 

IN JANUARY, ISOo. 

I desire now to call attention to what I regard as a most authentic 
and true statement of the situation then an<l there ; I mean the sworn 
statement of General Porter before the McDowell court of inquiry. 
Much criticism has been passed on that. 

I desire to incorporate it as a part of my argument, because it will 
stand any criticism that can be brought to bear upon it. The facts were 
then fresh in the miml of General Porter. 

It is true that the examiimtion was under the most constrained cir- 
cumstances. It is not true, and the Eecorder has been misinformed, 
when he said that General Porter volunteered his evidence there. He 
was brought compulsorily Ijefore the court. It is one of those little 
errors which seem to me"^ of very little consequence, l>ut which give a 
coloring to the argument for which they are presented, like the state- 
ment tiiat GeneralHunter was invited to sit upon the court-martial by 
General Porter, and was one of his intimate friends, both of which are 
denied by him. But the circumstances under which Porter Mas exam- 
ined were these : It was after all the evidence in his case had been 
closed ; it was after ]\tcDowell had given destructive testimony against 



G6 

biin before that court, which he then knew, and we now know, was not 
true. It was pending' the time between the closing of tlie evidence and 
the publication of the sentence. He was not i>erinitted to testify fully 
and freely; he was restricted to certain questions which bore ui>on the 
question of this joint order, and of the relations of Porter and ]\IcDowell. 
Fortunately you will tind the matter stated, with perfect consistency, 
not only with its various parts, but, as we claim, with all the subse- 
quent statements that General Porter has ever made. The ground of 
criticism as to inconsistency in itself is this : He speaks of various move- 
ments and intentions as to his operations at Dawkins' Branch, after 
(xeneral McDowell left him, an<l of the effect of what General McDow- 
ell said to him, but the court will see, when they come to examine it, 
that he had always in his miiul the eti'ect of these three things, the rec- 
ognized presence of the enemy in front. General McDowell's injunction 
to remain where he was, and the fact of General McDowell taking King- 
with his 0,000 men awa^' from the combination — away from any possible 
operation under the joint order. It is. said also, that the statements in 
this deposition are falsified and contradicted by the dispatclies which 
are now" produced in this, that General Porter said it would be "a fatal 
military blunder'' to move over to the front, or to the right and front, 
as it was insisted that General McDowell had directed him to do. It is 
said that by these dispatches it appears that he did afterwards direct 
mo\"ements over to the front or to the right and front. That certainly 
is not so. The only movement to the right and front was that which 
was put an end to by General McDowell. The only movement to the 
right was that jnade through Morell's deployment over beyond the rail- 
road, exactly to the right, after General JMcDowell had i)ersonally 
(piitted (xeneral Porter, and before the message had been received 
througli Locke for him to reuiain where he was, and that he should take 
Kirfg with him. Xow, I will read a few passages of General Porter's 
testimony before the ]\[cDowell court of inquiry, because, in view of the 
argument I presented this morning, it seems to me tliat it will come in 
as a complete corioboration. 

Question (By Coart). What order did General McDowell give, or what anthority 
did heexereise over you, a.id in virtue of whose order f State fully and particularly. 

Answer. General McDowell exercised authority over me in obedience to an order of 
General Pope's, addressed jointly to General McDowell and me, and which I presume 
is in possession of the court. I have no copy of it. Our commands being united, he 
necessarily came into the command under the Articles of War. 

The witness hei'e stated in substance to the court that the question leads to many 
things pertaining to the recent court in his case, the de^-isiou of which has not yet 
be<'n annotiuced. 

The ([uestion requires .a statement of what transpired, and he felt, at this time, some 
delicacy in answering, both so far as (ieneral McDowell and himself are concerned. 
I would have to state the orders under Avliich I was moving in that dire<;tion. 

The court decided that the (question was a proper one. 

The witness continued: 

That joint order refers to a previous oi'der given to me, of which this is a copy. 

The witness jn'oduced a co]iy of an r)rder from Major-Gencral Po])e. datrd Hea(h|uar- 
ters Army of Virginia, Centreville, August 29, 1862, which was read by ilif Recorder, 
and is appended to the proceedings of the day and marked A. 

The witness continued : 

Under that order, .King's division constituted a part of my conunand. I was mov- 
ing toward (iainesville when I received the joint order, and was joined by General 
McDowell, who had also received a copy of the joint order. / had at Ihat time received 
notice of the eiicniji hciii;/ ni front atid }utd captured two prisoiierx. Aly coiiiinaiid was then 
formiiKj in line, jtreparatori/ to inorint/ and (tdrancin(/ towards (lainesriUc. General Mc- 
Dowell, on arriving, showed me the joint order, a copy of which I acknowledged hav- 
ing in my possession. An exi)ression of opinion then given by him to the etfect that 
that was no place to fight a battle, and that I was too far out, whicli, taken in con- 
ne<;tion with the conversation, I c<nisidercd an order, and stopped further progress towards 



67 

Gainesville for a short time. General McDowell aud I went to the riglit, which was 
rather to the north, with the view of seeing the character of the country, aud with the 
idea of conneetin;/, as that joint order required, with the troops on my rifjht. But very few 
words passed between us, and I suggested, from the character of the country, that he 
should take King's division with him, and form eonnection on the right of the timber tvhich 
icas then on the left ofliei/nolds, orjiresnmed to be Ixeiinolds. He left me suddenly, not replying 
to a call from me to the effect, "What should I do?" aud with no understanding on 
my part how I should he governed, I immediately returned to my command. On the 
way back, seeing the enemji (jathering on my front, I sent an officer {Lieutenant-Colonel Locke, 
my chief of staff ), to King's division, directing it to remain tvhere it was for the jircsent, and 
commenced moving my eommand toivards Gainesville, and one division to the right or north of 
the road. I received an answer from General McDoivell to remain where I teas ; he was going 
to the right aud would take King with liim. He did go, taking King's division, as I pre- 
sumed, to take position on the left of Reynolds. I remained where I was. When General 
McDowell left me, I did not know where he had gone. No troops were in sight, and 
L knew of the position of lieytiolds and Sigel, who were on our right, merely by the sound of 
SigeVs cannon aud from information that day, that Reynolds was in the vicinity of Groveton. 
The head of my corps was on the first stream after leaving Manassas Junction on the 
road to Gainesville, one division in the line of battle, or the most of it. 

Question (by Court). Did you consider the expression of General McDowell, as stated 
by you, that you were too far to the front, and that this was no ])la(e to fight a battle, 
in the light of an order not to advance, but to resume your original position? 

Answer. / did, when Kiug^s division was taken from me, and as countermanding the 
first order of General Po]ie, under the authority given him by that joint order. 

Question (by Court). Was such an order a proper one under the circumstances ? If 
not, state why. 

Answer. I did not think so, and for that reason when General McDowell left me, I eon- 
tinned my movement as if I had not seen the joint order. My previous order required me 
to go to Gainesville, and from information received by the bearer of the first order. 
General Gibbon, I knew it was to prevent the junction of the advancing enemy and 
Jackson's force, then near Groveton, and that the object was to strike tiie turnpike 
to Gainesville before the advancing column should an-ive. The sooner we arrived 
there the more ettective would be our action. That order directed me to move quickly 
or we would lose much. That order had been seen by General McDowell, and when 
he altered it, as I conceived he had the authority, I presumed he knew more fully than 
I did the plans of General Pope. I will add that the joint order contemplated forming 
a line connecting with the troops on the right, and as I presumed, as General McDowell 
acted, taking King's division with him, that he intended to form such a line. / thought 
at the time that the attack should have been made at once upon the troops as they were coming 
to us and as soon as possible. 

Question (by Court). State, so far as you know, what followed, so far as the move- 
ments of Genersil McDowell's troops and your own were concerned, and what orders 
you subse(juently received from General McDowell. 

Answer. General McDowell took King off' to the right. I know nothing further 
of his movements. I remained where I was until three o'clock next morning. A 
portion of the command left at daybreak. I received no orders whatever iiom Gen- 
eral McDowell. 

Question. (By Court.) But for this order, what movem,ent would you have made, and 
have you reason to suppose that if you had not been stopped the junction of Longstreet and 
Jackson would have been rffccled f 

Answer. / should have continued moving towards Gainesville, and until %ve got out to 
the turnpike, or met the enemy; I presume we would have prevented the junction or been 
whipped. 

******* 

Question. (By General McDowell.) Under what relations, as to command, did yon 
and General McDowell move from Manassas and continue, iirior to the receipt of Gen- 
eral Pope's joint order? 

Answer. I di<l not know that General McDowell was going from Manassas, and I 
have no recollection of any relations whatever, nor of any understanding. 

Question. (By General McDowell.) Was there nothing said about General McDowell 
being the senior, ami of his commanding the whole by virtue of his rank ? 

Answer. Nothing that I know of. 

Question. (By General McDowell.) What time did you take up your line of march 
from Manassas Junction for Gainesville? 

Answer. The hour the head of the column left, I presume, was about ten o'clock; it 
may have been earlier. Ammunition had been distributed to the men, or was directed 
to be distributed, and the comuiand to be put in motion immediately. 

Question. (By'General McDowell.) When you received the joint order, tvhere were you 
personally, aud where was your eommand ? 

AuswiM'. / (('«■* at the he id of my coin nn, and a portion of the command, or the head of 

cii 



68 

the column, was then formiug line in front ; one regiment, as skirmishers, was in advance, and 
also a small party of cavalry which I had as escort. The remainder of the corps was ou 
the road. The head of jny column was in the Manassas road to Gaiuesville, at the 
first stream, as previously described by me. 

Question. (By GenerarMcDowell.) The witness says he received an order from Gen- 
eral McDowell,"^ or what he considered an order, when General McDowell first joined 
him, which order he did not obey. Will witness state why he disobeyed what he con- 
sidered an order ? 

Answer. The order I have said I considered an order in connection with his conver- 
sation, and his taking King's division from me. I therefore did obey it. 

Question. (By General McDowell.) What did you understand to be the effect of 
General McDowell's conversation ; was it that you were to go no further in the direc- 
tion of Gainsville than you then were? 

Answer. The conversation was in connection with moving over to the right, which 
necessarily would prevent an atlvance. 

That is in connection with Mt'DoweH's taking King over to connect 
on the right. 

It will be observed from Avhat follows that General Porter had not 
the least impression of any direction from McDowell after he left him 
Avith King, to go to the front, or right and front. 

Question. (By General McDowell.) Yon state you did not think General McDowell's 
order (if it was one) a proper one, and that for that reason you continued your move- 
ment as if you had not seen the joint order. Is the witness to l»e understood that this 
was in obedience of what he has stated to be General McDowell's order 'I 

Answer. I did not consider that an order at that time, and have tried to convey that 
im])ression, but it was an expression of opinion which I might have construed as an 
order ; hut ivhen General McDowell left me, he gave no reply to my question, and seeing ih< 
enemy in my front, I considered myself free to act according to my own judgment until I re- 
ceived notice of the withdraival of King. 

Question. (By General McDowell.) What Avas the effect on your movements of the 
message you state was brought to you by Colonel Locke (your chief of staft), from 
General McDowell, that you were to stay where yon were, that he was going to the 
right, and would take King with him ? 

Answer. The eft'ect was to post my command, or a portion of the command, in line 
where the head of the column then was, ])r(ii)ared to resist the advance of an enemy 
in that direction, and turn a portion of the command a little back on the r«)ad. After 
doing this, I sent messengers to General Pope, informing him of the fact. 

Question. (By G<'neral McDowell.) Informing General Pope of what fact ? 

An.swer. Of my jjresent position and what there was in my front. I will say that I 
sent several messengers, conveying, to the best of my recollection, the general informa- 
tion of my location, and one telling him that King's division had hecn taken to the right. 
Some of tiiose messengers never returned to me, and I presume were captured. 

Question. (By General McDowell.) Did yon receive any further nu'.ssage from Gen- 
oral JUcDowell, other thftu the one yon state that Colonel Locke brought you, as before 
stated, which you considered an order '? 

Answer. IS'one that I recollect of. I had memoranda which I sent to General Morell, 
and which conveys the general impression that I had rcMcived messages from General 
McDowt'll, but I have no recollection of receiving them, nor were they brought to 
mind till their appearance before the court. That memoranda says General McDowell 
informs me all is going well on the right, or something to that ett'ect. 

Question. (By General McDowell.) Is witncssto be understood lie did not on the 29th, 
after seeing General McDowell the second time, receive any instructions or directions 
or orders from General McDowell to move his troops from where he states he was 
directed to remain ? 

Answer. I have no recollection, and I am confident I received no message or order 
from him other than those that I have mentioned. 

The witness speaks of the effect of CJeneral McDowell's message as 
brought by General Locke, to cause him to remain in i)Osition. 

Question. (By General McDowell.) How far was it from the head of witness' column 
to Gainesville? 

Answer. I do not know; I had never been over that portion of the country, and have 
not been since. 

Question, (liy General McDowell.) How long had the witness' head of coliunn been 
halted when G<'neral McDowell joined him 1 

Answer. I cainiot siiy, but not long. It had halted before I arrived there. 

Question. (By General McDowell.) Witness speaks of the eficct of General McDowell's 



69, 

message (as brought by Colonel Tjoeke) to liave been to cause luni to remain iu posi- 
tion at the place where (ieneral McDowell first saw him. How long did witness" troops 
contimu^ in this position ? 

Answer. A ])ortion of the command remained there until daybreak the following 
morning, and some till after daybreak. The most of Morell's division was on or near 
that ground all day. 

Question. (By General McDowell.) Did witness conceive himself prohibited from 
making, or attempting to make, any movement to the front, or to the right, or to the 
front and right ? 

Answer. By that direction or order token in connection with the joint order, I con- 
sidered myself checked in advancing, ('.s7kywV(//// toA'AH ill coiiiirclioii with the removal of 
King's dirlmin. I did not consider that I miitd more to the rii/lit, and [considered: that (len- 
eral McDoircU took Kin(fs dirision to form a connection on the right, or to go to the right 
and form Kiich a connection, as was possible. 1 add further, that I considered it impracti- 
cahle to go to the right. 

Question. (By General McDowell.) Did witnesa attempt to make any movement in 
either of the directions above named ? 

Answer. Not directly to the right. I did to the light and front, and when I received 
the last message from General McDowell to remain where I was, I recalled it. 

Showing that the attempt referred to is the one stated in the subse- 
quent message from himself to McDowell, that he had made an attem])t 
to get Morell over to the right, and before the message came by Colonel 
Locke to remain where he was. 

Then the Recorder has insisted that the orders to Morell "to push 
over to the aid of Sigel" were in express contradiction of this state- 
ment that he made no attempt either to the right or the right and 
front. But the direction to Sigel was not to the right or right and front. 
McDowell and Porter together had found it impracticable to enter the 
woods to the right. What was the direction to move to the aid of Sigel ? 
Why, it was to move over and strike upon the road by which Khig was 
marching ; that was the movement ; not into and through the woods to 
the right, beyond where McDowell and Porter had gone together, but 
farther back in the direction to strike the Sudley road, which was the 
road by which King was moving. 

Question. (By General McDowell.) Did you make no attempt to go to the front or 
the right, or the riglit and front, after that message ? 

Answer. I made no attempt Avith any body of troops. I sent messengers through 
there to go to General Pope, and to get information from the troops on the right. 

Question. (By General McDowell. ) After General McDowell left the witness, did the 
witness not know he was expected by General McDowell to move to the right or to the 
right and front ? 

Answer. I did not. » 

My learned friend says that these subsequent messages to go to the 
aid of Sigel show that he <lid not know that McDowell did expect it. 
There is not the least warrant for that on a fair reading of this testi- 
monj'. This point, and the bearing and connection of the dispatches tO' 
what took place that afternoon, are so full,y explained by Mr. Bullitt 
that I pass on. Let us read it, however, once more : 

Question. (By General McDowell.) Witness speaks of havijig reported tj General 
Pope. When did witness conceive himself as no longer under (icneral McDowell ? 

Answer. My messages were addressed to General McDowell, I think, all of thimi. 
The ujcssengers were directed to deliver them to General Pope, if they saw or met 
him. I considered myself as limited in my operations under General McDowell's or- 
ders, until I should receive directions from General Pope. ,.*.«< 

Question. (By General McDowell.) How long Avas witness and General McDowell 
together before they moved to the right " with a view of seeing the character of the 
country " ? 

Answer. I do not think we were together more than four or five minutes, tliou"-h I 
have no distinct recollection. ° 

Question. (By General McDowell.) How long were thev together, after movino- to 
the right ? .0,0 

Answer. It may have been ten (tr twelve minutes, perhaps longer. 



70 

Question. (By General McDowell.) You have stated "when General McDowell left 
nie, I did not know where lie liad gone." Have you not stated before the recent court- 
martial, in your defense, as follows: "We" (General McDowell and yonrself) "soon 
l)arted, General McDowell to proceed towards the Sudley Springs road, I to return to 
the position at which he first spoke to me, after our meeting"? 

Answer. I know now where General McDowell went. I did not know then. 

Question. (By General McDowell.) After General McDowell left you, you say you 
Bent an officer to King's division, directing it to remain wliere it was, for the present. 
What Avas the necessity for this order? Had the division, so tar as you then knew, 
been ordered clsewhex-e ? 

Answer. I sent the message to tliat dirision to remain where if was for the present, in order 
not to iring it to the front, where I was forming a line, hefore I was ready for it, and intend- 
ing to use it as the main support. 

Question. (By General McDoAvell.) Why did you continue to regard King's division 
as attached to your command after the receipt of the joint order ? 

Answer. I never thought of the point before, but General McDowell had left me and, 
as I understood, in no wise changing the relations of King's diWsion to my corps. 

Question. (By General McDowell.) Did not the joint order itself modify the first 
order you received from Genei'al Pope ? 

Answer. It placed all under the direction of General McDowell. 

Question (by General McDowell). If it placed all under General McDowell, how 
did you regard the fact of its being addressed jointly to you and him, and not to him 
only, if he was the sole commander? 

Answer. I had reason to believe that order was written on an api)lication made by 
me to General Pope for orders to be given to me in writing ; this, in consequence of 
having received verbal orders from him by persons wliom I knew nothing of, and 
which were contrary to some instructions which I had received in writing. I presume 
the order was written by General Pope, because I had a portion of General McDowell's 
coumiand with me, and the order was intended for both. 

Question (by General McDowell). Did witness send any written order to King's 
division? 

Answer. No, sir. 

Question (by General McDowell). How long was it after you left General McDow- 
ell, before you sent Colonel Locke to King's division? 

Answer. I sent him as soon as I returned to my command after leaving General Mc- 
Dowell. I returned inmiediately. 

I do not know, nor do I care, whether there was any different state- 
ment by General Porter as to the legal effect of the joint order. I have 
not heen able to find it. But if there was, it had no relevancy whatever 
to this case. The pretended contradictions and inconsistencies imi)uted 
by the Recorder do not exist; and I submit that that piece of testimony 
from which I have now read these extracts is one of the strongest pieces 
of testimony in this case that has been presented by the goverimient, 
and that it is fatal entirely to the prosecution in this respect. 

THE 4.30 P. M. ORDER. 

Now, a few words as to the pretense of a disobedience, on the part of 
General Porter, to the 4.30 p. m. order of the 29th. So nnich has been 
said already on that subject that I am only called upon to answer what 
the Recorder has said about it. 

Headquarters in the Field, 

August 29, 1862— 4.:iO p. m. 
Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right fiank. I desire you to push 
forward into action at once on the enemy's fiank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping 
your right in coniinuuication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the 
woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their fiank. Keep 
lieavy reserves, and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. 
In case you an- obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep yon in 
close communication with the right wing. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major-Generul Commanding. 
Maior-Gcueral Portkk. 

The Recorder's first and main proposition is, that there is no new evi- 
dence before this Board, and that the case is not changed fiom the atti- 



71 

tucle which it hekl on the former trial. It does seem to me that such a 
statement ignores all the real evidence in this case. But, 1 supjiose, it 
is necessarj^, in attempting to make an argument against General Por- 
ter, at this stage of the case and on this subject, to ignore and forget all 
material evidence. ISTo new evidence ! What do you say to the evidence 
of Geueral Euggles, one of the most important pieces of testimony in- 
troduced into this case, in respect to the 4:30 p. m. order? 

General Ruggles was the man who wrote that order. It was very 
material to know whether the " 4.30 " which is on it could be taken as 
a certain indication of its actual date. Why was that so ? Because 
Captain Pope had undertaken to say that he knew that he started with 
the order at 4.30, because that was the date of the order ; but he had no 
other means of knowledge, and no other foundation for his recollection, 

Now, theu, if General Euggles had written the order, and had dated 
it upon delivery to Captain Pope, there would have been some sense 
and substance to Captain Pope's testimonj", some foundation as to the 
beginning of the half hour to two hours, which, from his various state- 
ments, it must be regarded that he has said it took him to go with it. 
But Euggles says his habit was, and he knows it was followed in this 
instance, when he and General Pope began the work of i)reparing the 
order, he acting as scribe, and General Pope as dictator, to date the 
order first, and whether, after writing the " 4.30 j). m.," there were inter- 
rujitions, or whether the whole order was written consecutively and im- 
mediately afterwards, or whether he Jind the general went about other 
business in the mean time, he has no means of stating. Neither he nor 
any one else has any means of stating. So that the very foundation of 
Captain Pope's evidence entirely falls out of the case, viz, immediate 
connection between 4.30 as the time of the beginning of the order, and 
4.30 as the time of its delivery to Captain Po]De. Xow, when the Ee- 
corder says that there is not au}^ new evidence in the case, he must have 
forgotten that. 

Then, is there no other new evidence in the case ? A\Tiat does he say 
to the testimony of Captain Eandol, of the regular service, who came 
from Boston Harbor, where he is now stationed ? The Board cannot 
have forgotten his clear and strong statement. If my recollection does 
not fail me, he saw the delivery of that order to General Porter. He 
saw the ofticer come uj) and deliver it ; and adds his testimony to that 
of five or six witnesses, who were produced on the trial before the court- 
martial, that it was sundown — 6.30, not 5 o'clock, or 5.30. Had the 
Eecorder forgotten that when he said " There is no new evidence" ? 
Should he say that there is no new evidence, in face of the fact of the 
complete demolition of all the government evidence on the foriner triaP? 
Is the testimony of Captain Moale, and of Lieutenant Jones, no new 
evidence ? It is true they were not present on the scene of action there, 
and they did not witness the delivery or the receipt of that order ; but 
they had a far more fatal x)iece of new e^ddence to produce, to the de- 
struction of the government case on this head; and what was it? Why, 
that Captain Pope, when he was no longer in the immediate service oi 
his uncle, when he was in a remote part of the continent, years after- 
wards, when there was no anticipation of any new trial for Porter, when 
it was not supposed that any such transaction could take place, in 
friendly discourse with his associates, with his mess in the comj^any to 
which he belonged, he confessed — that is the word to use — confessed 
that his testimony on the former trial was not true. He had said on 
the former trial that he presumed that he got that order at 4.30, be- 
cause it was dated 4.30, and he accomplished the journey in half an hour, 



72 

and delivered the order to General Porter at 5 o'clock ; with great pre- 
cision, as if he had a clear recollection about it, he said, " Perhaps within 
three minutes after five." But to Captain Moale and Lieutenant Jones 
he confessed that on the way with that order he got lost, and to one of 
them he said he was from one to two hours, and to the other he said he 
was a very long time, making the same statement, that he had lost his 
way in carrying the order. 

Now, where is the substance of the evidence for the prosecution on 
that part of the case ? Where is there any evidence whatever, to meet 
that ottered by General Porter, that it was received at 0.30 p. m., sun- 
down or after i I cannot, as a hiAvyer, see any. And how a military 
man can discover any substance of evidence whatever left on the part 
of the prosecution, it is impossible for me to imagine. Further than 
that, you have had Capt. Douglas Pope recalled. He has endeavored 
to show you how he came. You have had Duttee, the orderly, recalled, 
and he, too, has tried to show you liow he came. I submit that their 
evidence on this subject, on this new examination, independent of all 
new evidence, independent of the demolition of their former statements, 
by the testimony of Captain Moale and Lieutenant Jones, shows that 
they had not the least idea which Avay they went, and that they 
have not now. They tried to pick out a path upon the map ; but you 
have i)Ositive proof that Duttee said that until he went and viewed the 
ground, he thought he went around through Five Forks. 

What, then, is the fair conclusion from all the testimony as it stands ? 
Is it not that the testimony of Douglas Pope aud of Duttee on the former 
trial ought not to have been credited, and that now it cannot be credited, 
in the least ? The fact is established of their having lost their way, of their 
seeing no troops on the Sudley road, which from below the old Alexandria 
pike is where they pretend to have come, when King's division and 
Eicketts' division must have been blocking up that road entirely, so that 
the passage of any one would have been a work of extreme ditficulty. Yet 
they did not see a soldier. Wli at is the inevitable conclusion ? That they 
got down to the junction somehow after wandering in the woods, whether 
by Wheeler's or down by Comi)ton's Lane, or somewhere else ; and that 
they struck the Alexandria road and came down to the junction of the 
Sudley road is probable. But it is not possible that from there they 
went down the Sudley road, because then they must have met these 
troops. The ingenious mai)-maker for the government has attempted 
to relieve that difticulty by getting Kicketts ott' the road. ]>ut it will 
hardly serve the purpose. Kicketts was on the Sudley road right be- 
hind King. There is but one way that they could not have seen a sol- 
dier, and that was to cross directly tlie Sudley road and go down the 
continuation of the old Warrenton, Alexandria and Washington jiike 
from their junction in the direction of Manassas, and get around some 
way on the Manassas road, and come up by the junction by Hethlehem 
church, and that is the way they took, and that accounts for their being 
so long upon the way, and shows the 

TIME OF DELIVERY OF 4.30 ORDER. 

There is one other remark to be nmde in connection with the 4.30 p. 
m. order as to the time of its delivery. There was testimony on the 
former trial, and I think there is testimony now, that they came up to 
the junction from the direction of Manassas to the headquarters of Gen- 
eral I'orter, and it seems to me that there is notliing left whatever of 
the case, but t(.) conclude, taking all the parts of the testimony together. 



73 

that they did come around by that way, aud must necessarily, receiving 
that order some time after 4.30, and that they, by some round-about 
way, must have got h^st. Then you malve all tlie evidence coincide. 
You accept as true these six witnesses introduced on the part of Gen- 
eral Porter, all credible, all intelligent, all respectable, that it was 
received not before sundown. But there is one other fatal circumstance 
which I must not omit to mention. In all celebrated cases, I think the 
experience of every lawyer will permit him to testify that before the 
case concludes, there is some piece of false evidence foisted ui)on the 
case, sometimes even by voluntary evidence from some unknown source, 
originated and promoted by some unknown party. That has actually 
taken place in this instance. A third ]iarty, a second orderly, one Dyer, 
has been produced here, who pretends to have accompanied Captain 
Pope and Orderly Duffee on that expedition. But Duflee does not recol- 
lect his i)resence; if you can accept Duffee's testimony, it is that he was 
not there, and the most convincing proof that he was not there is what 
he says himself. I will not recall all the particulars of how he recog- 
nized the road when he went down there. He went over the ground 
with Buflee to find the way, and he found it by an unmistakable land- 
mark of a house with a four-square roof. That was the way he recog- 
nized it as he rode over. He says he went with Captain Pope sixteen 
years ago, and then saw the same house which he recognized last week. 
Unfortunately for that statement, it turned out that tliat four-square 
house was built after these battles were over. He said he did not go 
quite up to General Porter's headquarters, but that he saw the church 
by which his headquarters were, and he recognized the church, knew it 
was a church by the steeple. Well, it turned out upon authentic testi- 
mony, which cannot be disbelieved or doubted, that the church never 
had a steeple. The Eecorder has an idea that it was in ruins, a melan- 
choly ruin, and that perhaps two of the walls had fallen in, so that any- 
body could see that it was a sacred ruin. But that did not impress the 
man Dyer. He saw a steeple which never had existed. Then he saw 
General Porter come out of his tent with Captain Pope. But the evi- 
dence is clear that General Porter had no tent. And the evidence on 
which General Porter was convicted before, aud which was reasserted 
by Judge-Advocate Holt in melancholy tones in his paper to the Presi- 
dent, was that General Porter was lying down under a tree, and con- 
tinued lying nnder the tree for several minutes after the order was 
received. But this man Dyer pretended to have seen him come out from 
around the corner of his tent with Captain Pope. But to crown all, 
he swears that he went back with Captain Pope, and went direct to Gen- 
eral Pope's headquarters. Well, how was that '? Captain Pope testified 
that it was about 8 o'clock when he reached the scene of headquarters 
on his retiu^n, and he was confused at so many camp-fires ; he could not 
tell General Pope's headquarters from those of anybody else, and he 
had to go to General McDowell's headquarters to inquire which General 
Pope's headquarters were. But this witness says they got there before 
dark, and saw no camp-fires, and did not go to McDowell but went 
straight to Pope. Now, we are known by the company we keep, and 
when yoVi find these three witnesses now brought, thus standing together, 
Douglass Pope, Dufifee, and Dyer, what remains to sustain the ground 
of this prosecution on their evidence and accusation f It seems to me 
tliat they all tumble out of the case together. 

But there is another new and startling piece of evidence which 
demonstrates that the 4.30 p. m. order was not received by Porter until 
sunset. At page 810 of the new testimony, there is a fatal piece of 



74 

evidence — two of tliem — and tlie Eecorder must have been slumbering 
^vlien be failed to recollect tbem. Tbe necessary part of the case of the 
prosecution is that this 4.30 p. m. order was received at 5 or 5.30 
o'clock, in time for General Porter to have made an attack before 
dark. But here is a dispatch which General Porter wrote at 6 p. m., 
Avhich absolutely negatives, in everj' line of it, all possible idea of his 
having- received this order to attack, not only from the fact that he says 
he has no cavalry — and Captain Pope brought him some orderlies as now 
appears, left three with him — but the whole tenor of the dispatch shows 
that he had heard nothing from McDowell or Pope for a long time, and 
did not know what the situation was. Let me read this dispatch : 

Failed in getting Morell over to you. After wandering about tlie woods for a time, 
I withdrew him, and while doing so artillery opened on ns. My scouts could not get 
through. Each one found the enemy betAveen us, and I lielieve some have been cap- 
tured. Infantry are also in front. I am trying to get a battery, but have not suc- 
ceeded as yet. From the masses of dust on our left, and from rejjorts of scouts, think 
the enemy are moving largely in that way. Please communicate the way this mes 
senger came. I have no cavalry or messengers now. Please let me know your de- 
signs; whether you retire or not. I cannot get water, and am out of provisions. Have 
lost a few men from infantry liring. 

Aug. '^9 — 6 ]). m. 

F. J. PORTER, 

J/«/. Gcii. Vo s. 

Xow, when he wrote that dispatch at p. m., had he yet received the 
4.30 p. m. order? That is impossible. 

Another thing I must refer to in order to refute the suggestions made 
about this. He says : " I have no cavalry or messengers." Where was he 
when he wrote that ? He was at his headquarters at Bethlehem Church. 
"0,"says the Eecorder, "he had cavalry." Yes; there were cavalry 
up by Morell, because, shortly afterward, not getting any cavalry from 
McDowell under this message, he sends to Morell for some cavalry. 
The meaning is, not to deny that he had cavalry up at the other end of 
his hue, but none at his headquarters. And that leads me to this — in 
this place I may as well say it as in any other — that as to the alleged 
variations and inconsistencies in the various statements of General Por- 
ter, and particularly in his opening statement before this Board, there 
are just exactly two. And the AAonder to me always has been, and the 
wonder to me when General Porter's opening statement was prepared 
was, that it was possible, or could be possible, to make a statement in 
which there should be so few omissions or failures of memory as com- 
pared with the facts which now appear demonstrated here. There are 
two. One is a diflerence of recollection between him and Sturgis, 
"whether he knew of the presence of General Sturgis, and ordered him 
back to Manassas with his 840 men on that day. There is a direct dif- 
ference of recollection between them, and, judging it by the ordinary 
laws-of evidence, it looks to me as if Sturgis's recollection Avas the bet- 
ter. But I am tbrowu into confitsion u2>on that when I refer to Porter's 
examination ujKm the McDowell court of inquiry in January, 18G3, when 
he testified that he knew nothing of the movenunits of Sturgis on that 
day. The other lailui-e of menuuy which the Eecorder regards as so 
destructive to General Porter is in this matter of forgetting that he had 
some cavalry with IMoiell that day, a part of a Pennsyhania troop — a 
ti'oop that Morell, to whom the commander says he was to report, but 
don't recollect rei)orting, and Locke and jVIartin, who Avere in the front, 
did not see or huxe any knowledge of. 

So if tlie testimony of those cavalrymen is to be taken, that must stand 
confessed, that failure of memory. But it does not in the least affect the 



75 

merits of this case, nor in respect to any material point the deductions 
that are necessarily to be drawn. 

That ends what I have to say upon the 4.30 p. m. order, because I 
assume it to be demonstrated that not being received till sunset, it was 
then too late to make the attack which was directed by it. That Porter, 
acting' upon the natural impulse of a loyal and devoted soldier, receiving- 
such an order as that from his chief— that his first imimlse was to carry 
it out, is manifest. What did he do ? Did he, as was pretended by the 
Judge-Advocate, and I think is still insisted by the Kecorder, send an 
order to move forward two regiments suj)ported by two more ? No. It 
appears now clearly proved ui)on the record, that that had all been 
already done ujjon some previous but false report that the enemy before 
him were retreating. But he sent an immediate order to General Morell 
to make an attack with his whole force, and he followed it up in i^erson 
instantly to the front, and with such speed that he was guilty of a pos- 
sible omission which has been charged upon him as an act of criminal 
neglect. What was that "^ Why, that Sykes being with him at head- 
quarters, he hurried forward to the front, where Morell was ready to 
begin an attack, in such haste that he omitted to tell Sykes of the re- 
ceipt of the order. To my mind, that is onlj^ clear proof of Porter's zeal 
to carry out the order. He found that he had been under a misappre- 
hension about the withdrawal of the forces behind Bull Eun, indicated 
by his dispatches shortly before. He found that General Pope now was 
insisting that he should make an immediate attack, and he hastens for- 
ward. What is in his mind is to carry out that order. He first sends 
Locke ahead with his order to make an immediate attack with his whole 
force. He goes to the front, and if it is true, if Sykes' memory is not at 
fault on this point, he went forward without ordering Sykes or com- 
municating the order to him. If I understand the military maneuver- 
ing the order was properly to be given as it was given to IVIorell to make 
the attack. Sykes, with his division, was right behind, ready to be 
brought \i]) in instant support. He w^as in immediate contact. Now, 
what is all his parade of rhetoric and of assertion about this failure to 
exhibit this order to Sykes ? It oidy shows the instant zeal with which 
Porter sprang to obey that order. Then what happened ? He got to 
the front ; he found Morell about ready to obey that order, and dark- 
ness was already upon them. I accept the military authority that has 
been brought into the case, to the effect that it was imiiracticable then 
to make an attack. General McDowell said on the former trial that he 
might have made an attack within an hour after receiving the order. 
He confessed, on the present examination, that he knew he w^as wrong- 
about this, confessed that Porter's position was in fact not so fiir ad- 
vanced as he had supposed; he will not say exactly how mach, but it 
would have taken much longer to make the attack here ordered than he 
had ]>reviously supposed. Colonel Smith, who before testified, to the 
destruction of General Porter, that that attack might have been made 
within an hour, concurring in the opinion then given by McDowell, now 
comes and frankly states that it would have taken not less than two 
hours. Suppose it to have been in the neighborhood of seven o'clock, 
already nearly dark, when Porter got to the front, could he but concur 
with the conclusion of his skillful subordinate, Morell, that it was too 
late — two hours, nine o'clock — to complete the movement and i)ush for- 
ward into contact with the enemy f I suppose it is a military absurdity 
to pretend that. So I leave that branch of the case. 



76 

VIOLATION QF THE 52d ARTICLE OF AVAE. 

Now ill respect to those more grievous charges, as they seem to me to 
be. Having- acquitted Geiieial Porter of all that can possibly be charged 
against him under the head of disobedience, now comes the question of 
Avhether he was guilty of the frightful crimes charged upon him in the 
specifications under the second charge, imputing to him shameful treach- 
ery and misconduct in the face of the enemy, running away when he 
knew that a battle was raging on his right, in which the rest of the 
forces were engaged, by which even the capital of the country itself was 
involved in danger, and moving off without the least effort, or lying- 
still upon his arms all day without the least effort tor assist. You will 
observe that all this has practically been disposed of in our discussion 
of the previous question under the joint order, if there was no retreat. 
The whole pretense of a retreat was based upon the dispatch to Mc- 
Dowell and King, that, as the sound of battle seemed to retire, indicat- 
ing to him that the main part of our forces were withdrawing behind 
Bull Itun, as the joint order had contemplated the necessity of doing-, 
he had made up his mind to retire also. I never have been able to dis- 
cover any just ground of complaint as to that suggestion of his. If the 
^circumstances were what he supposed, and what the dispatch shows he 
supposed, it was not acted upon ; there was no movement whatever such 
as the dispatch contemplated; there was no retreat. The substance of 
the information upon which he had written that dispatch was immedi- 
ately contradicted, and he moved forward and dh-ected an advance in- 
stead of a retreat. But under the application of the joint order, under 
General Pope's reiterated injunction in that order that it might be 
necessary, and that it probably would be necessary, for all of that army 
to fall back behind Bull Eun that night, and under no circumstances to 
get into any position by which they could not foil behind Bull Bun that 
night, if at three or four or five o'clock in the afternoon he became sat- 
isfied from the sound of battle, as this dispatch shows he did, that the 
rest of the army was falling behind Bull Bun, what ought he to have 
done? Ought he to have left his little band of 9,000 or 10,000 men ex- 
posed to the whole rebel army of now 50,000 instead of 25,000, and he 
the only outpost and wholly unsupported I AVell, I know nothing of 
soldiery, but it does seem to me to be the obvious dictate of common 
sense that, if that was his belief, the i)urpose of following the rest of 
the army beliind ]>ull Run, as indicated in this message to McDowell 
and King, was not only eminently proi)er, but under the circumstances 
was absolutely necessary ; and when that information is contradicted, 
then you find that the first tiling he does is to move forward. 

As to the numbers of the respective armies that day, 1 do not propose 
to afflict you with any further discussion. I have taken it for granted 
that, from all the statements that have been made up to this time. Por- 
ter's force consisted of 10,000 men; that is the proof upon which he was 
tried before ; that is the theory ui)on which this case has been tried 
throughout, until the day before yesterday, when the Becorder, upon 
what Ave regard as mistaken and fictitious methods, figured it at 12,000 
or 15,000. I'ope tliought it was 12,000, but the actual figures show 
10,000. ]S"either do I know or care what the exact number was of the 
rebel forces opposed to him on Dawkins' Branch, or between there and 
tlie pike; they were all in reporting distance of each other. It was one 
united force, and an attack by him iii)on that force at any time after 
McDowell left him would have brought down togetlier, concentrated 
upon any jiart of that ground, the whole of Lee's and Longstreet's force. 



77 

And what had he reason to believe they were? He and McDoAvell 
agree, upon the testimony as it now stands upon the record, tliat they 
knew there were at least 14,100 who must have got there before they 
did, and they took it for granted that the rest were coming. 

Kow, what is the nature of the question under this specification ? AYe 
have got the question of disobedience out of the way. That is all gone. 
I assume that we have made a complete case in answer to the charge of 
disobedience. The question on this part of the case then is, the retreat 
being out of the way, whether it was his duty to make an attack between 
the time of McDoAvell's departure, taking King with him, and the receipt 
of the 1.30 p. m. order. Now, I am perhai)s not capable of discussing 
the military principles that must govern such a question ; but I can state 
upon the one side the theory ui)on which he was found guilty because 
he did not attack, and I can state, upon the other, the facts as they now 
stand, and I think you will ag.ree that, if those facts as they have now 
been proved had been before tliat court-martial, there never w<mld have 
been the least idea of convicting him. In the first place, we liave the 
fact of the actnal force that he had ; and, substantially, there is no dif- 
ference between the former trial and this in respect to that. King and 
Eicketts having been withdrawn from him, he was left with, say, in 
round numbers, 10,000 men. The Kecorder pretends, by a novel method 
of reckoning, that he had 33,000 men. The triumph of the science of 
mathematics is here well illustrated. He had his own 13,000 (magnify- 
ing this 10,000 to 13,000) ; then he had King's and Eicketts' 17,000 ; 
then he had Banks' 10,000 — 10,000 ; a great many more than I supposed. 
Forty thousand men, so says the learned Eecorder, and that he ought 
to have made an attack. Well, yes ; if he had 10,000 men, I agree that 
he ought to have n\ade an attack. But, when it is necessary for the 
Eecorder at this late day to resort to such marvelous calculations, is it 
not a pretty clear abandonment of the case as it always stood before 
and as we think it stands now. Why bring into this case all this rub- 
bish about Banks ? Was Banks under the command of Porter ! Why 
didn't Pope, anxious as he was to have Porter's conviction stand in 
former years, make that suggestion ! Why didn't the Judge-Advocate- 
General, reciting to the President all the evidence there was against 
Porter, say anytljing about Banks ? That is the triumph of the Eecord- 
er's ingenuity ; that is a new invention, and, I think, a weak invention 
of the enemy. General Banks (says the Eecorder) was at Bristoe or 
Kettle Eun. There has been a quite a deal of dispute -and discussion, 
raised by him upon the evidence of Professor Andrews, and of his sui>e- 
rior ofiicer. General Gordon, as to the precise point where Banks was, 
whether at Bristoe or at Kettle Eun. I don't know where he was. The 
Eecorder says it is quite manifest that it was not Porter's force, but it 
was a brigade of observation from Banks' force, sent out half a mile or a 
mile from Bristoe, that caused the transportation of Wilcox's force over 
to their right wing in the afternoon of the 29th. But is it not too ob- 
vious for dispute that it was some movement of Porter's 10,000 men 
close upon the enemy, so close that Longstreet wonld not let Lee attack, 
although Lee wanted to attack, that dictated to them that precautionary 
transfer of Wilcox ? If that was not sufficient cause for transferring 
Wilcox over there with his three brigades, how was the advance of a 
single brigade of observation, away down within a mile of Bristoe, cause 
for the transfer of Wilcox "i The Eecorder say the enemy in that move- 
ment was waiting for something to turn uj). Well, sometliing- had al- 
ready turned up. Porter had turned up, and was there with his 10,000 
men close upon them. It was undoubtedly some threatening movement 



78 

upon Moreir.s part ; something done, or apparently threatened to be 
done, that called for that transfer. So I do not think it worth while to 
discnss that qnestion any more. 

The character of the position at Dawkins' Branch, held by Porter for 
offence and defense, is proved by the maps and snrvejs, and the testi- 
mony of Warren, of ^Nforell, of Sykes, and others. Did the former conrt- 
martial nnderstand that? The maps that were before them show that 
they did not. For all that they knew, Porter, Avherever he was, had 
nothing bnt the clear open conntry before him, withont a single rebel 
soldier intervening between him and Jackson's right wing. On their 
theory, an atta<;k was jnst as practicable as it is u])on the Eecorder's 
theory, as ovideiicetl hj the map which I have been enabled to incorpo- 
rate into my argnment, becanse there was nothing to prevent his attack- 
ing. 'Sow, here is this new fact of the introdnction of anywhere from 
14,000 to 2."),000 men absolntel}' commanding and closing the way. They 
ontflanked him on his left and they ontflanked him on the right, clear 
away to the Warrenton tnrnpike. Xow, where is the soldier — we chal- 
lenge him to come forward — who will say that, nnder these circnm stances, 
(General Porter ought to have made an attack! General Pope does not 
dare say so. If he could have said that, he would have been here to 
say it ; he would not have waited for any subpcena ; if he, as a soldier, 
could have demonstrated to you, as soldiers, that Porter, in that situa- 
tion, ought to have attacked, he would have come, because he is anxious 
to support this prosecution, and keep General Porter under this brand of 
infamy which he has laid upon his head. No ; I don't believe there is a 
soldier in this or any other country who dares to come and say hat 
Porter, under those circumstances, should have made an attack. 

Then what else is there ? There is the difference of position. I speak 
not now of the ignorance of the court-martial of the ground which has 
been so clearly laid down before this Board. I speak now of the con- 
fessed difference as to I^orter's position, the relative position of Porter 
to the right wing of the rebel army as it was then believed to be and as 
it is now demonstrated to have been. It is involved in the question of 
the then su^iposed absence of the Confederate force which we now know, 
and was then by Porter asserted, assuredly to have been i>resent be- 
tween Jackson and l*orter. They thought, and all thought apparently — 
McDowell certainly thought — that Porter was much nearer the Warren- 
ton turnpike than he was. They all thought that Porter had reached 
the second run that crossed the Manassas and Gainesville road, one 
mile in advance of where he was. The ma])s show it. The sworn state- 
ments show it. And then they thought that he was behind the right 
wing of the rebel army, and very near to it; that there was nothing there 
but Jackson's force, as has been demonstrate<l to you over and over 
again — nothing there but Jackson, and that there was no jtretense of 
execution on Porter's part of his recognized duty, the situation being 
what they supposed it was, of going in, orders or no orders, and attack- 
ing the right tiank and rear of Jackson's force. 

WAS A BATTLE " RAGIN(^ " ALL DAY? 

There was another thing. The court-martial believed, and it was so 
sworn, that there was a battle raging all day in his plain sight and hearing- 
Well, was there ! You all know about tliat now. The Pecorder called 
a host of witnesses to prove that there was a battle. It has enabled us 
to develo]) exactly the situation. There was not a battle laging with 
continuous fury from daylight until dark, as Pope, in his dispatch of the 



7y 

next moruiug, asserted. There was a series of successive spurts, as 
Heintzelmau said; there were skirmishes all along the line from just 
below the Warrenton pike up to Sudley Springs and Sudley Church. 
Was there no battle 1 Why, yes ; there were lots of them. Every regi- 
ment, apparently, and every brigade, had a battle of its own. But they 
were no more connected than if one had been in Maine and another in 
Florida, and the rest in interlying States. There was no support of one 
attack by another attack. Let me read what General Schurz said upon 
that subject. He was there ; he was engaged in it. Heintzelmau says 
there were successive spiu-ts. General Schurz says : 

If all those forces, instead of being frittered aicay in inaolated efforts, liad co-operatod 
with each other at any one moment after a common plan, the result of the day would 
have been far greater than the mere retaking and occupation of the gnniud we had 
already taken and occupied in the morning, and which, in the afternoon, was for a 
short time at least lost again. 

We have prepared, and will give you, a synopsis in i^rint of what 
these successive spurts were, where they were, and when they took 
place. It demonstrates that there was no continuous battle, and they 
account for the fact that General Porter, who, you will remember, was 
left alone, without a word from General Pope, all this time, ne^'er heard 
anything but artillery firing. The Eecorder says, "O, yes, he did." 
General Marshall, in charge of his skirmish-line, makes very strong 
statements of seeing from that skirmish-line, on the other side of Daw- 
kins' Branch, the rebel army and Pope's army in fight, moving back- 
wards and forwards, heard their yells, and that there was no man in our 
force who did not feel assured that Pope's army was being driven from 
the field. General Marshall stated that. I have no doubt that, so far 
as he was concerned, it was entirely true. There is not the least evi- 
dence that he made any such statement to General Porter. But what 
was it ? He does not fix the time on his first examination ; but on this 
new trial he does. What was it ? What conflict was there that day 
that answered all these conditions that could possibly be seen from any 
ground in the neighborhood of Dawlcins' Branch ? It was the fight be- 
tween King's division and Hood, when King was thrust down on the 
turnpike just at dusk. There is not any other fight that day, on that 
field, that could possibly have been seen or heard from that part of the 
country, that coidd answer the conditions described by General Mar- 
shall, and that does answer exactly to them. Mr. Maltby tells me, 
from a very caretul inspection of the record, that, until that fight with 
King's division, on no part of the line was there, at any time, a larger 
force than eight regiments concerned in any one of these skirmishes or 
conflicts. There was a great deal of slaughter, undoubtedly. What 
principle it was conducted ui)on no historian has ever yet stated. We 
have a promised history of Colonel Smith's, which may probably explain 
it, but tliere never yet has been any explanation of that method of war- 
fare. Well, I have one which I will give you presently. I think it was 
conducted upon the general laws of war as laid down by General Pope 
when he took command of the army ; upon the principles of attacking 
whenever you see anybody to attack, without regard to the circum- 
stances or the consequences, exactly according to the military code of 
the Irishman at Donnybrook fair. 

But, now, what is the real fact as to its being a continuous battle, 
within sight and hearing of General Porter, and raging all day 'I We 
have ])roduced the evidence of every man in his division who is worth 
believing that until General Marshall saw the fight between Hood and 
King thev saw nothing. Thev heard onlv artillerv firing. And there 



80 

Tvas General Porter awaiting ne\A'S from Pope and McDowell. The news 
from McDowell that lie got, said that all went well with him towards Bull 
Rnn. It didn't go well anywhere else. I suppose that what Porter 
thought was that McDowell had got in there and formed a connection. 
The evidence shows that King, or rather Hatch (as King was absent), 
marched uj) the Sudley Spring road, going to and fro on contradictory 
orders from Pope and McDowell, and that he did not get into any 
action until this disastrous run on the pike, when he Avas rushed down 
through all the other forces at about sunset or after. I suppose that 
a corps commander, as I have had occasion to say on this subject, is 
bound to take notice of the situation, and if he was aware of circum- 
stances and facts wholly unknown to his commanding general at the 
other end of the line, he was bound to act upon what he saw before 
him, was he not ? Now, was there any time that day when he ought 
properly to have attacked, and when it Mould not, on the contrary, 
luiAe been a fatal and stupid blunder, for Avhich he would liave been 
grossly culi)able, and chargeable witli all the destruction of life that 
would have been occasioned, if he had nmde an attack — was tliere any- 
thing known to him that would have justified the saciitice of his 
corps by an attack that day? We know noAV that if he had sacriJiced 
liis wliole cor]»s by the blunder of an attack, it would not have afforded 
any relief to l*ope\s army. There is a demonstration of this, as it seems 
to me, in this case that the whole Avorld Avould l)e content with, in con- 
firmation of Longstreet's testimony, tliat it was Porter's presence there 
tliat prevented an attack by Lee that day. 'And what is the demon- 
stration ? AVhat happened next day Avh en Porter Avas withdrawn by 
the orders of ( Jeneral Poi)e from this i)osition t What is the evidence f 
Wliat is the irresistible conclusion from the proofs as to Avhat hapi>ened 
on the 30th ? Why, that it was oidy l\>rter holding on to Avhere he 
Avas against every threat and cA'ery doubt that pievented on the 2!)tli 
the slaughter that Avas consummated on the .'30th. AVhat could haA^e 
justified Porter in AvithdraAA'ing his force from there on the morning of 
the 30tli but the i)ositiA'e orders of General Poi)e, who still remained, or 
claimed to liaAn* remained, in absolute ignorance of the inter\ening sit- 
uation. 

liemember that day of ihe 30th. Wlien General Pope withdrew Gen- 
eial Porter's force and brought it up witli him to Groveton, lie could not 
belieA'e, Peynold's and Porter together coukl not couAince him, that the 
rebel army, under Lee and Longstreet, Avas there. Had not he said in 
his disi»atch of tlie previous day tliat they were coining at such a rate 
as would bring them in by the night ol' the 30tli or the 3lst ? No, he 
could not believe that the Avhole rebel army Avas then already there. 
He said they Avere in full retreat even then, that morning of tiie 30th. 
He launched his army upon them sup])osing that they Avere in full re- 
treat, Avhen they Avere there in that fortress, that im])iegnable fortress, 
ui)on the Independent railroad cut, and thence stretching away upon 
these heighfs (h>wn to the situation Avhere Porter had left them that morn- 
ing. Well, y(m know what slaughter took place on the 30th. Y(m knoAV 
it Avas Avhen Porter Avas AvithdraAvn from the i)c>sition which on his judji- 
ment he had maintained the day before. It seems to me that the truth 
as to the situation of the 20th, and the ]no])iiefy of Porter's conduct (m the 
20tli, are demonstrated by Avhat ajijieared to folloAv on the .{Otli, Avhen, 
contrary to his own judgment, he Avas AvifhdraAvn from this fortified po- 
sition on Dawkins' Branch, Avhich had up till that time hehl the main 
force of the rebel army in check, and the Avhole Federal force Avas hud- 
dled together on the inside of the circle in front of the Independent 



81 

railroad cut, aiul upon the successive heights, beginning Avith Douglas 
height aud extending down to the Manassas and Gainesville road, all 
along which the rebel army was intrenched. 

At this point, if the Board please, let me call your attention specially 
to two maps, one called Map No. 4, showing what we claim to be the 
positions of the respective forces during this time which is covered by 
these general specifications, under the second charge, and irrespective of 
any specific order to attack, showing what w^e now know to have been 
the situation, and Avhat General Porter then substantially believed to be 
the situation. That map has been criticised, and unjust reflections cast 
upon Captain Judson in regard to it. So I will beg leave to state the 
facts in regard to it. The map itself is one of the Government maps 
made for this case, made by (reneral Warren and by Captain Judson — 
the great map from which tliis is reduced. When the evidence was all in 
substantially — the evidence of those positions especially upon which we 
rely, we desired General Porter to have a map, that soldiers would under- 
stand, prepared, <lepicting the respective positions of the ( 'Onfederate 
and Federal forces, from O o'clock until 12 on the 20th. Cai)tain Judson 
was employed by him personally, at his own expense, outside of his offi- 
cial time — that is, not involving his oflicial time — to do what ? To make 
these positions f No. Simply to project them upon the map as given to 
him from the evidence. General Porter and his conn sel , from the evidence, 
defined the positions, and we believe and are certain that they will be sus- 
tained by all the evidence in the case that is worth considering. What 
Captain Judson did in that matter I cannot see the least imin-opriety in 
his doing, any more than if our learne<l friend, the Eecorder, is employed, 
as I hope he often is, to try and argiie cases at private expense for some 
party when the Government does not require his services. There is no 
time now to discuss these positions. Whether they are right or not this 
Board will have to determine. The only point of conflict appears to be in 
respect to these movements sworn to by Sigel and Schenck in the neigh- 
borhood of the W^arrenton pike, which took place on the noon and after- 
noon of the 29th. We believe these positions fixed upon this map to be 
true, although they refer you not to the original, but to the altered time 
of the movements, as stated by Sigel and by Schenck. [This map has 
already been referred to as Map J).] 

Sigel alters his testimony from his first statement. If you look at his 
second statement, you will find that it substantially accords with these 
positions. If you will take the time stated in Heintzelman's diary for 
the movement by Reno, and then take the testimony of the only man 
from Eeno's force who has been examined, the only man of substance, 
Stevens, and then take Benjamin's testimony, and that of General 
Reynohls, as it stands in the old record, you will find that they all fully 
substantiate the testimony of the Confederate generals, and accord with 
these positions. But, in the view we take, it matters very little for the 
purpose of these general charges that I am now considering exactly 
where the force of Longstreet was, if only it was in such a position that 
it could and did command these heights on the other side of Dawkius' 
Branch, and could reach them before General Porter could. And to 
accomi)any the map just produced, I otter another map prepared in 
the same way, showing what happened on the 30th, and I believe that 
is the last map that I shall ask to have incorporated in my argument. 
This probably puts to the test the wisdom of Porter's course on the day 
before. (Map shown to the Board.) TJiere (on Map No. 4, Map I)) 
are the forces as they were substantially from twelve to six on the 29th. 



82 

How is it possible tliat, with Porter's force where it is thus shown to 
have been, this Federal force under Pope could be destroyed? 

Here on Map No. 6, of the 30th, is the situation when, by Pope's or- 
ders, General Porter was drawn over into the very center of the circle 
formed by the Confederates, whereby the Confederates were enabled to 
advance unobstructed to their final positions as here shown and surround 
and slaugliter our forces as they did upon the 30th. 

I suppose that this Board can never forget the touching testimony 
of General Warren as to the complete and hopeless slaughter of his 
entire force, wlien this position as depicted on this maj) was consum- 
mated. 

That event came about by an abandonment of what General Porter 
had deemed a wise position, and had maintained against all hazards and 
doubts tlie previous day. [This map of the position on the 30th will be 
found in the Appendix as Map H.] 

DISPATCHES OF THE 29TH. 

Now, if the Board please, the Eecorder has had a great deal to say in 
respect to the dispatches that passed between General Morell on the 
20th and General Porter. I do not propose to weary the Board with a 
reconsideration of these. That has been done in the statement pre- 
sented by Mr. Bullitt, and most carefully perfected by him. 

Tliese dispatches sliow no inconsistency ; they fully explain the much 
complained of message to McDowell and King, on the strength of which 
Porter was convicted of retreating. Now there are some things to be 
said in regard to these dispatches. General Porter remained at the 
front after McDowell left him. McDowell did not go until somewhere be- 
tween twelve and one o'clock ; that is certain. Porter remained a long 
time after that at the front, and came to the rear, and established his 
headquarters at Bethlehem church, somewhere from two to three o'clock, 
probably at three o'clock. These written dispatches between him and 
Morell must have begun about that hour. I do not suppose there was 
any need of written dispatches when both were at the front. It is not 
likely that we have all the dispatches. If we could have all that Gen- 
eral Porter wrote that day, if none were withheld from us by the pros- 
ecution, there would not ba a single circumstance in all the details of 
that afternoon left unexplained. If we could have the dispatch that 
General J*orter sent to General Pope by AVeld ; if we could have the 
other <lispatch that he sent to General Pope in answer to the 4.30 \). m. 
order, that came by Douglass Pope, explaining the situation then in re- 
gard to the force in front of him, in regard to the time, showing the ex- 
act time when that was received, we should have everything. But it 
does seem to me that those disi)atclies now before you tell sul)stantially 
the whole story, an<l make out a perfect case, under all the charges, 
in respect to the conduct of General Porter on the 20th. 

The Recorder, for some reason or other, has seen fit to say that Por- 
ter's headquarters were two and five-eiglitlis miles from the head of his 
column. Well, if it were so, I don't know that there would be anything 
wrong, if his column were two and flA'c-eighths miles long: but unfor- 
tunately for the statement his column was only a mile and three-quar- 
ters ; IVIorell at one end of it, and he at the other. I think you will find 
it admitted by Judge- Advocate Holt, on his written argument, that 
Sykes, who was Avith Porter at his headquarters, was in the pro])er place. 
1 sui)pose that is an admission that General Porter was in his i)roper 
place, where he could not only command his whole force in front of him — 



83 

wiiere lie could cominaud his own force, and get the i)ronii)test intelli- 
gence of everything that was going on in front, and at the same time he 
in a situation to communicate with Generals IMcDowell and Pope, and 
to receive the messages that General Pope did not send him. General 
Lee, it seems, had his headquarters in the rear of his force, on. the 20th 
and 30th. General Po])e started out in the morning, with his headquar- 
ters at Centreville, eight or ten miles away, and did not come on the 
lield until after one o'clock, and then he established his headquarters a 
little farther from his foremost force than General Porter was from his. 
General Pope said that he was in the presence of the enemy when he 
was at Centreville, so that I do not think there is any difficulty in this 
matter of the distance of General Porter's headquarters from his front. 

VALUE OF GOVERNMENT TESTOIONY — GENERAL M'DOWELL. 

The whole case, so far as the facts go, has now been completely dis- 
])Osed of. There is not a rag left of the government case against General 
Porter; and yet there is something that remains. There are the opinions 
of two witnesses, Avho, if their opinions were entitled in this particular 
case to weight, ought to receive great consideration. Those are the 
opinions of Generals McDowell and Pope. What I proi^ose further to 
say in respect to them, to complete this review of the affairs of the 29th, 
is, that General McDowell and General Pope have placed themselves in 
such a position before this Board, that you must utterly reject their 
opinions when given adversely to General Porter. 

About General McDowell enough doubtless has already l)een said. 
The fatal mistake that he made on the former trial, or that he alleged 
was made, was in allowing his testimony as to what lie said to Porter to 
be construed into an order to make an immediate attack with Porter's 
whole force on the right flank and rear of the enemy in front of him. He 
claimed this time, and said, that he didn't mean any such thing ; he didn't 
mean that General Porter should have done anything more than we have 
fully proved that he did do. Well, I think that should have removed 
General McDowell's evidence, and the weight of his opinion, if there 
is a shred of his opinion still left in the case, should have removed it all. 
But I must call attention to two or three circumstances in respect to 
(xeneral McDowell which would wipe out, as it seems to me, from the 
case, the weight of his opinions, because of bias and hostility from some 
cause, I don't know what, to General Porter. Let us see. In 1870, I 
think it was, he, in answer to the petition or application of General 
Porter to the President of the United States for a reopening of his case, 
prepared for circulation and distributed certain evidence, as he called it, 
to counteract that claim. What Avas it ? It was an account by General 
Jackson of the battle of the 30th, but purporting to be of the battle of 
the 20th. With what object ? To show that General Porter must have 
known that there was a tierce contest going on between the Federal 
troops and the Confederate troops at Groveton. Well, it now so hap- 
])eiied that that account of General Jackson related not to the 20th, but 
on its face related to, and purported to relate to, the 30th. And the 
worst part of it was, that the ferocious Federal onsets referred to by 
Jackson, which were intended to be a demonstration of Porter's knowl- 
edge on the 20th, from his distant position at Dawkins' Branch, that 
there was a furious battle raging, were Porter's own tighting of the 30th. 
It was his impetuous attack ; it was his brave troops of the Fifth Army 
Corps on the 30th that made such a demonstration — such onslaughts, 
such irresistible attacks upon Jackson's front, that he was comi)elled to 
7 CH 



84 

call for reiiiforceiuents, and that was jiut forth to the public as a demon- 
stration tliat Porter, in his distant position on the day before, must have 
known that that very state of things was going on then, and thus to 
find cause to condemn his inaction on the 20th, the day before. 

Well, the question is as to General ^McDowell's purpose in this. I am 
going to read to you Jackson's account of what then happened on the 
.'30th, because, with that niaj) of tlie 30th before you, it can be more easily 
followed. You know what took i)lace, and you know who did the great 
deeds of tliat day. As C^eneral McDowell now admits, it was General 
Porter and his troops that bore the brunt of that fight. Xow, the ques- 
tion is whetlier General ]M<-Dowe]l, who was charged Avith the superin- 
tendence of that whole work of the 30th — who was charged with the 
whole business of the pursuit — in tlie first iilace, whether he ever read 
this, which 1 hope he never <lid ; and if he did read it, whether he could 
for a nuunent have remained of the impivssion that it referred to the 
29th. This is Jackson's account of that fight, and you will see that 
nothing ajtproaching this or anytlung like it happened on the 29th : 

Aftor sojiif* desultory skirmisliiug and heavy cannonading during the day, the Fed- 
eral infantry, about four o'clock in the evening, moved I'rom under cover of the wood, 
and advanced in several lines, iirst engaging the right, hut soon extending its attack 
to the center and left. In a few niouiciits our entire line was engaged in a iierce and 
sanguinary struggle with the eneiny. As one line Avas repulsed another took its place, 
and pressed forward as if deterniiued, by force of nunilters and fury of assault, to drive 
us from our {lositiou. So impetuous and well maintained were these onsets as to in- 
duce me to send to the commanding geueral for re-enf(ucements ; but the tin)ely and 
gallant advance of General Longstreet, on the right, relieved my troops from the pres- 
sure of overwhelming numbers, and gave to those brave men the chance of a more equal 
conflict. As Longstreet pressed ujicm the right, the Federal advance was checked, 
and soon a general advance of my wliole line was ordered. Eagerly and fiercely did 
each brigade press forward, exhibiting in ])arts of the iield sceaes of close encounter 
and nnirderous strife, not witnessed often in the turmoil of battle. The Federals gave 
way before our troops, fell back in disorder, and fled precipitately, leaving their dead 
and wounded on the field. During tlieir retreat the artillery opened witli destructive 
power upon the fugitive masses. The infantry followed until darkness put an end to 
the pursuit. 

An exact description of the transaction of the 30th, of which General 
Porter bore the brunt. Xow, is it possible for General ^McDowell, pro- 
curing tliat, publishing it, putting a heading on it that it referred to the 
transactions of the 29th, to have read it and not seen at once that it 
referred not tf» the 29th, but to Porters fight, as we may well call it, of 
the 30th ? I do not wish totiirow the least discredit upon any general ; 
I am only speaking as I have a riglit to speak of Miiat stands recorded 
here, and to sjteak of the weight to be given to General McDowell's 
opinion, as adverse to General Porter's. If it liad stopped tliere it would 
have been l»ad enough. Bat what more have we? Why, Avhen that 
came out, Colonel Smith, who seems to be a deluded but a reasonably 
truthful witness, at once ]»roteste«l that it was not true ; that that was 
a mistake: that it referred not to the 29t]i, but to Porter's figlit of the 
30th. Well, the question was raised, and it Itecame a i)ublic, bruited, 
agitated question among military men. What hai»])ened .' That ques- 
tion came to General McDowell's ears. What slumld have ha])pened? 
I su}>i)ose fair ]»lay is a rule among soldiers as it is among civilians. 
Here was this report gotten up by General .McDowell, circulated by him 
for the iuiri>ose of thwarting i'orter's ajqilii-ation for a rehearing, which 
necessarily must have been to his infinite damage and i)rejudice. The 
question was publicly raised whether (Jeneral ^McDowell had not made 
a mistake in his dates — Avliether he lia<l not erroneously ]»ublished the 
events of the 30th as the events of the 29th. I should sui)pose that the 



85 

first iiistiiK't of a soldier in such a case would have been to find out 
whether he liad nuide a mistake or not. It would be the first impulse 
of anybody outside of the Army, and it seems to me that it would be of 
every man in the Army. AVell, now, what did General McDowell do? 
Knowing- that the question was agitated, and that he was suspected of 
having made this mistake, to the great damage of his brother soldier, 
who was suffering under this undeserved ignominy, what did he do "? 
He did nothing. He let it go uncorrected. Why I Now, do not let 
me do him any injustice. Let me show you his own words. Why did 
he let it go uncorrected ? I read from page 768 of the recoi'd : 

Question. Now, wlieu this doubt was raised, whether it did, iu fact, refer to the 29th 
or the 30th, did you take any paius to find out .' 

Answer. I did u< it ; but the ' ' pains " were taken in that being sent on to Washington, 
to see whetlier it was a correct extract, and tli(\v said it was. 

Question. Did it occur to you then, that if this mistake had been made, and it, in 
fact, referred to tlie 30th, and not to the 29th, an injustice had beeu done to General 
Porter, which miglit be corrected then? 

Answer. You must understand, that up to within a few minutes, I never knew what 
I have since admitted to be the fact, that that statement did not i-efer to tlie 29th. 

Question. lint when it did become a matter of question, whether it referred to the 
29th or SOtli, you did not take any paius to find out which it did refer to? 

Answer. Xo, sir. 

Question. Did it occur to you, at that time, tliat if it was a mistake, an injustice 
had been done to General Porter by that, which might, and should then be corrected, 
at that time ? 

Answer. No, it did not, because I did not thinJc it mi/ jn'ovincc to do it. 

Not his province to correct an error which he himself had made to the 
prejudice of another soldier, who was suffering under this ignominy ! It 
cannot be that lie wants fair play for General Porter. It cannot be, 
that any opinion that he expressed ought to be for one moment consid- 
ered. There is one other little matter, in respect to General Mc- 
Dowell, to which I call your attention in that same connection, although 
it seems to me that what I have just shown is enough. That is fatal, 
is it not, to the impartialityof any opinion of his involving the conduct 
of General l*orter ? 

GENERAL POPE'S J ESTIMONY. 

Now I come to General Pope, wiiose opinion is so much relied upon 
by the prosecution, and, in fact, his is now the only remaining opinion. 
I supi»ose it may fairly be said to have been abandoned by his contempt- 
uous refusal to come before this Board and supi^ort it. Put, under- 
standing that it may be claimed differently, let us see how he stands. 
It seems to me that there is exhibited upon this record a deadly hostility 
on his part to General I'orter, and a confession by him of personal inter- 
est in the question of Porter's guilt or innocence; and there is some- 
thing more exhil>ited, if I understand the matter right. He has a most 
peculiar congenital defect; I mean his way — constitutional with him 
and peculiar to him — of looking at things and stating things; his method 
of stating the truth, if that is the proper word. He will tell the biggest 
kind of a "truth,'' that is out of all relations, not only with all truths 
known to other people, but with his own truths as he has seen them and 
stated them the day before. Now, if that be so, his opinion certainly 
ought not to be regarded as of any great force. In respect to that, I 
shall be under the necessity of calling your attention to oidy a few in- 
stances. There is a disease called " color blindness/' when a man can- 
not distinguish one color from another : when he will look at the red 
diamonds of a colored window, and say that they are green, or at a yel- 



86 

low light, and declare that is blue. It is no fault on his part. It is a 
natural, inherent, constitutional defect. So it seems to me that there is 
such a thing as 1>liudness to the truth, and inability to recognize the ex- 
isting relations of things. That seems to be the infirmity of this general. 
Let us see — he did declare, did he not, in the presence of General Eug- 
gles, on the 2d of September, that he -was entirely satisfied with all of 
General Porter's explanations in regard to these much-complained-of 
matters. He met him cordially at Centreville, in the presence of the 
■witnesses, General Webb, and General Green, and General William F. 
Smith. ]Srow, that would seem to be a pretty strong contradiction of all 
his opinions and charges before. P)Ut, as to this natural infirmity of his, 
I want to call the attention of the Board to certain written statements. 
At page -!34 of the court-martial record is his account of the battle of 
the 29th. I will only read one sentence. It was written on the morning 
of the oUth, at 5 a.m.: 

We fouj^lit .a terrific battle here yesterday with the combiued forces of the euciiiy, 
which lasted with coiitimioiis fury from daylight until after dark, by Avhich time the 
enemy was tbiven from the field, which we now occui)y. 

If he did not know anything of the presence of Longstreet, it is a 
very curious thing to find here a statement that he hatt been fighting 
against the combined forces of the enemy; and if he knew that, as he 
swore upon the court-martial, he came upon the field about twelve or 
one, and i)ractically put a stoji to hostilities until about four, it is a A'ery 
remarkabk' thing that on the next nu)rning he saw the truth to be in 
this way : 

We foii<;ht a terrific battle yesterday with the coinhbud fonc-s of the eucniy, which 
lasted with continuous fury from (taylujltt tintil after dark. 

Then, at 9 p. m. on that day he wrote another dispatch, which is con- 
tained in General Porter's opening statement, at page 101. You know 
the facts of the battle of the oOth, that it was brought on l)y an assault 
which General Porter was directed under General ]McDowell to make, 
and that the assault was directed upon the assurance that the enemy 
were fiying and in full retreat. Well, they made an assault. They were 
almost cut to i»ieces. Bh)od flowed like water. Tliousands of lirave 
men perislied, and this is the account that General Pope gave of it that 
same night, 9.15 p. m., from Centre ville: 

We have had a terrific battle again to-day. The enemy, largely re-enforced, as 
mulled our poHiiion earhj io-d(u/. We held our ground firmly until 6 "p. m., when the 
enemy, massing A-eiy heavy forces on the left, forced back that wing aliout half a mile. 
At dark we held that jiosition. Under all the circumstances, both horses and men 
having been two days without food, and the enemy greatlyoutnnmbering us, I thought 
it best to draw back to this place at dark. The nioveuielit has been made in i>erfect 
order and without loss. The troops are in good heart, and marched off the field with- 
out the least hurry or confusion. Their conduct uns rcri/Jiii). 

Tltat refers to Porter's troops especially. 

If'e have lo^t uothiur/, ucithcr yuiis ))or wagons. 

Well, General Puggles, his aide-de-camp, who was reipiired to pen 
this dispatch for hiiii, says, at the time it was written : 

"General, I saw some guns lost, I saw some wagons lost. You are mistaken there, 
are you not r' He said, "Well, write it. We have lost lu^thing, neither guns nor 
v.agousi" 

Then lie comes to Washington and is stung to madness by the tele- 
grams upon which the Pecorder has relied so much, and that' madness, 
as it seems to me, has continued until this day. 

Kext 1 want to call your attention to his report of September 3, at 



87 

page lllG of this record. That' is one of tliemost remarkable manifest- 
ations of this pecuharity of General Pope that I have ever fonnd. We 
know exactly now the orders that General Pope gave on the morning 
of tlie 29tli. The history of this report is that it was Avritten for the 
l)urpose of laying the fonndation for the prosecution of delinquent ofH- 
cers, as claimed or stated in his report to the Committee on the Conduct 
of the War. They Avanted the actual truth, and here he states it, as he 
then sa:w it, speaking of what happened on the morning of the 29th. 
You know Avhat the orders were then ? There was a written order to 
Porter to march upon Centreville at daylight. Then a verbal message, 
followed by a written order for him to march upon Gainesville, and then 
the joint order. Xow, here is the way General Pope states it : 

I also insfntcfed F. J. Poytcr, witli his own corps and Einr/\^ dhusion of McDovreVl'a covy>s, 
which liad for some reason fallen back from the Wavreutou turnpike toward Manassas 
Junction, 1o more at dai/Jif/lit in the inornini/ upon GaincuviUe along the Manassas Gap liail- 
road, until they communicated closely with the force under Heintzelmau and Sigel, 
cautioning them not to f/o further than was necessary to effect this junction, as \ve might be 
obliged to retire behind Bull Run that night for subsistence, if nothing else. 

It shows also his construction of what he got jumbled up here with the 
joint order cautioning them not to go further than necessary to effect 
this junction. Did the Recorder ever see that ? 

Porter marched as directed, followed h\j Kinrfs division, which was hy this time Joined hij 
liicletts^ division, Avhich had been forced back from Thoroughfare Gap by the heavy 
forces of the enemy advancing to support Jackson. As soon as I found that the enemy 
had been l)roitght ti) a half, and was heiny viyoronsly attaclccd along U'arrenioii turnpike, I 
sent orders to McDowell. 

Xow, here are two orders, which nobody else has ever heard of. 

I'o advance rapidly on our left, and attack the enemy on his flank, extending his right to 
meet Beynolds^ left, and to Fitz-John Porter to keep his right well closed on McDowelVs left, 
and to attack the enemy in flank and renr, while he was pushed iu front. This would 
have made the line of battle of McDowell and Porter at right angles to that of the 
other forces engaged. 

Can you conceive of a general who had commanded three or four days 
before, and had issued these written orders which Ave have been consid- 
ering here, that he should state it in this way, unless he was suffering 
from the disease Avhich I have imputed to him ? 

pope's eepout of .tanuary 27, 18G3. 

Then what is the next ? His official report, made to the government, 
and withheld, for some reason or other, from publication, until the exi- 
dence in General Porter's case was all in. There are some rousing state- 
ments of " truth " there to which I would like to call the attention of the 
Board. Referring to the 29th, on page 19, he says : 

I sent orders to General Porter, whom I supposed to he at Manassas Junction, ivhere he 
should hare been in compliance with my orders of the day previous, to move upon Centreville at 
the earliest dawn. 

Well, that whole history- has been explored, and nol)ody but General 
Pope has CA^er known of any order to General Porter that day, the 28th, 
but to Htay at Bristoe until he ica.s ir anted, and it was at Bristoe that he 
AA'as ordered to move upon Centreville. 

On page 20: 

I also sent orders to Maj. Gen. P"'itz-J(>hn Porter, at IVIanassas Junction, to move for- 
ward with the utmost rapidity with his own corps and King's division of McDowell's 
corps, wliich was gupposed to be at that point, upon Gainesville, by the direct road 
from ^Manassas Junction to that jilace. I urged him to make all speed that he might 
come up with Ihe enemy and be able to turn his tiank near where the Warreuton turn- 
pike is intersected by the road from Mauassas Junction to Gainesville. 



88 
And at page 23 : 

It was neressarv for me to act thus promptly and make an attack, as I bad not the 
time, for want of provisions and forage, to await an attack from the enemy; nor did I 
think it good policy to do so under the circumstances. 

During the whole night of the 29th, and the morning of the 30th, the advance of the main 
body under Lee wav arriving on the field to re-enforce Jackson. 

Tliink of tbis. ]\[ontbs after the events lie still insists that the main 
army of Leo came throns'li Tlioronghfare Gap during the night of the 
29th, and tlie morning of the 30th, to get on to the held. 

Every moment of delay increased the odds against us, and I, therefore, advanced 
to the attack as rapidly as I was able to bring my forces into action. Shortly after 
General Porter moved forward to the attack along the TVarrenton turnjnke. 

This is the 30th. See how he recognizes the truth on the 30th. 

And the aumuU on the enemy was made Inj Heintzehnan and JReno on the right. It became 
.ipparent that the enemy was massing his troo])s, as fast as they arrived on the field, on 
his right, an<l was moving forward from that direction to turn our left, at which point 
it Avas itlaiu he intended to make his main attack. I accordingly directed General 
McDowtll to recall Ricketts' division immediately from our right and post it on the 
left of our line with irs left refused. 

Now, here — 

The attack of I'orier was neither vigorous or jiersistent, and his troojys soon retired in con- 
s i dira h le eo nfu s io n . 

Certainly the mind that penned that sentence, kno^ving and seeing 
what he did of Porter's conduct and of the conduct of his glorious troops 
of the Fifth Army Corps on the 30th, is suffering under some serious 
perturl)ation. Xow, the report to the Committee on the Conduct of 
the AVar made by General Pope, at page 190, lias another startling 
"truth." It is, however, the one which shows his hostility to Porter. 
His claim of the authorshii) of the prosecution, and his claim for reward 
from the administration for having carried it successfully through, show, 
as 1 think, his infinite bias against General Porter. And the map which 
is attached to that report must now be taken, in vicAV of the facts as 
they now stand, as a confession of his bewilderment or ignorance, to 
state it in the mildest way, of the transactions of the 29th, when he 
testified on the tV)rmer trial. I want to lead to you a letter that he wrote 
in answer to (ieneral Porter's appeal, addresse<l to General Grant, rec- 
ognizing the fact that General Porter is trying to get a rehearing: 

HEADQrAirri.ns Tiiiin* Miut.vry District, 

Atlanta, Georgia, tSeptcmher 1(5, 1867. 
Gkxeral U. S. Grant, 

Washington, D. C. : 
Genkral : As lam one of the principal imrtivs concerned in the case of Fit:-Jolin Porter, 
and as I learn that he is in Washington City seeking a reo])ening of his case, on the 
ground that lie lias come into possession of testimony since the close of the war Avhich 
has an important bearing on the subject, and as I sujuiose it is not unlikely tliat a 
commission may be ordered to examine that testimony, and report upon it, I consider 
it my duty, as well as my right, respectfully to submit to your attention, or that of 
.any connnissicm that may be ordered, the following remarks, for smli eonsidt ration .is 
they merit. * * * 

I am, neiu-ral, verv respectfnllv, vour obedient servant. 

JOHN POPE. 
Bvt. Maj. Gen. U. IS. A. 

Then follows an elaborate argument, a rehash of all the old errors 
that he committed five years liefore at the court-martial, which he adhere<l 
to then, as he has ever since, with tlic tenacity of a Bourbon who <'an 
learn nothing and forget nothing. 



89 

GENERAL POPE'S "BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE CASE." 

His brief statement of facts made in 1S69 is his next pul)lication, and 
it is well worthy of a brief inspection. It is at pages 757 and 759 of 
this record. In the first place it undertakes to state the case against 
General Porter. It is in answer to another appeal by Porter to the 
President. In the first place it omits to state any charge or complaint 
of disobedience of the joint order. 

It states this : 

McDoweU had marched in Portei-'s rear from Mnnnssas Junction irith his corps, Jnil hear- 
infi, OH reochint) the forks of the road at Bethlehem Church, the sounds of a severe battle being 
fought at Groreton, 2)assed the rear of Porter's corps, and following the road to Sudley Springs, 
brought his corps in upon the Uft of our line and iuiniediately pushed forward into action. 

Do you suppose that he believed that, unless he saw things through 
diseased o])tics ? He then sets forth Porter's message to McDowell and 
King, incor])orates that in his brief statement, and in it he omits the 
vital part of it as it was in his hands, viz : 

I am now going to the head of the column to sec n-hat is pa^ssing and how affairs are going. 
I will communicate with tjou. 

The whole spirit of this document is liostile. He repeats tlie old story 
about the delivery of the 4.30 p. m. order at five o'clock: 

27(C dclircrji of tltis order to Porter atfre o'chicl;, at least one and a half hours before sun- 
set, and full two hours before the battle dosed for the night, was prorcd on liis trial; but the 
order was in no respect obeyed, and seems to hare produced no effect upon Porter, except that 
instead of retreating to Manassas, according to his first intention, he only retreated part of 
the way — far enough to be out of sight of the enemy and ont of danger. 

Then certainly here is a most enormous statement of " truth" in view 
of the present facts. At page 760 in the brief statement : 

That Porter did precisely ivhat he wrote McDowell and King he intended to do was perfectly 
uiell known, of course, to every man in his army corps, and easily proved before the court- 
martial. It is impossible to believe that any man in tliis country possessed of the 
facts can lie found so prejudiced as to justify such a ti'ansactiou, or to ask a modifica- 
tiou of the sentence against Porter. It is Porter liimself who wrote tlie charges 
against himself, and whose own written testimony establishes his crime. It is impos- 
sible for any man, especially any military man, to imagine any excuse for, or any 
satisfactory explanation of, such condncT. 

Then, on page 701, he publishes, as of the 2!)th, an extract from Gen- 
eral J. E. 1>. Stuart's report, which sliows tliat Longstreet was there in 
force. 

In this extract, General Stuart states that before noon he had been 
informed of Porter's advance along the Manassas Gainesville road. 

General Stuart then says : 

T^e prolongation of his (Porter's) line of march would have passed through my position, 
tvhich was a very fine one for artillery as well as observation, and struck Longstreet in flank. 

* ^ ^ Immediately upon receipt of that intelligence, Jenkins', Kemper's, and D. 
R. Jones' luMgades, and several pieces of artillery, were ordered to me by General 
Longstreet. and l)eing placed in position, fronting Kristoe, awaited the enemy's 
advance. 

Ul)on this. General Pope asserts : 

It will be observed, also, that when Longstreet was duly notified of his danger, and 
asked to send troops to resist Porter's advance, he sent only three brigailes, viz, Jen- 
kins', Kemper's, and D. K. Jones' (all he could spare, as will appear fiom .lack.son's 
report), and this was positively all the force ever in front of Fitz-Johu Porter from first to 
last, placed there with no purpose whatever to attack, bnt, if possible, to i)reveut his 
advance, 

Eather reiffarkable, in view of the clear proof of Wilcox's three 
brigades being transferred in addition, to withstand Porter. He pub- 



90 

lishes in this same brief statement an extract from Long^street's report, 
which omits, however, a very important part of that rei)ort, cutting out 
a preceding sentence and giving the sentence immediately following that 
Avhich Avould liave set forth somewhat more, as other people understand 
it, and as it is now known, the history of the movements of that day. 
He left out this (showing Longstreet's presence and line of battle) : 

Early ox the" 29tli (AiKjust), the coJiimits were united, and the (tdvance to join Genend 
Jackson resumed. 

■* On approaching the field, some of Bri(iadier-(ieneraJ Rood's hatteries were ordered into 
position, and his Divisiox was i')i:i'loyki) on RKiirr and left of the turnpike, at 
right angles with it, and supported hg Brigadier I'Juans' brigade. 

Three brigades, uuder General Svileox, were tliro-\vn forward to the support of the 
left, and three others, nnder General Kemper, to the support of the right of these 
conjuiands. General D. R. Jones' dlA ision was placed upon the Manassas Gap Kail- 
road, to the right, and in echelon with regard to the three last Itrigadee. 

Having omitted thef;e important sentences, General Pope proceeds 
to quote tlie subsequent portion thus : 

* * * At a late hour in the day Major-General Stuart rcixtitcd the approach of 
the enemy in heavy columns against my extreme right. I withdrew General Wilcox^ 
nith his three brigades, from the left, and placed his command in position to su]>port 
.Jones in case of an attack against my right. Jfter some few shots the enemg withdrew 
his forees, moving them around toAvards his front, and about four o'clock in the after- 
noon began to ]>ress forward agaiilst General Jackson's position. Wilcox's brigades 
tvere moved back to their former position. 

Then General Pope, assuming that General Wilcox's division of three 
brigades were the same as the three brigades mentioned by Stuart in 
the passage quoted from him (which they were not), and ignoring the 
fact that Jones, upon the right, was in command of a division, and that 
Kemper Avith his division was there also, and the fact that AVilcox and 
Hood, if needed, Avere within easy reach, exclaims : 

It s?ems, then, that as soon as Porter retreated towards Manassas from this over- 
whehning force, Lungstreet innnediateig withdrew Ihtsc brigades, and, joining Jackson's right, 
immediaichi pressed forward with them against that jwrtion of our armg concerning whose 
defeat Porter expressed such doleful apprehensions in his letter to McDowell. 

Then he incorporates what he got fiom McDowell, that extract from 
eTackson's report of the 30th, nniking it of the 2'Jth, turning Porter's own 
guns against him^elt; and charging him Avith lying inactiA'e at DaA\^- 
kins' Branch all tliat day, although in full hearing" of a great battle, 
that is to say, of Porter's oAvn memorable attack of the 30th, Avhich so 
nearly overwhelmed the rebel army of Jackson, until Longstreet came 
in obedience to his urgent call for re-enforcements. Here is an extract 
or statement of '' truth "' as of the 20th : 

But Lee, according to the testimony of the chief engineer on hisstailt', took breakfast 
that morning {i. e., the 2i)th) on the opposite side of Thoroughfare Gap, full thirtg miles dis- 
tant, and it was utterlg impossible to re-enforce Jackson before a rerg late hourlpf ni(;ht, long 
before which time the whole affair would have been ended. 

This taking breakfast on the ojiposite side of Thoroughfare (xjip, full 
thirty miles distant, is one of the most astonishing statements that I 
have ever heard. Thoroughfare (4ap is about six miles from Gaines- 
ville. There is a map i)ublished in connection with his report to the 
Committee on the Conduct of the War which seems to have some bear- 
ing on this statement of General Lee's taking' breakfast on the other 
side of Thoroughfare Gap, fully thirty miles from Gainesville ; a very 
singular thing, Avhich ought to be explained by somebody. Here is 
Thoroughfare Gap ; this is Gentreville ; and this'map reverses the true 
])ositions of the ga])s, and puts Thoroughfare Gaj) Avhere Mana.ssas Gap 
hould lie, thirty miles to the Avest. That is o ne of the niiips n:ade and 



91 

annexed to General Pope's report to the Committee on the Conduct of 
the War. It is very strange that a man slioukl read history wrong and 
geography wrong too. I cannot understand it. It seems to me tliat 
must be an accident. Of course General Pope must have IcnoAvn, as 
well as General McDowell, that the statement in Jackson's report, incor* 
l)orated in his " brief statement" to refer to the 29tli, did in fact refer 
to the 30th, and to Porter's glorious conduct on that day. I'et he in- 
sisted, and by-and-by I will show you that he insists to this day, that 
that is right. But General McDowell, when brought face to face with 
his error, conceded that he was wrong. General Pope not only still in- 
sists upon it that it is right, but still insists that it is no business of his 
to correct it if it is not right. 

GENEEAL POPE'S EXPLANATORY LETTER OR BRIEF STATEMENT. 

IsTow I come to his letter of October 23, 1878, showing why he imt out 
the brief statement. This is worthy of attention in considering whether 
he is an unbiased person in speaking of General Porter. It seems that 
some question had been made, and it came to his ears, about these ex- 
tracts, and he publishes them again in a letter to General Sherman, dated 
October 23, 1878. He says : 

Although General jNIcDowell (states in his testimony before the Board now in session 
in Porter's ease that he made this extraet and sent printed slips to me, I still think it 
proper fully to explain my connection with its subsequent use in the })aper (l>rief state- 
ment) above referred to, and my authority for using it. 

Then he states how he got it from the War Department and got it 
verified. But we know what that meant; that it was a verified extract 
from the book, but the extract which was verified, not giving the date, • 
the date was put on by somebody else, viz, General McDowell. 

Having thus called attention in the statement itself to Porter's assertion that the 
extract Ironi Jackson's report referred to the 30th and not the 29th of August, 1862, 
and given my authority for using it, a7id my belief that Porter was nmtakeii, and an ad- 
ditional statement that the case Avas complete without considering the extract from. 
Jackson's report ; so that it was, and is, practically out of consideration. / supposed, 
and istill suppose, that I did everiithiug denuuidtd hy fairness and justice. 

The ''Brief statement," with the above note inserted at the bottom of it, was then 
filed in the War Department, and copies were furnished Colonel Sehriver, General 
Townseud, and others, so that the note at the bottom has been known to them for 
eight years past, and neither of these officers has ever sugaested to me even that there icasany 
mistake about them. The opinion of Colonel Smith and the assertion of General I'oritr are, 
therefore, hfl to hi balanced against the certificate of General Townsend and the letter of Colo- 
nel Schrire'r, and whatever the facts may ultimately prove to be, I do not see wliat I have to do 
with it. 

But how are these mistakes of history to be corrected if the two men 
who got up that circular say when they are brought face to fiice with the 
glaring error, the one that " he does not think that it is his province to 
correct it," and the other that "he does not see what he has to do with 
it"? There is one singular fact in this letter which bears rather hardly 
upon General McDowell, as showing how unnecessary it was for General 
McDowell to come here and say that he furnished these statements to 
General Pope, when he procured them from the War Department in 
1809. He says : 

It is proper to say thai the " Extracts '' in ejuestton were sent m:- in 16G7 from IVashimjton, 
I do not know by whom. 

That was two years before General McDowell went through the 
supererogatory work of furnishing them to General Poi)e; he had them 
already, and had been laying them by for future use against General 



92 

Porter. Tlien he has written various letters to General Belknap and 
the Comte de Paris, which are in evidence, full of tliese reassertions of 
the exploded mistakes against General Porter, and all testifying in the 
vstrongest manner to his absolute and undying hostility to Porter ; which, 
as I have said, is also fairly deducible from the oral e^idence in this 
case. There is nothing left adverse to General Porter but this opinion, 
and you can fairly estimate the weight that is to be given to it. 

General Koberts has been cited. He is no longer living; but to show 
you how much weight is to be given to General Eoberts' testimony, he 
IS the author of this false and malicious libel against the Fifth Army 
Corps, which was contained in the fourth specitication of the second 
charge against General Porters corps and its commander in respect to 
the action of the oOth, which General Ivoberts, as a brigadier-general 
and inspector-general of General Pope's army, could not but have known 
all about. That specitication is as follows : 

Specification 4th. In this: That the said Major-Geueral Fltz-John Porter, on the 
field of battle of Manassas, on Saturday, the 'iOth of Aiitntst, 1862, having received a lawful 
order from his shjj<'/-/o>- offieer and eommandintj general, Major-GeneralJohn Pope, to engage 
the cnemy^s lines, and to carry a position near their center, and to fake an annoying battery 
there posted, did procsid in the execution of that order with unnecessary slowness, and, by 
delayn, give the enemy opportunities to n-atch and know his movements and to prepare to 
'meet his attack, and did finally so feebly fall upon the enemy's line ax to make little or no im- 
jirevsion on the same, and did fall back and dran- away hix forces nnncccxsarily, and wilhout 
making any of the great personal efforts to rally his troops or to keep their line, o'' to inspire 
his troops to meet the sacrificts and to make the resistance demanded by the importance of his 
position and the monn'ntons consequences and disasters of a retreat at so critical a juncture of 
the day. 

That was too nuich e^en for the court-martial. General IJoberts stands 
as the author, with his name subsci-ibed to that statement of Porter's con- 
duct of the 30th, probablj* about as gallant and determined a fight and 
series of charges as was ever made by an army corps in the American 
Army or any other army. How can you give any weight to the remnant 
of his opinion ? So I leaA'e that part of the case, stating that, against the 
solid facts thttt we have proved, it seems to me you can attach no value 
whatever to these opinions. 

THE ArNlMUS OF frE>"ERAL PORTER. 

Finally, a few words as to the animus of General Porter. On the pres- 
ent solid facts, tliis charge of evil animus seems to me to be not the least 
material. It never was resorted to even by Judg•e-Ad^'ocate-General 
Holt, except to throw in as a makeweight to determine the scales, which 
he thought were, upon tlie evidence, doubtful. But now it is ajtparent 
to all the world, and no longer doubtful, that Porter did his whole duty, 
no matter what his estimate of General Poj)e might have been. If his 
feelings were such as General Burnside testified to, that he entertained, 
in common with all the ofiicers of the Army, or a gi'eat part of them, 
namely, a distrust of General Pope's ability to conduct a great campaign,, 
and yet, notwithstanding that, he did his whole <luty, the i)erformance 
of his whole duty is all the more meritorious, is it not '? But what was 
General Porter's attiiniis l 1 shall not consume the time of the Board in 
develoi)iug all that is shown by the dis])atches and telegrams of Porter, 
from the time of starting from Harrison's Landing, from the tinu^ that 
he first kncAV that he was to co-operate with and finally to join the army 
of l\)pe in Mrginia. There is c^■erything in those dispatches which is 
to his credit — sleepless vigilance, untiring activity, implicit obedience 
as an otticer, evidenced by all the dispatclies, by all the telegran)s, by 
all the orders. I will not consume the time of the Board in<h)ing it, but 



93 

I would like the Board to take these telegrams, these dispatches, cover- 
iiig the movements all the way from Harrison's Landing up to the 20th 
of August, where his telegrams are first called in question as otfensive. 
They show that he did all thatcouhl become a gallant and braAC general, 
as in all our previous history where he Avas concerne<l he had done. 
They do not indicate anywhere any hostility to Pope, oi- any i)urpose not 
to do his duty. They testity all the time tlmt he was doing his duty to 
the utmost. 

AVhat were the relations iii which he stood in sending these tele- 
grams ? To whom were they addressed ? AVere they telegrams for 
publication ' Not at all. AVere they orders to subordinates ? Not at 
all. Were they for the pul)lic eye ? Not at all. But General Burnside 
had requested him to keep him informed, as a means of comnumication 
with the President, of what was going on. Now, I challenge the doc- 
trine of the prosecution in this case as to the relative attitude of cor[)s 
commanders. I deny that they are not at liberty to criticise the move- 
ments of their superior general, to asupei'ioror to the supreme source of 
all military authority. I agree that they must not criticise to subordi- 
nates; that they nuist not criticise in the public ear; that they must 
not so speak as to create disaftection. But has it ever been known, in 
any country, that subordinate generals might not send criticisms to 
hea(h]uarters, even upon the conduct of a campaign by their immediate 
commander f In Avhat army has it not been done? In what country 
has it not been permitted ? Why, the theory of the infallibility of the 
Pope, to question which is heresy, is now for the first time sought to l)e 
applied to military matters — they set np the infallibility of this Pope, 
and that all questioning of it is treason. That will not do. Even Na- 
l)oleon, in the zenith of his glory, allowed criticisms upon himself, and 
of sui)erior generals by those under them. It is a new theoiy in this 
free country, that because a man happens to be a major-general and a 
corps commander, he is tongue-tied, that he has lost all freedom of thought, 
all freedom of speech. A pretty good specimen of what a co-ordinate, if 
not a subordinate, commander can do in the way of criticism of a com- 
manding general appears in General Pope's criticism to President 
Lincoln about General ^McClellan, which is contained in hisrej^ort to the 
Committee on the Conduct of the War, at page 105; and as his author- 
ity will not be questioned here, I would like to read that. lie says : 

In face of the exti'aordinary difficulties wliicli existed, and the terrible res]ioiisibi]- 
ity about to be throwu upon ine, I considered it my duty to state plainly to the Prcsi- 
ideut that I felt too much distrust of General McClellan to risk the destruction of my 
<army, if it were left in his ])owcr, under any circumstances, to exhil)it the feebleness 
and irresolution which had hitherto characterized his operations. 

Well, I think that is a pretty good samjde of the kind of criticism 
which is allowable. It seems to me that it is necessary to allow criti- 
cisms, for the safety of the army. Suppose that, instead of a great 
master of the art of' war like General Pope, a great army had an in- 
comi>etent commander, with skillful generals under him, the ^^■hole army 
might be destroyed if you take from them that power of criticism. 
NoV, T undertake to say that Porter's allusions in these telegrams are 
all true, all perfectly justifiable ; although the discreetness of sending 
them or making some of those remarks, knowing what General Pope is, 
might i)ossibly l)e questioned. I have stated his relations to Burnside, 
and the ol)ject of sending the telegrams. It is true that Po])e's Avhole 
campaign is not in review here; but something is in view which is re- 
ferred to in these telegrams, and tliat much I must bring to the attention 
of the Board. It appears that General Pope took comnumd in the sum- 



94 

mer, I think it was June or July of 1802, and began tlie formation of 
tliis Army of Virginia. He came from the West and imported ne\\' doc- 
trines of militar}' science, which certainly startled, if they did not shake, 
tlie confidence of all military men in the East ; and as these telegrams of 
Porter, so much objected to, refer expressly to these new theories of 
war, I desire to bring the new theories of war once more to the atten- 
tion of the Board. I refer to his fiimous introductory order of July 
14, on page 278 of the Board Eecord. If such an order cannot be 
criticised, then General Porter was wrong in criticising it ', if it cannot be 
lidiculed, it was wrong for General Porter to laugh at it. But I shall 
insist that even a military saint, if there be such a person, could not 
help laughing at it. This was the order which was proclaimed, not only 
to his own army, but to the rebel army, when he assumed command of 
the xVrmy of Virginia : 

"Wasiiixgtox, Mondaii, July 11. 
To the ofiicefH and soldiers of the Army of Virgliiid : 

By the siK'fial assijiuineut of the President oftlie United States, I have assumed eoni- 
niaud of tliis army. I have spent two weeks in learninj>; your whereabouts, yourcondi- 
tiou and your wants, in preparinf*' you for active operations, and in placing you in posi- 
tions from wliich you can act promptly and to the ])nrpose. 

/ have eome to ijon from the U'est, where we have ahvays seen the Vacls of our enemie.^, 
from an armi) whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and to heat him when found ; 
whose policy has been attack and not defense. In but one instance has the enemy been able to 
place our 11'estern armies in a defensive attitude. I presume that I have been called here to 
pursue the same system and to had you ayainst the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and 
that speedily. I am sure you lony for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable 
of achieviny; that opportunity I shall endeavor to yive you. Meantime I deiire you to dismiss 
from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find in voyue amongst you. I hear con- 
stantly of taking strong positions and holding thcni — 

As Porter did on the 29th— 

of lines of retreat and of bases of su2}plies. Let us discard such ideas. 

There, I think, voit see the source of his condemnation of Porter's acts 
of the 2yth. 

The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which, he can most easily 
advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and 
leave our own to take care of themselrcs. Let us look before us and not behind. Jiiuccess and 
glory are in the advanci'. Disaster and shame lurk in the rear. 

Let us act on this understanding, and it is siife to predict that your banners shall be 
inscribed with many a jflorions deed, and that your nauies will be dear to your coun- 
trymen forever. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major-dencral Commanding. 

This was a pul)lic i)roclamation, made on the 14th of July. It was 
not only proclaimed to his own army, but to the army opi)osed to him. 
AVhat did it jiromise them ? It gave them an understanding of how he 
was going to act; it assured the enemy that there should be no more 
such conduct on the part of the Federal army as taking strong jwsitions 
and hohling them; that they would not preserve any lines of retreat, 
or nniintain any bases of sui)]>lies ; the only strong position he would 
h»(>k for ^\ ould be the one from which he could most easily advance upon 
the enemy, by which, I understand, he means to be afways upon the 
road; that he wcmld always leave his own lines of retreat to take care 
of themselves; that he would never look behind him, because disaster 
and shame lurked in the rear. That is his ]»roclamation. Was it merely 
for the i^urpose of buncombe, or was he going to act on this understand- 
ing ? On that we have sonie light thrown in his report to the Committee 
on the Conduct of the War, which shows, as it seems to me, that it was 



95 

a genuine tiling— a deliberate method of warfare — because eight days 
previous he had been examined as a witness by Mr. Covode, before the 
Committee on the Conduct of the War, at Washingtoji, and v.hen asked 
how he proposed to light, he said : 

At the same, time I sliall be in siicli position that, in case the ciii-inv advance in 
considerable force towards Wasliinijton, I shal! be a))]e to concentrate all my forces 
for the defense of this phace, which I ]>ropose to defend, not by standing on the de- 
fensive at all, or confronting the enemy and intrenching myself, "bnt I im)2)oiie to do it 
htj Jailing of on his fanls, and atfacl: him from the momnit he crom's the Rupimhannock, 
<hty and nhjht, imlil his foi-o<s are datroi/ed, or mine. 

By Mr. Odell : 

Qnestion. Is it yonr design to act on the defensive alone? 

Answer. Not at all. 

Question. So that you mean to attack ? 

Answer. I mean io attack them at all times that I can get an opiwrtmulij. If I were to 
confront them with the force that I have, and go'buiiding intrenchiiients, &c., they 
could Hank me on either side, and force me back without my ])eing able to offer any 
resistance of any consequence. There is a possibility that they nuiy send a large 
force this way, if the command of (ieueral McClellaii be in a perilous condition, or 
where it can be held by an inconsiderable foi-ce, and prevented from coming out. 
They may do that, \mi I do not think it very likely that they will attempt to'move 
on this i»laee just now. ' But if they should come this way with a very huge force, it 
seems to me that the only sort of defense of Washington I can attbrd, with the force 
I have, is to lie off upon the Jlanls of iheir army, and aitack them day and night, at nvex- 
perted times and places, so as to prevent them from adraniing. It will he hard work, but I 
do not see anything else so likely to jyreraiJ against them. 

By Mr. Covode : 

Question. Would you not, in all these movements, feel eniljarrassed with the knowl- 
edge that while you are moving forward on the enemy, you are looked, upon as the 
protector of the capital here? 

Answer. No, sir ; for I am fully convinced I am doing the best I know to effect that 
object. It is not necessary, in my oj>inion, in order to protect the capital, that I should in- 
terpose myself hetween the enemy and. the place itself; in fact, it would he the very tvorst pol- 
icy to do so now, for wherever I could put myself, they could place themselves between 
me and the capital, l)y attacking my Hanks. By laying of on their flanks, if they 
■should have onli/ forty thousand o)' Jifty thousand men, I could ichi^} them. If they should 
have seventy thousand or eighty thousand men, I would attack their flanks and force 
them, in order to get rid of mc, to follow me out into the mountain, which would be tvhat you 
would want, I should suppose. They couhl not march on Washington, ivith me lying with 
such a force as that on their flanks. I should feel perfectly satisfied that I was doing 
the best I could with my force to dispose of them in that way. 

These declarations had been already made and published when he 
took command of the Army, and it is the reference to this sort of thing 
in these dispatches of Porter's that has been so much complained of. 
We do not see the Avhole of this campaign, but we have certain glimpses 
of it Avhich show that he acted upon this understanding and view of the 
art of war, and provoked the criticism, not onlj^ of General Porter, but 
of all soldiers. I invite your attention to the position at 7 p. m., on the 
2Cth of August, to see how it was that Jackson got in behind him while 
he was " looking before and not behind." Pope's dispatch is contained 
in Porter'fe statement, at page 80, and it shows where these forces of his 
were jiosted. It is a disi)atch from AVarrenton Junction, August 26, 7 
J), m., to General Porter: 

Please move forward with Sykes' division to-morrow morning, through Fayettevillo, 
to a point within two and a half miles of the town of Warrenton, and take position 
where you can easily move to the front, with your right resting on the railroad. Call 
up Morell to join you as speedily as possible, leaving only small cavalry forces to 
watch the fords. If there are any troops below, coming uj), they should come np 
rapidly, leaving only a small rear guard at Rappahannock Station. You will find 
General Bauks at Fayetteville. I append below the position of our forces, as also 
those of the enemy. I do not see how a general engagement can be postponed more 
than a dav or two. 



96 

McDo-ivell with his own corps. Siiffl's and three hriijades of Reynolds' men, being^ 
about thirty-four thousand, are at and immediately in front of Warrenton ; Reno joins 
him on his riijlit and rear, with eiijht thousand men. at an early hour to-morrow ; C'ox^ 
with seven thousand men, will move forward to jnin him in The afternoon of To-mor- 
row; Banks witli six thousand is at FayetTeville ; .Stur^^is, about eight thousand strong, 
will move forward by day after to-morrow. 

There tliey were at 7 o'clock p. m. on the 20th of August, facing 
towards the Rappaliannock, facing the enemy. At 12 o'clock that night 
in a (li.spatch from General Pope to ^McDowell in hi.s official report, at 
page 234, we have this extraordinary state of things growing out of this 
policy of " looking before *' and not ''behind,*' and letting his lines of 
communications "take care of themselves." Jackson had, in fact, got 
through Thoroughfare Gap on the 2Gth, in the morning. That aj^pears 
in Jackson's report, printed m the Board Eecord, at page 522. He had 
gone perhaps twenty miles and struck, and Pope knew nothing of it 
until he was informed l)y report next morning, when his whole army was 
still "looking before" across the Eappahannock ; an<l Jackson, twenty- 
four hours previous, had slix»ped in behind him. This is dated August 
26, 1802, at midnight, just at the very moment, as I understand, that 
Jackson was striking in his rear upon the railroad, between him and 
Washington : 

Gen«'ral Sigel reports the enemy's rear ,>;Mard aT Orleans, to-night, with Ids main 
force encamped at White Plains. You will i>lease ascertain vmy early in The m<uiiiug 
whether this is so, and liave the whole of your command ready ; yon had best ascer- 
tain to-night, if you j)ossib1y can. Whether his wliole force, or the larger ])art of it, 
has gone around, is a question which we nnisT setTle instanTly, and no portion of his 
.force nuist march oi)j)osite to us to-night without our knowing if. I telegraithed you 
an hour ago what disposition I had made, sujtposing the advance through Thorough- 
fare Gap to be a. colunni of not more than ten or fifteen thousand men. If his wliole 
force, or the larger i>art of it, lias gone, we must know it at (uice. Tlie troops here 
have no artillery; and if the main forces of the enemy arc still opposite to y<ui, you 
must send forward to Greenwich, to be there to-morrow evening, with two liatteries 
of artillery, or three if you can get them, to meet Kearney. We must know at a very 
early hour in the morning, so as to determine our plans. 

JNO. POPE, 
M((jor-GciicraJ. 

Now, there is an illustration of leaving lines of retreat to take care of 
them.selves, and emphatic proof that <lisaster and shame lurked in the 
rear of this very movement. Stuart .struck at Catlett's Station on the 
night of the 2(>th, throwing everything into confusion, and at daybreak 
of the 27th Jackson's force cajitured Manassas, the base of su])plies, 
destroying" an immen.se quantity of st<n'es upon which the sustenance of 
Pope's army depended, and actually cutting off that army from commu- 
nication with the capital, which he Avas defending' by " laying off on the 
flanks of enemy." Tliis appears by Stuart's report in the Ijoard Eecord, 
at page r>2r>; and Trimble, Avho was in that attair. ]mts it at 12.30 a. m. 
on the night of the 20th and morning of the 27th. There was an illus- 
tration of the in^actical working of his ])]an of "looking before" and not 
" behind'' — of letting his lines <»f retreat and communication take care of 
themselves and of not caring anything about his bases of sui>plies. Then 
you have the illustration of the jnirsuit of .laclcson to Centreville when 
.Jackson was not at Centreville, and had not been there. Eeno and 
Jleintzelman were ord(ned to Centreville on the 2Sth and Porter on the 
2f)th. There was an instance of studying the probahU- lines of retreat of 
the em'my. I claim that all the fighting on the 2J)th ilhistrates his 
method of attacking' wherever he "could get an op]tortufiity to do .so," 
as he swore before Covode's committee that he intend«'d to <lo; and his 
insisting that the enemy were running away on the .'JOth, and attacking 
them as if they were, is a specimen of his policy of attacking under all 



97 

circuinstances and never standing on the defensive. Let me read you 
the evidence of General Patrick on the vsubject, at ])age 103, for it shows 
that this theory of attacking under all circumstances was carried out to 
the fuU. General Patrick found the enemy very speedily on that morn- 
ing and the nighi previous. 

I reporteil the condition of affairs, as tliey liad been during the niglit and as they 
then ap])eared, that the enemy had come down the road here about where they lay 
dnrin<i the night [noith of Young's Branch], and tliat they liad withdrawn to witliiii 
the woods here [near Ciroveton]. My recollection is that it came out farther than 
tliat; That is. that it continued nearer toward the pike and made something of au 
angle here. I reported that tlie wood was full of rebs. 

Question. On both sides of the pike? 

Answer. Yes; but mostly on the south side. I was there twice. I cannot say at 
which time this occurred. I should think, hoAvever, it wa.s the second time I was 
tliere. My instructions then were from General McDowell to go back. The conver- 
sation was between McDowell, Pope, and myself. 

Question. Yon had better state it as it was. 

Answer. Well, I cannot give the words. 

Question. No: the substance. 

Answer. The substance of it was, "Yon are mii-.taken. There is nobody in there of 
any consequence. They are merely stragglers." I gave the reasons, and I supposed, 
I believed, that there were heavy bodies in that wood; the fact that this column had 
come down in that way and must have fallen liack in that directiim, because otherwise 
Reynolds would have iuterti'red with them. The direction was to go back and feel of 
them — put ill my skirmishers on both sides of the road and see what there was there. 
As I got there some of Sigel's scouts, mounted, were there ; they went in, and before 
getting ui> to the wood anywhere from the edge of the wood there was a pretty strong 
fire fi-om what would seem to be a skirmish line poured out upon them, and they came 
riding back very hastily, and I remarked, "It was as I told you; the woods are full." 
In the mean time I was getting out the skirmishers to go forward, and I went up 
again to McDowell and Pope and I'eported this. I cannot say to which it was; they 
were both tf)gether, and one of them replied, "O, these Dutchmen are always seeing 
the enemy,"' referring to these scouts. "Now get off and get some coffee, and you will 
feel better natured, and then go back and throw out your skirmishers and pursue them 
with your whole command, for we can't affonl to let them escape. We have got to 
bag them." 

Question. Who said that f 

Answer. They both used the expression, but McDowell was the one who used it 
especially to me. 

Question. Did yon make any reply '? 

Answer. I think I asked him, "Which side of the bag will it be?" 

And in fact it proved to be the wrong side of the bag. 

Was not that an instance of attack, because he would never assume 
a defensive policy I Well, now, with these glimpses of the method of 
the campaign, let us coine to these telegrams that are so much com- 
plained of. At page Si appears a telegram of August 25. It will be 
rememliered that at that time General Porter was under General Mc- 
Clellan's direction. He telegraphs to Burnside, giving a full account 
of all that transpired: he was then in the advance proceeding up from 
the Rappahannock. 

To General Burxside : 

Have you received my dis]iatches indicating my movements to-morrow ? Y'ou know 
that Rappahannock Station is under lire from opposite hills, and the houses were de- 
stroyed l)y Pope. I do not like to direct movements on such uncertain data as that 
furnished" by General Halleck. I know he is misinformed of the location of some of the 
corps mentioned in Iiis dispatches. Reno has not been at Kelly's for three days, and 
there is (Uily a picket at Rappahannock Station ; and Kearney, not Banks, is at Bealeton. 
Reno and Reynolds are beyond my reach. I have directed Sykes to go to Rappa- 
hannock Station at tive to-nunrow, and will go there myself via Kelly's Ford. JJoes 
(lent-rnl McClellan approve f 

Now, what harm is there in that? McClellan was his superior com- 
mander. Was it wrong for him to seek to have the approval of Gen- 
eral McClellan? The next telegram that they complain of is that of 



98 

August 27, wlien General Porter had, as'we claim, voluutarily joined 
General Pope, and made himself a part of his army. But whether vol- 
untarily or not, it was the disconnectiug from one army and attaching 
to another; and the thing complained of is, that he asked General 
Burnside to inform General ]McClellan that he had done it; that he might 
know that he was doing right. Pie did not ask for any advice from Mc- 
Clellan; he had no communication from or with McOlellan; and it seems 
to me that, as a wise soldier, he informed General McClellan, so that he. 
Porter, might know that 3IcClellan was informed that he was with Pope, 
and looking no further to JVIcClellau for orders. Is not that the fair 
construction of this dispatch ? Let me read it: 

From Advaxck, 11.45 j). m., August 26. Received August 27, 18G3. 
Major-Gcneral Bukxside : 

Have just received orders from General Pope to move Sykes to-morrow to within 
two miles of Warrenton, and to call up Morell to same point, leaving tlie fords guarded 
l)y the cavalry. 

You see the vigilance which all these telegrams display, notwithstand- 
ing they contain these objectionable passages. 

He says the troops in rear should he hrought up as rapidly as possible, leaving only 
a small rear guard at Rappahannock Station ; and that he cannot see how a general 
engagement can he i)nt oft' more than a day or two. I shall move up as ordered, hut 
the want of grain and the necessity of receiving a supply of subsistence will cause 
some delay. Please h<isten back Ihe ivayons sent down, and inform McCleUan, that I may 
know I am. doing right. 

jS^ow, what harm there is in a commander of a corps departing from 
one army and coming, whether by orders from Washington or by his 
own voluntary act, to constitute a part of a co-operating army, sending 
back word that he had done so for the information of his former com- 
mander, nobody has yet undertaken to explain. They said it was looking 
to McClellan. Well, were not those circumstances under which it was 
proper for him to look to McClellan for the purpose I have indicated ? 

The next complaint is in regard to a telegram of August 27, from War- 
renton Junction. Now we are coming to the time when General Porter, 
having a clearer insight as to what was going on, and of the metliod in 
which the campaign was being conducted, could not help expressing his 
natural instincts, as it seems to me, as a soldier, and he in<lulged in a 
little criticism upon the ])erformances which were so startling and so 
different from the theories of war upon whiclv, I su])pose, he had been 
educated. At page 88 of the statement this disi)atch inclosed an order 
from General Pope, which I will presently refer to; but this is what is 
complained of: 

Waukkxtox, 27tii — p. ni. 
To General BuiiXsiOK : 

Morell left his medicine, ammunition, and baggage at Kelly's Ford : can you have it 
hauled to Fredericks) mrg and stored ? 

General Porter was looking all this time to General Burnside for sup- 
plies : 

His wagons were all sent to you for grain and aiumujiition.- I have sent back to 
you every nmu of the First and .Sixth New York Cavalry, excej)! what has been sent 
to Gainesville. I will get them to you after a while. ^ Ecei-ything here iv at sixes and 
sevens, and I find I am to take care of mi/sclf in erer;/ respect. Oukijxk ok communi- 
cation HAS TAKEN CAKE OF ITSKI.F, IX coMl'i.iAXCK WITH OHDEUs. The ariuv has not 
three days' i)rovisions. The enemy captured all Pope's and other clothing ;' and from 
McDowell the same, inclndine/ H(2nors. 

Now, what does he refer to there I Is it not absolutely true ? What 
had happened f Jackson had got in behind Pope while Pope was look- 



99 

iiig out for liiiii at the front, and while <li>saster and shame Avere tlms 
hirking in the rear; there they were, Stuart at Oatlett's Station, in tlic 
shape of disaster, and Jackson, as shame, at Manassas. Evervthiiii;- 
was at " sixes and sevens." Had not the commanding general \no- 
claimed that he was going to act on the understandiilg that lines of 
communication and retreat should take care of themselves, that he Avould 
not take care of them, and that his subordinate commanders should 
not take care of them I This was one of the results of his novel policy. 
Was it criminal ? Was it more than human for General Porter, in writ- 
ing to General Burnside, \vith whom his communication was lawful — 
communicating, if yon please, with the President, who was the superior 
of Pope — to indulge in this irresistible and spontaneous criticism uj^on 
the results of this novel metliod of warfare, which had here for the tirst 
time l)een inaugurated and so forcibly illustrated f You observe Gen- 
ei-al Pope's very words in his proclamation are the words that Porter 
uses in this dispatch. 

The next one that they complain of is that of August 27, 4 p. m., on 
page 8t) of the statement : 

I send you the last order from General Pope, wliicli indieates the future as well as 
the present. Wagons are rolling- along rapi<lly to the rear, as if a mighty power was 
propelling them. I see no cause of alarm, though this may cause it. 

That referred to the w^agons by the thousand that were pouring on 
towards Alexandria, rolling night and day over those roads, esi)ecially 
that road from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe, which we have so care- 
fully examined. Had he any authority for the statement? This order 
from General Pope, which it transmitted, contained the very facts upon 
which he was commenting. Let me read it. Here is the order from 
General Pope, directing the flight of all wagons and of all trains towards 
Alexandria : 

Hkad'.juarters of Army of Virginia, 

Warrenton Junction, August 27th, 186*2. 

Major-General Banks, as soon as he arrives at Warrenton Junction, will assume the 
charge of the trains, and cover their movement towards Manassas Junction. The 
train of his own corps, under escort of two regiments of infantry and a battery of 
artillery, will pursue the road south of the railroad, which conducts into the rear of 
Manassas Junction. As soon as the trains have passed Warrenton Junction he will 
take post behind Cedar Run, covering the fords and bridges of that stream, and hold- 
ing the position as long as possible. He will cause all the railroad trains to be loaded 
with the public ami private stores now here, and run them back towards Manassas 
Junction as far as the railroad is practicable. Wherever a bridge is burned, so as to 
impede the further passage of the railroad trains, he will assemljle them all as near 
together as possible, and protect them with his connnand until the bridges are rebuilt. 
If the enemy is too strong before him, before the bridges can be repaired, he will be 
careful to destroy entirely the train, locomotives, and stores, before he falls back iu 
the direction of Manassas Junction. 

TMs was an order for a precipitate and universal flight in the direc- 
tion of Alexandria of all wagon trains. It was the execution of that 
order that blocked \\\) the road on the night of the 27th, so that General 
Porter, up to three o'clock, could not move. Now, was it a serious or 
wicked criticism for General Porter, writing as he was this message to 
Burnside, to say : 

Wagons are rolliiig along rapi<lly to the rear as if a mighty power was propelling 
them. I see no cause of alarm, though this may cause it. 

This, also, is seriously complained of in the same telegram : 

I found a vast difference between these troops and ours ; but I suppose they were 
new, as to-day they burned their clothes, &c., when there was not the least cause. I 

8CH 



100 

hear tliat they are mucli demoralizcil, aud needed some oood troops to give them 
heart and, I think, head. We are working now to get behind Bnll Run, and I pre- 
sume will be there in a few days, if strategy don't use ns np. 

How true tliat was! How proplietic! Strategy did use them up, 
and those that were not used up did upon the night of the 30th quietly 
withdraw behind Bull Run and take their places in safety on the 
heights of (Jentreville. 

The strategy is magnificent, and tactics in the inverse proportion. I wouhl like some 
of my ambulances. I would like also to be ordered to return to Fredericksburg, to 
push toward Hanover, or, with a larger force, to pusii towards Orange Court-House. 

Now, what does that mean '? A suggestion of what I have heard 
military men say ,was, even in the then wretched situation, a wise expe- 
dient. What was it ? To strike behind Lee, at his liues of commuuica- 
tiou, and compel his instantaneous retreat. If that had been done, all 
this useless slaughter of the 29th and 30th would have been avoided. 
That was Porter's suggestion, of which they complained. That was his 
his idea of getting away and doing something; of dealing an effectual 
blow at the enemy, with whom they were all contending. 

I do not doubt the enemy have a large amount of supplies provided for them, and I 
believe tliey have a contempt for the Army of Virginia. 

Do you not believe it ? What else but such a sentiment could have 
inspired Jackson to make that dash through Thoroughfare Gap, and 
put himself in the trap in which he did put himself, surrounded by the 
Army of Virginia ? Facts are to be looked at in analyzing this case, 
now that the passions of the war are over. Is it not true ? What but 
that very sentiment could have brought Jackson in there ? Will any 
military man say that if he ha<l not entertained such a sentiment he 
would have dared to do so ? He had read Pope's i)roclamation — to him 
a lu'oclamation as well as to Pope's own army — which notified him that 
Poi)e was not going to look behind him, nor at his base of su])plies; 
that he was to look before and not behind, because disaster and shame 
lurked in the rear. He knew that there was a great supi)ly depot at 
Manassas, and in he went, in obedience to General Pope's invitation, 
and destroyed it utterly. 

I wish myself away from it, with all our old Army of the Potouiac, and so do our 
companions. 

What does that mean ? Has he not suggested what he meant, that 
lie would lilvc to be ordered to make a strike in Lee's rear ? 

I would like also to be ordered to return to Fredericksl)urg, to push towards Hano- 
ver, or, with a larger force, to push towards Orange Court House. I wish 8umuer was 
at Wasluugton, and u]) near tlie Monocacy, witli good batteries. I do not doubt the 
enemy have a large amount of supplies provided for them, and I believe they have a 
contempt tor the Army of Virginia. I wish myself away from it, with all our old 
Army of the Potomac, and so do our comj)anions. I was informed to-day by the best 
authority that, in opposition to Gcnieral Pope's views, this army Avas i>uslied out to 
save the Army of the I'otoniac, an ariuy tliat could take care of itself. Poite says lie 
long since wanted to go heiiiud tlie Occorpian. I am in great need of the ambulances, 
iiwA the ot'licers need medicines, whicli, for want of trans[)ortatiou, were left bi^hind. 
I hear many of the sick of our corps are in liouses by the road — very sick, I think. 
There is no fear of an enemy crossing the Kai)]i.ilinniiock. The cavalry arc all in the 
advance of the rebel army. At Kelly's and ISariiett's Fords much pioperty was left, 
in conse(iuen<-e of the wagons going down for grain, Ac. If you can push up the grain 
to-night, please <lo so, direct to this place. There is no grain here or anywhere, and 
this army is wretchedly snpjjlied in that line. Pope says he never could get enough. 
Most of this is private, but if you can get me away, ^ilease (Jo so. 

What does he refer to '! Has he not stated what it referred to f Has 
he not laid out principles of counter-attack, which, if acted upon, would 
have a\oided the partial destruction of this army ? 



101 

Well, what is the next tliat is complained of! It is tlie dispatcli of 
August 28, 9.30 a. m., at Bristoe. 
I hope all ones well near Washmgtoii. 

:n^ow, McClellau was back, near Wasliington. 

I Tliiuk there need be no canseof fear for us. I feel as if on my own way now, and 
thus far have ke^it my command and trains well up. More sn])plies than I supposed 
on hand have l)e(>u 1 nought, but none to spare, and we nuist mai<e connection soon. 
I hope for the best, and my lucky star is always up about my Inrthday, the 31st, and 
hope Me's is up also. You will hear of ns sooii by way of Alexandria." 

That is complained of as a very contemj^tuous reference to the move- 
ments of the army. " You will hear of us soon by way of Alexandria." 
1 want, in that connection, to read to you a jiassage from General Pope's 
report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, at page 172, con- 
taining, as it seems to me, a passage bearing on this. Three years after- 
wards, when his i)assions were somewhat cooled, and he had got over 
the excitement of the cami)aign, at least, he malvcs this confession, 
giving an account of this campaign of the Army of A^irginia : 

At no tinie could I have lioped to tight a successful battle with the innneusely su- 
perior force of the army which confronted me, and which was able at any time to out- 
flank me, and bear my little army to the dust. 

Is not that an extraordinary statement after all the boasting j)rocla- 
nuitions of the campaign? This is a cool statement of fact three years 
afterwards. Of course, he knew, and everybody knew, that he might be 
looked for, as is here stated by Porter, and as tlie fact turns out, by way 
of Alexandria. What else could possibly be hoped for in the situation, 
as it was on the morning of the 28th"? Then they complain of this: 

All that talk about bagging Jackson, &c., was bosh. 

Well, it had so turned out, had it not? 

That enormous gap — Manassas — was left open and the enemy Jumped through ; and 
the story of McDowell having cut off Longstreet had no good foundation. The enemy 
have destroyed all our bridges, burnt trains, &c., and made this army rush back to 
look at its line of communication, and find us bare of subsistence. We are far from 
Alexandria, considering the nu>ans of transportation. Your supply trainof forty wagons 
is here, but I can't find them. There is a rejiort that Jackson is at Centreville, which 
you can believe or not. 

There is a sneer in that. But is it not justified ? This was at Manas- 
sas, at 2 p. m. of the 28th. The next morning the raid by Longstreet, 
Avho was cut off, took place. It shows that General I'oi'ter's sagacity 
and soldierly instinct led him to see, and foresee, the situation in a clear 
manner, the information of which, to the government, was of the 
greatest utility. Again is his dispatch of G a. m., on the 29th, at 
Bristoe : 

I shall be off in half an hour. The messenger Avho brought this says the enemy had 
been at Centreville, and pickets were found there last night. 

Sigel had severe hght last night ; took many inisoners ; Banks is at WaiTenton 
Junction ; McDoAvell near Gainesville ; Heintzelnian and Reno at Centreville, where 
tliey marched yesterday, and Pope went to Centreville with the last two as a body- 
guard. 

There is the only personal reflection that I can find in these dispatches. 
It seems to me to be ver^' liarndess and innocent. 

At the time, not knowing where was the enemy, and when Sigel Avas figLtiug within 
eight miles of him, and in sight. Comment is unnecessary. 

The enormous trains are still rolling on, many animals are not being watered for 
fifty hoiirs; I shall be out of provisions to-morrow night ; your train of forty wagons 
cannot be found. 

I hope Mac's at work, and we will soon get ordered out of this. It would seem 
from proper statements of the enemy that he was wandering around loose ; but I 
expect they know what they are doing, which is more than any one here or anywhere 
knows. 



102 

Is tliat not true ? "What had ju8t happened ? What was true tliat 
morning f What is sworn to by General McDowell as being true during 
all that canii)aign from the 12th, when he went to joiu General Pope, up 
to the UUth, when this dispatch was written ? General McDowell swore 
before you at Governor's Island that on all these days, Irom August 12 to 
August 29, he and General Pope were hunting for each other a good 
deal. Now, does not that justify this observation, that knowhig what 
other i)eople are doing is "more than any one here knows"? This was 
written at the Aciy time when ]McDom ell was taking his famous ride, 
Avhen J*ope himself was saying, "' I Inive not been al)le to tind out any- 
thing al)out ]\rcDowell for a long time, or until a late hour this morning." 

I submit that at this late day, when we look at these things coolly and 
dispassionately, there was no wickedness, no malice, no evil animus in 
these disi>atches. They were almost irresistibly' i)rompted and called 
forth by the extraordinary situation ; they were confidential to Bnrnside 
and the President. General Burnside testified that it never occurred to 
him that General Porter in Avriting them had any evil motive or pur- 
])ose towards General Pope ; he oid;\' thought that it showed that General 
Porter felt about the commanding general as everybody else did, a cer- 
tain distrust in consequence of his new methods of Avarfare ])ractically 
carried out. It is stated in the statement, and it may not be improi)er 
to repeat it here, that the President thanked General Porter personally 
for those very telegrams on the battlefield at Antietam, Avhere lie met 
him. Now, Ave say that if you want to find General Porter's aniuuis in 
these disi)atches you must find it in what he Avas doing at this time, as 
cA'idenced by the dispatches, working to his utmost, night and day, press- 
ing forAvard with irresistible A'igor, as it seems, and with a wise ai)i)lica- 
tion of Avhat he knew of the rules of war. HoAVCAcr he may liaAC felt about 
General Pope, these A^ery telegrams demonstrate that all the time he did his 
Avhole duty. What more is Avanted ? Did not the authorities at AVash- 
ington think so ? Why was it that the Aveek after they put him in com- 
mand of JS,000 troops in the defense of the fortifications at Washington ? 
AVhy was it that thej' left him in commaiul afterwards during the great 
battle of Antietam, and only checked his course when they were pursu- 
ing the enemy after Antietam down toAvards Fredericksburg ? Those are 
(piestions that are very hard to answer. 1 do not Avish to discuss this ques- 
tion of animus further. I only want to say that actions, as the Pecorder 
.says, s])eak louder than Avords, and if you want Porter's animus you nrnst 
find it in the Avhole history of his life; you must find it in all his record 
from the time he left this Academy, all through the war Avith Mexico, 
U])on the Peninsula, Avhere he achieved great and glorious deeds ; y(m 
must lind it in that day of the oOth ; yes, and in this day of the 2i)th, 
Avhich is among his i»roudest, and Avill stand in history as one of his 
Avisest and l)esf dnys. 

Li closing this case, I nnist refer, by way of general obserxation, to 
certain evidence that has been introduced unnecessarily, as it seems to 
]ne. The facts nol)ody can couq)lain of; but Avhen it conu's down to 
small scandals, is it not better to reject them, as Judge-Advocate Holt 
rejected them — this evidence of Lord and Ormsby, and their absurd 
stories of Avhat they say took place in General Porter's (juarfers in 
AVashington during his trial there? There he Avas one day in great ex- 
citement coming in from the trial. Do you doubt, on Avhat you knoAv 
noAv, that he had cause for immense excitement t He is a very cool 
man, but do you question that his blood nnist have been uj) and that all 
there Avas in him of indignation and rage Avas stirred to its utmost 
depths? They said that they heard him say, "I Avar'n't loyal to Pope. 



103 

I was loyal to McClellaii." Well, what was that? Was it addressed to 
them I No; it was an exclamation, excited and wratlifnl. AVhat did it 
mean? Bid it not mean simply an ontlneak of wrath, that he conhl 
not contain, at sonu^hin^- that had been said or done at the court-martial 
that was trying him that day ? Instead of l)ein8- a statement, a propo- 
sition, an admission, a confession, as it is claimed, it was a wrathful re- 
pudiation of the idea, and is inca] table of any other construction. I will 
luit dwell upon that. The Judge- Advocate rejected it. Lord and Ormsby 
swore each other to secrecy, and then ran and told the Judge- Advocate, 
and he treated it with the contempt that it deserved. Yet that which 
could not be used in the days of the heat and passion of war is brought 
in here to serve a certain i)urpose, in this era of peace and good-vidll. 
Then, what do you think of Dr. Faxon's story? Was it necessary to 
bring in these absurdities? Dr. Faxon, who liad heard that there was 
a charge against General Porter of being dilatory on the march from 
Warrenton Junction to Bristoe, comes and testifier that as he was niarch- 
ing along with his regiment, going through Bristoe, at two o'clock in the 
afternoon, he passed where General Porter was standing at his head- 
quarters with some gentlemen, one hundred feet off, and although his 
regiment did not stop, although they went tramping along on the road, 
he" heard General Porter say to one of his aides that he "didn't care a 
damn if they didn't get there." But they had got to Bristoe already; 
it was beyond Bristoe, at two o'clock, where General Porter had ar- 
rived at eight in the morning, that this took ]dace. I think that doctor 
had better have been left in charge of his patients in Massachusetts. 
Then, what do you think of John Bond? He was sent to carry rations 
up the Sudley road on the afternoon of the 20th, and he saAv a nuin Avho 
sonu4iody told him was General Porter, and General Porter asked him 
how the battle goes, and he made an explanation of how the battle went, 
lie described General Porter's person, that he had a moustache and no 
beard, that he had a hat and a major-general's uniform; but it turns 
out that he had a cap and a full beard, and no major-general's uniform 
at all. Now, might not John Bond have better been left carrying rations 
to the end of his days than to have been called here ? And Bowers, the 
scout. The learned Kecorder tries to find points of distinction between 
a scout and a spy. Well, Bowers Avas at headquarters one day when 
General Porter was surrounded l)y his staft". Porter says, " General Pope 
is coming through this counnaiul this afternoon, and I don't want any 
attention paid to him" — absolutely denied by all the survivors of his 
start". AVas there ever any nu:>re ridiculous stuff than that sought to be 
imported into a serious controversy ? I suppose that all these witnesses 
are absolutely worthless in every point of ^iew. 

And now, if the Board please, enough has been said. 

The fate of the petitioner is in your hands. His sufferings under this 
sentence for the last sixteen years have been ])eculiar, unlike those that 
any other general or soldier has ever sustained. I do not ])ropose to de- 
pict them ; they cannot be exaggerated by any language. Only eminent 
soldiers, such as compose this Board, can fully realize and appreciate 
them. He is not the only person who now stamls awaiting your judg- 
ment ; not only he, but liis family and his comrades in arms, that glo- 
rious Fifth Army Corps, which never yet met without reaftirming 
their tiiith in his innocence, the whole Army, as I believe, and every 
faithful man who has ever been connected with it stands expecting 
and hoping for the restoration of his good name and fame; because, it 
is not his good name and tVnue only that is concerned, but the Army's 
and the country's. I believe that this nation is too great, that it is too 



104 

magiianiuious, to snfl'er the coiitiiuiation of such a wrong when once 
it has been ascertained. If the exigences of those times required that 
this slianie and contumely shoukl be borne by him during all this inter- 
A'al, his patriotism and his loyalty have stood the test. Nobody has 
ever heard a Axhisper or a murmur against his country, or its cause, from 
liim. He has always been faithful. He knew, or hoped he knew that 
time would bring his relief. There were historical instances which 
Avould justify the hope. There was the case of brave old Admiral Coch- 
rane, Earl of Dundonald, who suffered a similar but by no means equal 
ignominy, convicted of a crime of wliich he was wholly ignorant and inno- 
cent, in 1814; aiul he had to live until 183-? before the brand of intiimy was 
taken from him. But the British nation was magiumimous, and restored 
him at last to all the honors and titles of which he had been unjustly de- 
l)ri\'ed. If any such indirect puii)ose as I have refei'red to nuide Por- 
ter's punislnnent and humiliation necessary ; if he was a sacrilice to dis- 
cipline, has it ]U)t answered its purpose t If it was necessary to strike 
down an innocent man to enforce discipline upon susiiected men in the 
Army of tlie Potomac, has it not done its work ? Look at them under 
all commanders, before and certainly afterwards — look at them from An- 
tietam to the last struggles in the Wilderness, under the successive com- 
mands of McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, Meade, and Grant. ^Mlen, any- 
Avhere, did a man of them fail to do his whole duty ? 

We think the time has come at last for this gross wrong to the pe- 
titioner to be righted. He has looked for it hopefully and faithfully for 
the last sixteen years. He has looked for it because he was sure of his 
innocence, because he had absolute faith in his cause, faith in his coun- 
try, faith in justice, faith in God. The question now is, whether God 
and justice and country shall all forsake him. AVe have no fears. We 
leave the result contidently with you. It seems to me that the time and 
place are both propitious for his A'indication. In ten days more will be 
the anniversary of his humiliation. Here, where his military life began, 
is the place where his star should be lestored to its true and native lus- 
ter, and so in his name, and the name of the brave army corps which he 
commanded, in the name of the Army which he did his best to honor, in 
the nauu; of truth insulted, and of justice outraged, we demand for the 
petitioner full and complete reparation. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

Mil! 

'0013 702 920 01 



